

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION**

In Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P § Case No. **19-34054-SGJ11**

Charitable DAF Fund, L.P et al

Appellant

§

vs.

§

21-03067

Highland Capital Management, L.P

§

Appellee

§

3:23-CV-01503-B

[167] Order granting Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (related document # [122](#)) Entered on 6/25/2023.

Volume 18

APPELLANT RECORD

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and CLO Holdco, Ltd.*

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

| | |
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| In re: | § Chapter 11 |
| | § |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., | § Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 |
| | § |
| Debtor. | § |
| | § |
| CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P. AND CLO | § |
| HOLDCO, LTD., DIRECTLY AND DERIVATIVELY | § |
| | § |
| Plaintiffs, | § Adversary Proceeding No. |
| | § |
| vs. | § 21-03067-sgj11 |
| | § |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., | § |
| HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD., AND | § |
| HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING LTD., NOMINALLY | § |
| | § |
| Defendant. | § |
| | § |

INDEX

**APPELLANTS' SECOND AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL**

Pursuant to Rules 8009(a)(1)(A)-(B) and (a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. and CLO Holdco, Ltd. ("Appellants") hereby designate the following items to be included in the record and identify the following issues with respect to

their appeal of the Order Granting Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s "Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint" [Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 122] which was entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 25, 2023.

I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

- Whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to rule on Highland Capital Management L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint
- Whether the Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint was improperly granted

II. DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD

Vol. 1
000001

1. Notice of Appeal for Bankruptcy Case Adversary Proceeding No. 21-03067-sgj11 [Doc. 168].

000042

2. The judgment, order, or decree appealed from: Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s "Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint" [Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 122] [Doc. 167].

000080

3. Docket Sheet kept by the Bankruptcy Clerk.

4. Documents listed below and as described in the Docket Sheet for Bankruptcy Case Proceeding No. 21-03067-sgj.

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| No. | Date Filed | Docket No. | Description/Document Text |
|-----|------------|------------|--|
| 1 | 9/29/21 | 1 | (36 pgs; 3 docs) Adversary case 21-03067. ORDER REFERRING CASE NUMBER 21-CV-0842-B from U.S District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division to U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. Complaint by Charitable DAF Fund, LP, CLO Holdco, Ltd. against Highland Capital Management, LP, Highland HCF Advisor Ltd., Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. Fee Amount \$350 (Attachments: # 1 Original Complaint # 2 Docket Sheet from 3:20-cv-0842-B) Nature(s) of suit: 02 (Other (e.g. other actions that would have been brought in state court if unrelated to bankruptcy)). (Okafor, M.) |
| 2 | 9/29/21 | 2 | (1 pg) Supplemental Document (cover sheet) by CLO Holdco Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund (RE: related document(s)1 Adversary case 21-03067) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #2 ON 04/13/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |

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| Vol. 2 000139 000232 000239 000270 Thru Vol. 6 | 3 | 9/29/21 | 6 | (93 pgs; 6 docs) MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint filed by CLO Holdco Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund LP (Attachments: # 1 Exh 1_First Amended Complaint # 2 Exh 2_Motion for Authorization to Retain James Seery # 3 Exh 3_Order Approving Retention of James Seery # 4 Exh 4_Order Approving Settlement # 5 Proposed Order) (Bridges, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/19/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #6 ON 04/19/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| | 4 | 9/29/21 | 22 | (7 pgs; 2 docs) MOTION for an Order to Enforce the Order of Reference filed by Highland Capital Management LP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A--Proposed Order) (Annable, Zachery) Modified text on 5/20/2021 (mjr). (Entered: 05/19/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #22 ON 05/19/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| | 5 | 9/29/21 | 23 | (31 pgs) Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Highland Capital Management LP re: 22 MOTION for an Order to Enforce the Order of Reference. (Annable, Zachery) Modified text on 5/20/2021 (mjr).(Entered: 05/19/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #23 ON 05/19/2021 IN U.S.DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| | 6 | 9/29/21 | 24 | (926 pgs; 29 docs) Appendix in Support filed by Highland Capital Management LP re: 23 Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1 # 2 Appendix 2 # 3 Appendix 3 # 4 Appendix 4 # 5 Appendix 5 # 6 Appendix 6 # 7 Appendix 7 # 8 Appendix 8 # 9 Appendix 9 # 10 Appendix10 # 11 Appendix 11 # 12 Appendix 12 # 13 Appendix 13 # 14 Appendix 14 # 15 Appendix 15 # 16 Appendix 16 # 17 Appendix 17 # 18 Appendix 18 # 19 Appendix 19 # 20 Appendix 20 # 21 Appendix 21# 22 Appendix 22 # 23 Appendix 23 # 24 Appendix 24 # 25 Appendix 25 # 26 Appendix 26 # 27 Appendix 27 # 28 Appendix 28) (Annable, Zachery) Modified linkage and text on 5/20/2021 (mjr). (Entered:05/19/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #24 ON 05/19/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| Vol. 7 001196 | 7 | 9/29/21 | 26 | (7 pgs; 2 docs) MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by Highland Capital Management LP (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A--Proposed Order) (Annable, Zachery) Modified text on 5/28/2021 (jmg).(Entered: 05/27/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #26 ON 05/27/2021 IN U.S.DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |

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| Vol. 7 001203 thru Vol 8 | 8 | 9/29/21 | 28 | (508 pgs; 14 docs) Appendix in Support filed by Highland Capital Management LP (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1 # 2 Appendix 2 # 3 Appendix 3 # 4 Appendix 4 # 5 Appendix 5 # 6 Appendix 6 # 7 Appendix 7 # 8 Appendix 8 # 9 Appendix 9 # 10 Appendix 10 # 11 Appendix 11 # 12 Appendix 12 # 13 Appendix 13) (Annable, Zachery) (Entered: 05/27/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #28 ON 05/27/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| Vol. 9 001711 | 9 | 9/29/21 | 33 | (1 pg) Amended Civil Cover Sheet by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP. Amendment to 2 Supplemental Document. (Sbaiti, Mazin) Modified text on 6/23/2021 (mjr). (Entered: 06/22/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #33 ON 06/22/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001712 | 10 | 9/29/21 | 36 | (26 pgs) RESPONSE filed by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP re: 22 MOTION for an Order to Enforce the Order of Reference (Sbaiti, Mazin) (Entered: 06/29/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #36 ON 06/29/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001738 | 11 | 9/29/21 | 37 | (22 pgs) Appendix in Support filed by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP re 36 Response/Objection Response to Motion for an Order to Enforce the Order of Reference (Sbaiti, Mazin) (Entered: 06/29/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #37 ON 06/29/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001760 | 12 | 9/29/21 | 38 | (45 pgs) RESPONSE filed by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP re: 26 MOTION to Dismiss (Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint) (Sbaiti, Mazin) (Entered: 06/29/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #38 ON 06/29/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001805 | 13 | 9/29/21 | 39 | (88 pgs) Appendix in Support filed by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP re 38 Response/Objection to Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Sbaiti, Mazin) (Entered: 06/29/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #39 ON 06/29/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001893 | 14 | 9/29/21 | 42 | (12 pgs) REPLY filed by Highland Capital Management LP re: 22 MOTION for an Order to Enforce the Order of Reference (Annable, Zachery) (Entered: 07/13/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842AS #42 ON 07/13/2021 IN U.S. |

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|------------------------|----|---------|---|
| | | | DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| VOL. 9 | 15 | 9/29/21 | 43 (852 pgs) Appendix in Support filed by Highland Capital Management LP re: 42 Reply. (Annable, Zachery) Modified text on 7/14/2021 (mjr). (Entered: 07/13/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842AS #43 ON 07/13/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 001905 thru Vol. 13 | 16 | 9/29/21 | 45 (21 pgs) REPLY filed by Highland Capital Management LP re: 26 MOTION to Dismiss (Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint) (Annable, Zachery) (Entered: 07/13/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #44 ON 07/13/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 002757 | 17 | 9/29/21 | 57 (7 pgs; 2 docs) MOTION to Dismiss and Joinder in Motion to Dismiss of Highland Capital Management, L.P. filed by Highland CLO Funding Ltd. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) Attorney Paul R Bessette added to party Highland CLO Funding Ltd (pty:dft) (Bessette, Paul) (Entered: 08/30/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #57 ON 08/30/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 002778 | 18 | 9/29/23 | 58 (12 pgs) Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Highland CLO Funding Ltd. re 57 MOTION to Dismiss and Joinder in Motion to Dismiss of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Bessette, Paul) (Entered: 08/30/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #58 ON 08/30/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 002785 | 19 | 9/29/23 | 59 (80 pgs; 5 docs) Appendix in Support filed by Highland CLO Funding Ltd re 58 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A - Jackson v Dear # 2 Exhibit(s) B - Prudential Assurance v. Newman # 3 Exhibit(s) C - Harbourvest Settlement Agreement # 4 Exhibit(s) D - Boleat Declaration) (Bessette, Paul) (Entered: 08/30/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #59 ON 08/30/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| 002797 | 20 | 9/29/21 | 64 (1 pg) ORDER OF REFERENCE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and this District's Miscellaneous Order No. 33, this case is hereby REFERRED to Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, to be adjudicated as a matter related to the consolidated Chapter 11 Bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P., Chapter 11 Case No.19-34054. (Ordered by Judge Jane J. Boyle |
| 002877 | | | |

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| Vol. 14 002878 002883 thru Vol. 16 | | | | on 9/20/2021) (svc) (Entered: 09/20/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #64 ON 09/20/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.) |
| | 21 | 10/19/21 | 66 | (5 pgs) Notice of hearing filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 26 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP, 47 Motion to strike document filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd., 55 Motion to abate filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.) Hearing to be held on 11/23/2021 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 26 and for 47 and for 55, (Annable, Zachery) |
| | 22 | 11/22/21 | 71 | (509 pgs; 2 docs) Witness and Exhibit List <i>for Hearing on November 23, 2021</i> filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 26 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1-13) (Hayward, Melissa) |
| Vol. 17 003392 003394 003583 003585 003611 | 23 | 11/22/21 | 72 | (2 pgs) Witness List filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 26 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding, 47 Motion to strike (related document(s): 43 Document), 55 Motion to abate (related document(s) 1 Complaint), 69 Motion to abate <i>Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Stay All Proceedings</i> (related document(s) 55 Motion to abate (related document(s) 1 Complaint))). (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| | 24 | 11/22/21 | 73 | (189 pgs; 4 docs) Exhibit List <i>for November 23, 2021 hearing</i> filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 47 Motion to strike (related document(s): 43 Document), 55 Motion to abate (related document(s) 1 Complaint)). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1_Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration # 2 Exhibit 2_Highland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss # 3 Exhibit 3_Order (I) Confirming Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland) (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| | 25 | 12/7/21 | 80 | (2 pgs) Order granting Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.'s motion to dismiss adversary as a party with prejudice (related document 57) Entered on 12/7/2021. (Okafor, Marcey) Modified text on 3/11/2022 (Okafor, Marcey). |
| | 26 | 3/11/22 | 99 | (26 pgs) Memorandum of Opinion and order granting motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding (RE: related document(s) 26 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP). Entered on 3/11/2022 (Okafor, Marcey) |
| | 27 | 3/11/22 | 100 | (26 pgs) Order granting motion to dismiss adversary proceeding with prejudice (related document #26) Entered on 3/11/2022. (Okafor, Marcey) |

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| Vol. 18 003637 | 28 | 3/21/22 | 104 | (29 pgs) Notice of appeal. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 100 Order on motion to dismiss adversary proceeding). Appellant Designation due by 04/4/2022. (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| 003666 | 29 | 5/26/22 | 120 | (177 pgs; 2 docs) Support/supplemental document <i>Motion to Supplement Appellate Record</i> filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 111 Appellant designation). (Attachments: # 1 Amended Transcript of January 14, 2021 Hearing) (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| 003843 | 30 | 6/9/22 | 121 | (1 pg) DISTRICT COURT Order: Case 3:22-00695-B is hereby transferred to the docket of the Honorable Judge Jane J. Boyle for consolidation with The Charitable DAF Fund LP, et al. v. Highland Capital Management LP, Case No. 3:21-cv-3129-N. Judge Karen Gren Scholer no longer assigned to case.(RE: related document(s) 86 Notice of appeal filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd., 104 Notice of appeal filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.). Entered on 6/9/2022 (Whitaker, Sheniqua) (Entered: 06/10/2022) |
| 003844 | 31 | 10/24/22 | 122 | (7 pgs) Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (Annable, Zachery) |
| 003851 | 32 | 10/14/22 | 123 | (31 pgs) Brief in support filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>)). (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 19 003882 Thru Vol 20 | 33 | 10/14/22 | 124 | (513 pgs; 15 docs) Support/supplemental document (<i>Appendix in Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>)). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 # 2 Exhibit 2 # 3 Exhibit 3 # 4 Exhibit 4 # 5 Exhibit 5 # 6 Exhibit 6 # 7 Exhibit 7 # 8 Exhibit 8 # 9 Exhibit 9 # 10 Exhibit 10 # 11 Exhibit 11 # 12 Exhibit 12 # 13 Exhibit 13 # 14 Exhibit 14) (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 21 004395 | 34 | 10/27/22 | 126 | (5 pgs) Notice of hearing (<i>Notice of Hearing and Briefing Schedule on Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP). Hearing to be held on 12/8/2022 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 122. (Annable, Zachery) |

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| Vol. 21 004400 004410 004442 Thru Vol. 22 | 35 | 11/18/22 | 128 | (10 pgs) Motion for withdrawal of reference. Fee amount \$188, filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| | 36 | 11/18/22 | 129 | (32 pgs) Response opposed to (related document(s): 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP) filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP. (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| | 37 | 11/18/22 | 130 | (254 pgs; 2 docs) Response opposed to (related document(s): 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP) filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix) (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| Vol. 22 004696 004717 004732 004737 004742 | 38 | 9/2/22 | 131 | (21 pgs) DISTRICT COURT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court REVERSES and REMANDS the bankruptcy court's Motion to Dismiss Order and AFFIRMS the bankruptcy courts Motion to Stay Order. re: appeal on Civil Action number: Case 3:22-00695-B consolidated with 3:21-CV-3129-B, (RE: related document(s) 81 Order on motion to abate, 100 Order on motion to dismiss adversary proceeding). Entered on 9/2/2022 (Whitaker, Sheniqua) (Entered: 11/29/2022) |
| | 39 | 12/2/22 | 133 | (15 pgs) Reply to (related document(s): 129 Response filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd., 130 Response filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP. (Annable, Zachery) |
| | 40 | 12/7/22 | 135 | (5 pgs) Notice of hearing filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP). Hearing to be held on 1/25/2023 at 01:30 PM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 122, (Annable, Zachery) |
| | 41 | 12/7/22 | 136 | (5 pgs) Notice of hearing filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.). Status Conference to be held on 1/25/2023 at 01:30 PM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga . (Annable, Zachery). |
| | 42 | 12/9/22 | 138 | (3 pgs) Response opposed to (related document(s): 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference. Fee amount \$188, filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP. (Annable, Zachery) |

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| Vol. 22 004745 | 43 | 12/9/22 | 139 | (25 pgs) Brief in support filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 138 Response). (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 23 004770 | 44 | 12/9/22 | 140 | (280 pgs; 8 docs) Support/supplemental document (<i>Appendix in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Response to Renewed Motion to Withdraw the Reference</i>) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 138 Response). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 # 2 Exhibit 2 # 3 Exhibit 3 # 4 Exhibit 4 # 5 Exhibit 5 # 6 Exhibit 6 # 7 Exhibit 7) (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 24 005050 | 45 | 12/16/22 | 144 | (6 pgs) Reply to (related document(s): 138 Response filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP) filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP. (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| 005056 Thru Vol. 25. | 46 | 1/23/23 | 145 | (514 pgs; 15 docs) Witness and Exhibit List filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>)). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 # 2 Exhibit 2 # 3 Exhibit 3 # 4 Exhibit 4 # 5 Exhibit 5 # 6 Exhibit 6 # 7 Exhibit 7 # 8 Exhibit 8 # 9 Exhibit 9 # 10 Exhibit 10 # 11 Exhibit 11 # 12 Exhibit 12 # 13 Exhibit 13 # 14 Exhibit 14) (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 26 005570 | 47 | 1/23/23 | 146 | (280 pgs; 8 docs) Witness and Exhibit List filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference. Fee amount \$188.). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 # 2 Exhibit 2 # 3 Exhibit 3 # 4 Exhibit 4 # 5 Exhibit 5 # 6 Exhibit 6 # 7 Exhibit 7) (Annable, Zachery) |
| Vol. 27 005850 | 48 | 1/23/23 | 147 | (221 pgs; 7 docs) Witness and Exhibit List filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding (<i>Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>)). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1_Excerpts from July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript # 2 Exhibit 2_HCLOF Members Agreement Relating to the Company # 3 Exhibit 3_HarbourVest Settlement Agreement # 4 Exhibit 4_Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with HarbourVest # 5 Exhibit 5_HCLOF Offering # 6 Exhibit 6 Amended and Restated Investment Advisory Agreement) (Sbaiti, Mazin) |
| 006071 | 49 | 1/23/23 | 148 | (3 pgs) Witness and Exhibit List filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference. Fee amount \$188.). (Phillips, Louis) |
| Vol. 28 006074 | 50 | 1/25/23 | 150 | (56 pgs; 2 docs) Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (RE: related document(s) 147 List (witness/exhibit/generic), 149 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments: # 1 Exh 7_Testimony of Mark Patrick at June 8, 2021 hearing) (Sbaiti, Mazin) |

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| Vol. 28 006130 | 51 | 1/25/23 | 152 | (3 pgs) Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice by Louis M. Phillips filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP. (Phillips, Louis) |
| | 52 | 1/25/23 | 154 | (1 pg) Court admitted exhibits date of hearing January 25, 2023 (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference, filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.) (COURT ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS #1, #2, #3, #4, #5 & #6 OFFERED BY ATTY GREG DEMO). (Edmond, Michael) (Entered: 01/27/2023) |
| Vol. 32 006925 006942 006960 | 53 | 2/6/23 | 158 | Report and recommendation to the U.S. District Court by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge. (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.). Entered on 2/6/2023 (Okafor, Marcey) |
| | 54 | 2/6/23 | 161 | (18 pgs) DISTRICT COURT Notice of transmission of report and recommendation in re: renewed motion to withdraw reference. Civil Case # 3:22-cv-02802-S. (RE: related document(s) 158 Report and recommendation to the U.S. District Court by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge. (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.). Entered on 2/6/2023) (Whitaker, Sheniqua) |
| | 55 | 4/3/23 | 165 | (1 pg) DISTRICT COURT ORDER: The Court GRANTS the 11 Joint Motion to Transfer Proceeding and Consolidate Before Original Court and the above-numbered case (3:22-cv-02802-S) is transferred to the docket of the Honorable Judge Jane Boyle: Civil case 3:21-cv-00842-B (order referring case). (RE: related document(s) 1 Complaint filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd., 143 Notice of transmission of motion to withdraw reference). Entered on 4/3/2023 (Whitaker, Sheniqua) Modified on 4/10/2023 (Whitaker, Sheniqua). (Entered: 04/10/2023) |

TRANSCRIPTS

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|--------|----|----------|----|--|
| 006961 | 56 | 11/24/21 | 78 | (104 pgs) Transcript regarding Hearing Held 11-23-2021 RE: Motion Hearing. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING. TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 02/22/2022. Until that time the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office or a copy may be obtained from the official court transcriber. Court Reporter/Transcriber Liberty Transcripts/Dipti Patel, Telephone number 847-848-4907. (RE: related document(s) 75 Hearing held on 11/23/2021. (RE: related document(s) 55 MOTION to Stay filed by CLO Holdco Ltd, Charitable DAF Fund LP (Sbaiti, Mazin) (Entered: 08/26/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #55 ON 08/26/2021 IN U.S. |
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| | | | <p>DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.)) (Appearances: J. Pomerantz and J. Morris for Highland Defendants; J. Jordan and P. Bessett for HCLOF; M. Sbaiti for Plaintiffs. Nonevidentiary hearing. Motion denied. Mr. Pomerantz to upload order.), 76 Hearing held on 11/23/2021. (RE: related document(s) 47 Motion to strike 43 Appendix in support filed by CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP (Bridges, Jonathan) Modified text on 7/16/2021 (mjr). (Entered: 07/15/2021) [ORIGINALLY FILED IN 21-CV-0842 AS #47 ON 07/15/2021 IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION] (Okafor, M.)) (Appearances: J. Pomerantz and J. Morris for Highland Defendants; J. Jordan and P. Bessett for HCLOF; M. Sbaiti for Plaintiffs. Nonevidentiary hearing. Motion denied (Plaintiffs acknowledged complained-of Appendices it did not relate to Motion to Dismiss). Mr. Pomerantz to upload order.)). Transcript to be made available to the public on 02/22/2022. (Patel, Dipti)</p> |
| 57 | 2/21/23 | 164 | <p>164 (112 pgs) Transcript regarding Hearing Held 1/25/23 RE: HEARING ON DEFENDANT HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT L.P.'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT (122) AND STATUS CONFERENCE RE: MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE FILED BY PLAINTIFF CLO HOLDCO, LTD., PLAINTIFF CHARITABLE DAF FUND, LP (128). THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING. TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 05/22/2023. Until that time the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office or a copy may be obtained from the official court transcriber. Court Reporter/Transcriber Dipti Patel, Telephone number 847-848-4907. (RE: related document(s) 155 Hearing held on 1/25/2023. (RE: related document(s) 122 Motion to dismiss adversary proceeding, (Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint) filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP filed by Defendant Highland Capital Management, LP) (Appearances: J. Morris and G. Demo for Movants; L. Phillips and M. Sbaiti for Plaintiffs. Evidentiary hearing (appendices). Court took matter under advisement.), 156 Hearing held on 1/25/2023. (RE: related document(s) 128 Motion for withdrawal of reference. Fee amount \$188, filed by Plaintiffs CLO Holdco, Ltd., Charitable DAF Fund, LP filed by Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, LP, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.) (Appearances: J. Morris and G. Demo for Movants; L. Phillips and M. Sbaiti for Plaintiffs. Evidentiary hearing (appendices). Court announced it will recommend denial to District Court. Court is working on Report & Recommendation.)). Transcript to be made available to the public on 05/22/2023. (Patel, Dipti)</p> |

Dated: July 14, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

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Counsel for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically through the Court's ECF system, which provides notice to all parties of interest, on this 14th day of July, 2023.

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti

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*Counsel for The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.
and CLO Holdco, Ltd.*

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

| | | |
|---|---|--------------------------|
| In re: | § | Chapter 11 |
| | § | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., | § | Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 |
| | § | |
| Debtor. | § | |
| CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P. AND CLO | § | |
| HOLDCO, LTD., DIRECTLY AND DERIVATIVELY | § | |
| | § | |
| Plaintiffs, | § | Adversary Proceeding No. |
| | § | |
| vs. | § | 21-03067-sgj11 |
| | § | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., | § | |
| HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD., AND | § | |
| HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING LTD., NOMINALLY | § | |
| | § | |
| Defendant. | § | |
| | § | |

NOTICE OF APPEAL AND STATEMENT OF ELECTION

Part 1: Identify the appellant(s)

1. Name(s) of appellant(s):

The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.
CLO Holdco, Ltd.

2. Position of appellant(s) in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that is the subject of this appeal:

For appeals in an adversary proceeding:

- ☒ Plaintiff
☐ Defendant
☐ Other (describe)
-

For appeals in a bankruptcy case and not in an adversary proceeding:

- ☐ Debtor
☐ Creditor
☐ Trustee
☐ Other (describe)

Part 2: Identify the subject of this appeal

1. Describe the judgment, order, or decree appealed from:

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss the Adversary Proceeding [Doc. 100]

2. State the date on which the judgment, order, or decree was entered: March 11, 2022

Part 3: Identify the other parties to the appeal

List the names of all parties to the judgment, order, or decree appealed from and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their attorneys:

1. *Party/Appellee:* Debtor: Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Non-Debtor: Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd.

Attorney:

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

Jeffery N. Pomerantz

Ira D. Kharasch

John A. Morris

Gregory V. Demo

Hayley R. Winograd

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Telephone: (212) 561-7700

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And

Hayward & Associates PLLC
Melissa S. Hayward
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Telephone: (972) 755-7100
Fax: (972) 755-7110

2. *Party/Appellants*: Plaintiffs: The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.
CLO Holdco, Ltd.

Attorney:

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Mazin A. Sbaiti (TX Bar No. 24058096)
Jonathan Bridges (TX Bar No. 24028835)
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Part 4: Optional election to have appeal heard by District Court (applicable only in certain districts): Not applicable.

Dated: March 21, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

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Counsel for Plaintiffs




CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed March 11, 2022


United States Bankruptcy Judge

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

| | | |
|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| IN RE: | § | |
| | § | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT | § | CASE NO. 19-34054-SGJ-11 |
| L.P., | § | (CHAPTER 11) |
| REORGANIZED DEBTOR. | § | |
| | § | |
| CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P., AND CLO | § | |
| HOLDCO LTD., | § | |
| | § | |
| PLAINTIFFS, | § | |
| | § | |
| VS. | § | ADVERSARY NO. 21-03067 |
| | § | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, | § | |
| L.P., HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD., | § | |
| AND HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD., | § | |
| | § | |
| DEFENDANTS. | § | |

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS THE
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**

003640

I. INTRODUCTION

The above-referenced adversary proceeding (the “Adversary Proceeding”) is related to the bankruptcy case of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the “Bankruptcy Case”).¹ Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland,” the “Debtor,” or sometimes the “Reorganized Debtor”) filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition on October 16, 2019, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. That court subsequently transferred venue of the Bankruptcy Case to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the “Bankruptcy Court”), on December 4, 2019.

Before the court is Highland’s motion to dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) the Adversary Proceeding. Highland obtained confirmation of a reorganization plan on February 22, 2021, and the plan went effective on August 11, 2021. The Adversary Proceeding was filed in April 2021 (*i.e.*, after confirmation but before the effective date of Highland’s Chapter 11 plan). There were originally three Defendants named in the Adversary Proceeding: (i) Highland, and (ii) two non-Debtor affiliates which Highland controls that are called Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. (“HHCF”) and Highland CLO Funding Ltd. (“HCLOF”). Defendant HCLOF was later dismissed by agreement with the Plaintiffs.² Highland’s CEO, James P. Seery (“Mr. Seery”), was named in the Complaint initiating the Adversary Proceeding (the “Complaint”) as a “potential” Defendant but has not been added. The Plaintiffs are two entities that are allegedly controlled and/or directed by James Dondero, Highland’s founder and former CEO (“Mr. Dondero”): (i) Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (the “DAF”), which is a Cayman Island-based hedge fund designated as a “donor-advised fund,” originally seeded with funds from Highland, and (ii) CLO Holdco, Ltd. (“CLO Holdco”),

¹ Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054.

² At the hearing held on the Motion to Dismiss, the parties announced an agreement that HCLOF would be dismissed from the Adversary Proceeding with prejudice. HCLOF was apparently only named nominally in the Adversary Proceeding and no actual relief was sought against it. An order dismissing HCLOF was entered on December 7, 2021. Highland and HHCF were unaffected by the dismissal order.

which is also a Cayman Island-based entity, wholly owned and controlled by the DAF. Until at least mid-January 2021, Grant Scott, Mr. Dondero's life-long friend and college roommate, was the sole director of the DAF and also of CLO Holdco (neither of which otherwise had any officers or employees).

The Complaint, which was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division ("District Court"), but was referred to the Bankruptcy Court (as further described herein), asserts claims against Highland and HHCFA under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (15 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. ("RICO")), Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract, Negligence, and Tortious Interference with Contract—all relating to the Debtor's pursuit and effectuation *during the Bankruptcy Case* of a compromise and settlement agreement with a creditor known as HarbourVest, which *agreement was fully vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court* (after notice to creditors and parties in interest), pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. Accepting all facts pleaded as true and construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, this court concludes that all of the claims in the Complaint are precluded by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel. Thus, the Complaint, in its entirety, must be dismissed.

In order to understand the conclusion of this court, one must review matters that happened during the Bankruptcy Case. Although a court generally limits its inquiry on a motion to dismiss to the plaintiff's complaint or any documents attached to the complaint, a court may also take judicial notice of matters that are part of the public record when considering a motion to dismiss. *See T.L. Dallas (Special Risks), Ltd. v. Elton Porter Marine Ins.*, No. 4:07-cv-0419, 2008 WL 7627807, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2008); *Cade v. Henderson*, No. CIV A 01-943, 2001 WL 1012251, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2001). The relevant public record here includes: (a) the HarbourVest

Settlement Motion,³ and the exhibits admitted into evidence in support; (b) the Transfer Agreement;⁴ (c) Mr. Dondero's Objection to the HarbourVest Settlement;⁵ (d) the Objection to the HarbourVest Settlement of Dugaboy Investment Trust and Get Good Trust (*i.e.*, Mr. Dondero's family trusts),⁶ (e) CLO Holdco's Objection to the HarbourVest Settlement,⁷ (f) the Omnibus Replies;⁸ (g) the January 14, 2021 Hearing Transcript at which the Bankruptcy Court considered and approved the HarbourVest Settlement;⁹ and (h) the HarbourVest Settlement Order.¹⁰

II. BACKGROUND

The creditor HarbourVest was actually a collective of investors that, in 2017, invested approximately \$80 million into the entity known as HCLOF (*i.e.*, the previously dismissed nominal Defendant), thereby acquiring a 49.98% interest in it. HarbourVest filed six proofs of claim against the Debtor in the Bankruptcy Case, totaling \$300 million, alleging that the Debtor had committed fraud back in 2017, in connection with its encouraging HarbourVest to invest in and acquire that 49.98% interest in HCLOF. As alluded to earlier, the Debtor and HarbourVest eventually negotiated a settlement of HarbourVest's proofs of claim.

³ Debtor's Motion for an Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, DE # 1625 (the "Settlement Motion"). Note: all references herein to "DE # ____" shall refer to the docket entry number at which a pleading appears in the docket maintained in the Highland main bankruptcy case. All references to "DE # ____ in the AP" refer to the docket entry number at which a pleading appears in the docket maintained in the Adversary Proceeding.

⁴ Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, DE # 1631, Exhibit 1.

⁵ James Dondero's Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest, DE # 1697.

⁶ Objection to Debtor's Motion for an Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, DE # 1706.

⁷ CLO Holdco, Ltd.'s Objection to HarbourVest Settlement, DE # 1707.

⁸ Debtor's Omnibus Reply in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, DE # 1731; HarbourVest Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, DE # 1734.

⁹ Transcript of Hearing Held 1/14/2021, DE # 1765.

¹⁰ *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with Harbourvest (Claims Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith*, DE # 1788 (the "HarbourVest Settlement Order").

In December 2020, the Debtor filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court for an order approving its settlement with HarbourVest (the “HarbourVest Settlement”), pursuant to which, *inter alia*, HarbourVest would significantly reduce its \$300 million of alleged claims against the Debtor and transfer its 49.98% interest in HCLOF to an entity designated by the Debtor (the “Transfer”). At the time of the Transfer, the Debtor already owned a 0.6% interest in HCLOF, so the Transfer would give it a controlling interest ($49.98\% + 0.6\% = 50.58\%$) in HCLOF.

CLO Holdco objected to the proposed HarbourVest Settlement, presumably at the direction of its parent, the DAF. CLO Holdco owned (and still owns) 49.02% of HCLOF. CLO Holdco challenged the HarbourVest Settlement on the grounds that: (i) CLO Holdco had a “Right of First Refusal” to acquire HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF pursuant to the HCLOF Members Agreement among the Debtor, HarbourVest, and CLO Holdco (“HCLOF Members Agreement”), and (ii) HarbourVest had no right to transfer its interest without complying with the purported “Right of First Refusal.” Two other objections were lodged against the proposed HarbourVest Settlement, one by Mr. Dondero and the other by Mr. Dondero’s two family trusts: The Dugaboy Investment Trust (“Dugaboy”) and The Get Good Trust (“Get Good” and, together with Dugaboy, the “Dondero Family Trusts”). Mr. Dondero objected on the grounds that (a) the HarbourVest Settlement was not reasonable or in the best interests of the estate because the Debtor was grossly over-compensating HarbourVest, and (b) it amounted to a blatant attempt to purchase HarbourVest’s votes in support of the Debtor’s plan. The Dondero Family Trusts raised separate concerns regarding: (a) whether HarbourVest had the right to effectuate the Transfer, and (b) the valuation methodology the Debtor used for the HCLOF interests. Each of the objecting parties had a right to take discovery concerning the HarbourVest Settlement, including the valuation of the HCLOF interests and the Transfer.

The court held an evidentiary hearing, on January 14, 2021, on the HarbourVest Settlement and heard argument in support of the parties' objections and defenses. Highland's current CEO, Mr. Seery, and a HarbourVest representative, Michael Pugatch ("Mr. Pugatch"), were each called to testify. During the hearing, surprisingly, ***CLO Holdco voluntarily withdrew its objection, which had been premised on its alleged "Right of First Refusal,"*** based on CLO Holdco's "interpretation of the [HCLOF] member agreement."¹¹ Subsequent to CLO Holdco withdrawing its objection at the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court asked counsel for the Dondero Family Trusts whether they planned to press the issue of the transferability of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF. In response, counsel responded: "No, I am not. Basically, I think it's the fairness of the settlement. I think the transferability of the interest is separate and apart from the fairness of the settlement itself. I think the fairness -- the transferability was a contractual issue between two parties that the Court does not have to drill down on." Transcript of Hearing Held 1/14/2021, DE # 1765, at 22:5-20.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court overruled the remaining objections (*i.e.*, of Mr. Dondero and the Dondero Family Trusts) and approved the HarbourVest Settlement as fair and equitable and in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate. The HarbourVest Settlement Order made clear that HarbourVest could transfer its interest in HCLOF "without the need to obtain the consent of any party or to offer such interests first to any other investor in HCLOF."¹²

In summary, pursuant to the HarbourVest Settlement that the Bankruptcy Court approved, HarbourVest, in pertinent part, would (a) transfer its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor or its nominee, (b) be allowed a general unsecured claim against the Debtor in the amount of \$45 million,

¹¹ Transcript of Hearing Held 1/14/2021, DE # 1765, at 7:20-8:6.

¹² HarbourVest Settlement Order, DE # 1788.

and (c) be allowed a subordinated, general unsecured claim against the Debtor in the amount of \$35 million. The HarbourVest Settlement was essentially a rescission of the investment HarbourVest had made in HCLOF and also provided HarbourVest allowed, reduced claims against Highland in settlement of its alleged \$300 million of damages.

The HarbourVest Settlement Order was appealed by the Dondero Family Trusts, with notice of the appeal being filed in the Bankruptcy Court on February 5, 2021. The Dondero Family Trusts argue on appeal that the Debtor overpaid for the HCLOF interests, and the HarbourVest Settlement was an attempt to gerrymander the Debtor's plan and purchase votes. No stay pending appeal has been approved and the HarbourVest Settlement was implemented. The appeal remains pending before Judge Sam Lindsay in the District Court.¹³

On April 12, 2021, the Plaintiffs, DAF and CLO Holdco, filed the Complaint initiating this Adversary Proceeding in the District Court. The action was assigned to Judge Jane Boyle. *The subject matter of the Adversary Proceeding is entirely centered around the bona fides and permissibility of aspects of the HarbourVest Settlement.* Despite the full vetting in the Bankruptcy Court of the HarbourVest Settlement and an order approving the HarbourVest Settlement—which, by the way, was not appealed by Plaintiffs DAF or CLO Holdco—various torts and other causes of action are now being alleged by DAF and CLO Holdco against the Debtor *relating entirely to the HarbourVest Settlement.* As earlier alluded to, the Complaint raises claims that Highland, while a debtor-in-possession, committed: (1) breach of fiduciary duties to the Plaintiffs; (2) breach of the HCLOF Members Agreement; (3) negligence; (4) RICO violations; and (5) tortious interference.

¹³ Case No. 3:21-cv-00261-L.

On September 20, 2021, Judge Boyle issued an Order of Reference¹⁴ referring this action to be adjudicated as an adversary proceeding related to the Bankruptcy Case, pursuant **28 U.S.C. § 157** and the Standing Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings (Misc. Rule No. 33), for the Northern District of Texas, dated August 3, 1984. Thus, the Complaint is now pending before the Bankruptcy Court.

In its claim for breach of fiduciary duty (**Count 1**), Plaintiffs allege that the Debtor violated its “broad” duties to Plaintiffs under the “Investment Advisers Act of 1940” and the Debtor’s “internal policies and procedures” by: (i) engaging in “insider trading with HarbourVest”; (ii) “concealing” the value of the HarbourVest interest; and (iii) “diverting” the investment opportunity in the HarbourVest entities to the Debtor without offering it to Plaintiffs.

In support of its claim for breach of the HCLOF Members Agreement (**Count 2**), Plaintiffs allege that the Debtor breached the “Right of First Refusal” provision therein, by diverting the investment opportunity away from CLO Holdco to the Debtor.

In its negligence claim (**Count 3**), Plaintiffs assert that the Debtor’s actions violated the HCLOF Members Agreement and the Debtor’s internal policies by failing to accurately calculate the HCLOF interests and failing to give Plaintiffs the Right of First Refusal to purchase the interests.

In their RICO Claim (**Count 4**), Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Highland and two affiliated entities were an “association-in-fact” engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity for this same underlying conduct; namely, failing to disclose the valuation of HCLOF’s interest and, ultimately, effectuating the HarbourVest Settlement.

¹⁴ District Court Order of Reference, DE # 64 in the AP.

Finally, Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim (**Count 5**) is premised on the Debtor's alleged interference with Plaintiff's "Right of First Refusal" under the Members Agreement.

Highland, in response to the Complaint, filed its Motion to Dismiss on May 27, 2021. In the Motion to Dismiss, Highland argues that, based on the previous HarbourVest Settlement contested proceeding, the Plaintiffs' claims are precluded or barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel,¹⁵ and judicial estoppel. Alternatively, Highland also alleges that each of the claims in the Complaint should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently state claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). The Motion to Dismiss seeks to have the Complaint dismissed in its entirety.

The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on Highland's Motion to Dismiss the Adversary Proceeding now before the court. At the conclusion of the Motion to Dismiss hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

III. Legal Analysis

A. Jurisdiction and Authority

Bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction exists in this matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Adversary Proceeding is, at a minimum, "related to" the Highland Bankruptcy Case. Moreover, it "arises in" a bankruptcy case (making it "core"), in that a claim is being asserted against a debtor (which was not yet a "reorganized debtor" at the time the action was filed) and involves actions of a debtor-in-possession in administering its case. It involves orders of this Bankruptcy Court and activities and litigation over which the Bankruptcy Court presided. This Bankruptcy Court has authority to exercise bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction here, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and (b)(2)(A), (B), and (O), and the Standing Order of Reference of

¹⁵ The court notes that Highland, in the Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, lists collateral estoppel, in its summary of arguments, as grounds for dismissal of the Complaint. However, nowhere else is collateral estoppel mentioned within the Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. Rather, Highland focuses only on res judicata and judicial estoppel.

Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings (Misc. Rule No. 33), for the Northern District of Texas, dated August 3, 1984. The case was referred to the Bankruptcy Court by the District Court and there are no pending motions to withdraw the reference.

B. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” *Id.* Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) when, taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, it appears that the plaintiff “cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to the relief it seeks.” *C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortg. Co.*, 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). The court may take judicial notice of matters of public record when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. *See T.L. Dallas (Special Risks), Ltd.*, 2008 WL 7627807, at *2; *Cade*, 2001 WL 1012251, at *2.

C. Res Judicata

The first preclusion doctrine argued by Highland in its Motion to Dismiss is res judicata.¹⁶ Res judicata, otherwise known as “claim preclusion,” literally means “the thing has been decided.”

¹⁶ As mentioned earlier, there is a pending appeal of the HarbourVest Settlement Order. This fact is irrelevant for purposes of Highland’s preclusion arguments. The federal rule and the rule in this circuit is that, *despite an appeal, final orders of a court still maintain full force and effect for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes until reversed on appeal*. *Fid. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.*, 510 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir.1975)

“Though it is not often the case, a finding of res judicata is appropriate on a motion to dismiss when the res judicata bar is apparent from the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed facts.” *See Wade v. Household Fin. Corp. III*, No. 1:18-CV-570-RP, [2019 WL 433741](#), at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2019). “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” *Allen v. McCurry*, [449 U.S. 90, 94](#) (1980). The elements of res judicata are: “(1) the parties are identical or at least in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both suits.” *Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, [718 F.3d 460, 466](#) (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Test Masters Educ. Services, Inc. v. Singh*, [428 F.3d 559, 571](#) (5th Cir. 2005)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the elements of res judicata are apparent based on the facts pleaded and judicially noticed. *See Hall v. Hodgkins*, [305 F. Appx. 224, 227–28](#) (5th Cir. 2008); *Mitchell v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC*, No. 4:18-cv-00820-P, [2019 WL 5647599](#), at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2019). The fourth element of res judicata can be met where a claim or cause of action relates to the same “transaction, or series of transactions, out of which the [original] action arose.” *Ries v. Paige (In re Paige)*, [610 F.3d 865, 872](#) (5th Cir. 2010). “When applying this test, the primary question is whether the lawsuits were based on ‘the same nucleus of operative fact,’ regardless of the relief requested, or the claims brought. *Wade*, [2019 WL 433741](#), at *3.

Highland argues that, when taking judicial notice of the docket created in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement, it is apparent that the four elements of res judicata are met: (1) CLO

(“[a] case pending appeal is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit unless and until reversed on appeal”); *S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, [740 F.2d 1011, 1018](#) (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[w]e note that the federal rule and the rule in this circuit is that collateral estoppel may be applied to a trial court finding even while the judgment is pending on appeal”); *see Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co.*, 312 U.S. 183, 189 (1941) (“To the same effect, in the federal courts the general rule has long been recognized that while an appeal with proper supersedeas stays execution of the judgment, it does not—until and unless reversed—detract from its decisiveness and finality”).

Holdco objected to the HarbourVest Settlement, and the DAF is in privity with CLO Holdco as its 100% parent; (2) the Bankruptcy Court was a court of competent jurisdiction over the HarbourVest Settlement; (3) the Bankruptcy Court entered a final order based upon the merits of the HarbourVest Settlement; and (4) the claims or causes of action arise out of the same “common nucleus of operative facts” as those raised at the HarbourVest Settlement hearing.

To be clear, Highland argues the fourth element of res judicata is met because the claims brought by the Plaintiffs in the Complaint are substantially similar to, and arise from the very same facts, as those allegations that the Plaintiffs put forth during the Bankruptcy Court hearing on the HarbourVest Settlement. In connection with the HarbourVest Settlement, Plaintiff CLO Holdco argued to the Bankruptcy Court that the Debtor: (i) violated the HCLOF Members Agreement by failing to offer such interests to Plaintiffs pursuant to a “Right of First Refusal” provision; and (ii) diverted the investment opportunity to the Debtor without offering it to Plaintiffs. And the other objectors (*i.e.*, the Dondero Family Trusts) argued to the Bankruptcy Court that the Debtor did not accurately value the HCLOF 49.98% interest that was being transferred by HarbourVest back to the Debtor. The Bankruptcy Court overruled all of these arguments.

This court agrees that the claims being brought in the Adversary Proceeding arise from the same “transaction or series of transactions” and are based on the “same nucleus of operative facts” as were litigated and adjudicated in the Bankruptcy Court in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement. The allegations take the form of causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, RICO violations, and tort claims, but ***all include the very same underlying factual allegations as articulated in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement.***

However, while this court agrees with Highland that CLO Holdco’s claims arise from “the same common nucleus of operative fact” as the HarbourVest Settlement, this is not the end of the

court’s analysis. “Even if the two actions are the same under the transactional test, res judicata does not bar this action unless” the Plaintiffs “could and should have” brought the claims in the Complaint in the prior proceeding. *Osherow v. Ernst & Young (In re Intelogic, Inc.)*, 200 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has recognized procedural differences between contested matters under Bankruptcy Rule 9014, such as the HarbourVest Settlement hearing, and adversary proceedings. The Fifth Circuit noted that “[c]ounterclaims are only compulsory in ‘adversary proceedings,’” as Bankruptcy Rule 7013 (which adopts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13) does not automatically apply to “contested matters” under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. *D-1 Enterprises, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank*, 864 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit proceeded to suggest, under the “quick motion-and hearing style” of contested matters, a party is not required, or even allowed, to bring all of its claims. *Howe v. Vaughn (Matter of Howe)*, 913 F.2d 1138, 1146 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit clarified that, whether the earlier proceeding that is being suggested as holding res judicata effect is a contested matter or an adversary is not dispositive; rather, it is a factor in determining whether the claim at issue could or should have been effectively litigated in the earlier proceeding. *See id.* at 1146 n.28; *see also Osherow*, 200 F.3d at 388 (the court weighed “whether the bankruptcy court possessed procedural mechanisms that would have allowed” the party to assert claims in the prior contested matter).

It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit has found, on numerous occasions in which the prior proceeding was a contested matter, versus an adversary proceeding, that res judicata still applied. *See, e.g., Osherow*, 200 F.3d at 388-91 (finding res judicata applied to malpractice claims that could have been asserted at a fee hearing); *In re Baudoin*, 981 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that res judicata barred lender liability claims based on loans that had been deemed allowed claims without objection in a previous bankruptcy); *Eubanks v. FDIC*, 977 F.2d 166, 174 (5th Cir.

1992) (barring a lender liability action which could have and should have been brought as an objection to the lender's claim in a prior bankruptcy proceeding); *Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp.*, 742 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying res judicata to bar a claim that could have been raised as an objection to a claim asserted in a previous bankruptcy reorganization). These opinions came in the context of a cause of action not being asserted to contest a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case. The Fifth Circuit found that objections to claims in the bankruptcy process, generally contested matters, provide procedural mechanisms to bring a claim for affirmative relief under Bankruptcy Rule 3007, which allows the claim objection to be converted to an adversary proceeding.¹⁷ *Osherow*, 200 F.3d at 389-90.

But here, the Bankruptcy Court concludes that the Plaintiffs were not provided with procedural mechanisms needed in order to bring their causes of action in the Complaint during the HarbourVest Settlement contested matter. Despite the “transactional test” being met through a finding that the claims stem from “the same nucleus of operative facts,” the procedures of Bankruptcy Rule 9014 do not allow for claims of affirmative relief—whether it be RICO violations, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, or tort claims—to be asserted in response to a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 motion to compromise a controversy. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed procedural mechanisms supporting res judicata in the context of a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 motion to compromise a controversy, where the bankruptcy court is limited to determining whether or not to “approve a compromise or settlement.” See *Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a)*. Unlike in the context of claim objections, mentioned above, where counterclaims can allow the claim objection to be converted through Bankruptcy Rule 3007 to an adversary proceeding, such causes

¹⁷ The court in *Osherow* went on to find that Bankruptcy Rule 9014 gives discretion to the bankruptcy court to allow other rules in Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules to apply to contested matters. In that case, it suggested the bankruptcy court could have stayed the proceedings and allowed discovery to be commenced under the Part VII Rules to develop the affirmative causes of action to raise in the claim objection.

of action have no mechanism to exist in the context of a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 motion. The bankruptcy court is limited to granting or denying a proposed settlement as relief in ruling on a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 motion—regardless of its findings on issues that may also serve for the foundation of the causes of action asserted in the subsequent hearing (*but see* “**Collateral Estoppel**” discussion below). Procedurally, this would not allow the subsequent causes of action to ever be raised, if res judicata were to apply to a contested matter under Bankruptcy Rule 9019, which does not allow for the assertion of counterclaims or other forms of affirmative relief.

Thus, the court finds that the Plaintiffs were not given the procedural mechanisms to bring the causes of action asserted in the Complaint during the pendency of the HarbourVest Settlement contested matter. The court finds that res judicata does not apply as a doctrine to preclude the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in the Complaint.

D. Collateral Estoppel

On the contrary, collateral estoppel *does* have applicability here. Arguments potentially relevant to the collateral estoppel doctrine were made by the parties in their pleadings and at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss (phrased in terms of res judicata), but collateral estoppel *per se* was not addressed independently.¹⁸ The Bankruptcy Court now addresses collateral estoppel *sua sponte*. Raising preclusion doctrines *sua sponte* is in the interest of judicial economy and is appropriate, especially where both actions are before the same court. *See Carbonell v. La. Dep't of Health & Human Res.*, 772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1985).

To be clear, “res judicata encompasses two separate, but linked, preclusive doctrines: (1) true res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.” *Hous. Profl Towing Ass'n v. City of Hous.*, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Comer v. Murphy Oil*

¹⁸ As mentioned at footnote 15, Highland did make a passing reference to the collateral estoppel doctrine in its Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss.

USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466–67 (5th Cir. 2013)). Thus, while res judicata precludes relitigating claims or causes of action that were or could have been previously litigated in a prior action, collateral estoppel is referred to as “issue preclusion” and prevents relitigating the same **issues or facts** decided in a prior proceeding. Collateral estoppel precludes only the relitigation of issues or facts **actually litigated** in the original action, whether or not the second suit is based on the same cause of action. *Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board*, 548 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1977). “[A] **right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined** as a ground of recovery by a court of competent jurisdiction collaterally estops a party ... from relitigating the issue in a subsequent action,” if the party had reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard against the claim. *Hardy v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp.*, 681 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). “Collateral estoppel applies when, in the initial litigation, (1) the issue at stake in the pending litigation is the same, (2) the issue was actually litigated, and (3) the determination of the issue in the initial litigation was a necessary part of the judgment.” *Harvey Specialty & Supply, Inc. v. Anson Flowline Equip. Inc.*, 434 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2005). Each condition must be met in order for collateral estoppel to apply. “Collateral estoppel will apply in a second proceeding that involves separate claims if the claims involve the same issue . . . and the subject matter of the suits may be different as long as the requirements for collateral estoppel are met.” *In re Devoll*, No. 15-50122-CAG, 2015 WL 9460110, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015) (citation omitted).

So were each of these three collateral estoppel factors met? Were the **same** facts or issues **actually litigated** and was a determination of these facts and issues a **necessary part** of approving the HarbourVest Settlement? The Plaintiffs argued, in their response to the Motion to Dismiss, that the Bankruptcy Court did not resolve anything on the merits other than the approval of a

settlement, and that was done solely using its discretion to approve a settlement. The court thinks that this is a mischaracterization of the court's role in approving the HarbourVest Settlement.

In considering a proposed compromise and settlement agreement, a bankruptcy court must determine whether it is "fair and equitable." *Matter of Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980); *United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO)*, 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 244 (1984). A bankruptcy court applies a three-part test set out in *Jackson Brewing* with a focus on comparing "the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation." A bankruptcy court must evaluate: (1) the probability of success in litigating the claim subject to settlement, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law; (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay; and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise. These "other" factors—sometimes called the *Foster Mortgage* factors¹⁹—include: (i) "the best interests of the creditors, 'with proper deference to their reasonable views'"; and (ii) "'the extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Moeller (In re Age Ref., Inc.)*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

In connection with evaluating the HarbourVest Settlement and whether it was "fair and equitable" and in the "best interests of creditors," and whether it was the "product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion," the Bankruptcy Court held a multi-hour hearing that included lengthy direct and cross-examination of multiple witnesses and documentary evidence. The Bankruptcy Court was required to "appraise [itself] of the relevant facts and law so that [it could] make an informed and intelligent decision." See *In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997). The hearing included considering the arguments and evidence regarding

¹⁹ *Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Co.)*, 68 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1995).

the methodology for the valuation of the HCLOF interest and the existence or non-existence of a “Right of First Refusal.” The court heard credible testimony on, among other things, the value of the HCLOF interests from Mr. Seery and Mr. Pugatch. Both witnesses were subject to cross examination. The court heard how the value of the HCLOF interests plummeted nearly \$50 million, which was caused, at least in part, by the litigation strategies taken by Highland while it was still under the control of Mr. Dondero.²⁰ The Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that Mr. Seery’s \$22.5 million value of the HCLOF interest was baseless. The Plaintiffs believed the interests had a net asset value (“NAV”) of at least \$34.5 million on November 30, 2020, and a value of \$41.75 million on December 31, 2020, leading up to the HarbourVest Settlement hearing. Further, the Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that Mr. Seery was receiving insider information from Mr. Dondero in December 2020 regarding the HCLOF interests and used improper valuation methods. But, for whatever reason, the Plaintiffs decided not to ask questions of Mr. Seery at the hearing or further challenge Mr. Seery’s source or method of valuation for the HCLOF interests at the hearing.²¹ The allegations in the Complaint surrounding Mr. Seery’s method for valuation of the HCLOF interests were discoverable at the time of the HarbourVest Settlement hearing and directly relevant to the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis in approving the HarbourVest Settlement. The Bankruptcy Court found the testimony elicited from Mr. Seery by Highland and the objectors to be credible in ultimately finding a \$22.5 million value of the HCLOF interests was reasonable.

²⁰ Transcript of Hearing Held 1/14/2021, DE # 1765, at 96:20-97:24.

²¹ Mr. Dondero and CLO Holdco appeared at and examined the HarbourVest witness, Mr. Pugatch, at a deposition before the hearing on the HarbourVest Settlement. Declaration of John Morris, Exhs. 7 & 8 thereto [DE # 2237]. Moreover, it is rather astounding to this court for anyone to suggest that any human being (Mr. Seery or anyone else) knew more, or withheld, any information that wasn’t well known to Mr. Dondero and all principals/agents of DAF and CLO Holdco. Mr. Dondero and any personnel associated with DAF and CLO Holdco should have been as (or more) familiar with HCLOF’s assets and their potential value than any human beings on the planet—having managed these assets for years.

While a bankruptcy court does not delve into the merits of every possible claim that is waived or compromised through a settlement, here, (a) *consideration of the value that the estate was both receiving and paying*, as well as (b) the potential existence of a “Right of First Refusal” that might have prohibited the Transfer contemplated in the HarbourVest Settlement, were very much a focus of the hearing on the HarbourVest Settlement. These are the very same issues that are the gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. They were very much “actually litigated.” The Bankruptcy Court would never have approved the HarbourVest Settlement if it thought the value being exchanged was not fair, or if it thought the HCLOF Interests could not be transferred and that someone might later sue the Debtor, claiming the Transfer was improper. All parties had the chance to argue and present evidence about this. The Bankruptcy Court made a ruling based on the evidence and argument.

Further, the Bankruptcy Court included in the HarbourVest Settlement Order language to specifically avoid any future assertions or litigation as to whether a “Right of First Refusal” prevented the transfer of HCLOF interests to Highland or a Highland designee/subsidiary:

Pursuant to the express terms of the *Members Agreement Relating to the Company*, dated November 15, 2017, ***HarbourVest is authorized to transfer its interests in HCLOF to a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary of the Debtor*** pursuant to the terms of the *Transfer Agreement for Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. without the need to obtain the consent of any party or to offer such interests first to any other investor in HCLOF.* (Emphasis added.)

The court included this express language to document its finding that no “Right of First Refusal” was enforceable under the HCLOF Members Agreement based on the court’s analysis of the underlying agreements, as well as representations made by CLO Holdco that it was withdrawing its objection (that was wholly based on the alleged “Right of First Refusal”). A possible “Right of First Refusal” was fully briefed by the Debtor and CLO Holdco (with whom the DAF is in privity,

as its 100% parent), and the merits of such was fully considered by this court in approving the HarbourVest Settlement.

Despite this court's conclusion that res judicata does not apply here because procedural mechanisms did not allow an assertion of causes of action in the context of a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 settlement, *no barrier prevented the Plaintiffs from fully litigating the issues, rights, and facts at the HarbourVest Settlement hearing that form the gravamen of the Complaint*. While the causes of action in the Complaint could not be brought in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement contested matter, the issues and facts underlying the causes of action in the Complaint were fully litigated and ruled on in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement. Those issues were raised in objections and subject to witness testimony at the HarbourVest Settlement hearing and were the primary considerations that had to be evaluated for the Bankruptcy Court to approve of the HarbourVest Settlement. The Complaint fails to allege any facts independent of: (a) an improper valuation by Mr. Seery or (b) a failure by Highland to honor a "Right of First Refusal" in favor of CLO Holdco to support relief under its causes of action. Count 1 in the Complaint alleges that Highland breached a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiffs through diverting a corporate opportunity by not *first offering* the HCLOF interests to the Plaintiffs. While labeled as a claim for a "breach of fiduciary" duty, as opposed to a "breach of contract," the arguments are the same. Both counts argue that the HCLOF interests should have been offered to the Plaintiffs who held a superior right to purchase the interests. Again, this argument was presented in CLO Holdco's objection to the HarbourVest Settlement, which was withdrawn by CLO Holdco during the hearing. The Plaintiffs do not get a second bite of the apple at litigating a purported superior right, by dressing it up as different cause of action, when the issue at stake has already been litigated. Thus, both the HarbourVest Settlement and Complaint involve the same issues.

In summary, the first and second elements of collateral estoppel are met. The issues of valuation and a “Right of First Refusal” were one and the same as those articulated in the Complaint and were “actually litigated” in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement.

Going through the third prong of collateral estoppel, it is also met. The facts regarding valuation of the HCLOF interests and whether Highland was required to offer the HarbourVest’s HCLOF interests to CLO Holdco were very much *necessary* or *essential* to the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling approving the HarbourVest Settlement. The Bankruptcy Court was required to consider the value of the HCLOF interests to determine whether the consideration the estate was receiving in the compromise was fair and equitable. Further, the court noted at the settlement hearing that the “Right of First Refusal” was one of the “major arguments” in connection with the HarbourVest Settlement and the court included language in the HarbourVest Settlement Order specifically finding no such right existed. The court would not have approved the HarbourVest Settlement if it thought that it could not be accomplished or would result in Highland later being sued. This would not have been in the best interests of the estate. Thus, the HCLOF interest valuation and the ability or propriety of Highland transferring the HCLOF interest were “a necessary part of the judgment.”

Further, the Plaintiffs do not dispute CLO Holdco is in privity with DAF, as DAF is the parent and controlling entity of CLO Holdco. Instead, CLO Holdco argues that it somehow was not a party to the ongoing dispute between Highland and HarbourVest that led to the HarbourVest Settlement (although it was allowed to file objections and take discovery).

Bankruptcy is a collective proceeding that allows creditors to object and raise any argument they think the court should consider that bear on the wisdom of the compromise. Generally, for a party to be bound by orders issued by the bankruptcy court, the party must receive adequate notice of the proceedings for due process reasons. *In re Reagor-Dykes Motors, LP*, 613 B.R. 878, 885

(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2020); *In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.*, 467 B.R. 694, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); *see also Richards v. Jefferson Cty., Ala.*, 517 U.S. 793, 799, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996) (“Additionally, where a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate, legal proceedings may terminate pre-existing rights if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.”). The Bankruptcy Rules and bankruptcy jurisprudence provide for due process protection for settlements under Rule 9019(a) by requiring that a debtor in possession give creditors and parties in interest “adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before their interests may be adversely affected.” *In re Reagor-Dykes Motors*, 613 B.R. at 885 (citing *W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.)*, 43 F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994)). Rule 9019(a) further protects interested parties “[b]y requiring court approval following a hearing before any compromise or settlement may be enforced” to ensure a transparent settlement process and provide “other creditors an opportunity to voice their concerns.” *In re Reagor-Dykes Motors, LP*, 613 B.R. at 886 (citing *In re Big Apple Volkswagen, LLC*, 571 B.R. 43, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)). The Plaintiffs were properly noticed, as well as appeared and participated, in the Rule 9019 process.

Thus, the court concludes all three elements of collateral estoppel are met with regard to the fact issues of value of the HCLOF interests and any “Right of First Refusal” (and the ability/propriety of transferring the HCLOF interests). *All of the causes of action in the Complaint (Counts 1-5) revolve around these two issues that were previously fully litigated.* Thus, all causes of action asserted in the Complaint are precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

E. Judicial Estoppel

The final preclusion doctrine, asserted by Highland, is judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is “a common law doctrine by which a party who has assumed one position in [their] pleadings may be estopped from assuming an inconsistent position.” *Brandon v. Interfirst Corp.*, 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988). The doctrine is made “to protect the integrity of the judicial process” by “prevent[ing] parties from playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self interest.” *Id.* “[A] party cannot advance one argument and then, for convenience or gamesmanship after that argument has served its purpose, advance a different and inconsistent argument.” *Hotard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 286 F.3d 814, 818 (5th Cir. 2002). “Statements made in a previous suit by an attorney before the court can be imputed to a party and subject to judicial estoppel.” *Hall v. GE Plastic Pacific PTE Ltd.*, 327 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2003). In order for a party to be estopped, two elements must be satisfied: (1) it must be shown “the position of the party to be estopped is clearly inconsistent with its previous one; and (2) that party must have convinced the court to accept that previous position. *In re Coastal Plains Inc.*, 179 F.3d 197, 206 (5th Cir. 1999).

The Plaintiffs argue, first, that withdrawing an objection and then raising the same argument later is not taking an “inconsistent position.” Second, the Plaintiffs argue that, since the HarbourVest Settlement was approved and the objection was *unsuccessful*, CLO Holdco could not “have convinced the court to accept that previous position.”

Highland argues that CLO Holdco’s withdrawal of its objection at the HarbourVest hearing, that was premised on a “Right of First Refusal” under the HCLOF Members Agreement, is, in fact, directly at odds with the Complaint, which asserts claims for violations of the same “Right of First Refusal.” Further, Highland argues that the Bankruptcy Court, in ruling on the HarbourVest Settlement, relied on the withdrawal of that objection—noting that the withdrawal “eliminate[d] one of the major arguments” being heard in connection with the HarbourVest

Settlement. Highland cites Fifth Circuit authority noting that the “judicial acceptance” requirement does not mean that the party against whom the judicial estoppel doctrine is to be invoked must have prevailed on the merits.” *Hall*, 327 F.3d at 398.

Here, the court believes that the first prong of judicial estoppel is met. At the HarbourVest Settlement hearing, CLO Holdco withdrew its objection, stating that it had determined it had no “Right of First Refusal,” based on its “interpretation of the member agreement.” Now Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that CLO Holdco’s “Right of First Refusal” was violated by the HarbourVest Settlement. These positions are clearly inconsistent. If that weren’t enough, when asked by Debtor’s counsel at the HarbourVest Settlement hearing to enter a stipulation reflecting the HarbourVest Settlement was compliant with all applicable agreements between CLO Holdco and the Debtor, counsel for CLO Holdco stated: “I’m not going to enter into a stipulation on behalf of my client, but *the Debtor is compliant with all aspects of the contract*. We withdrew our objection, and we believe that’s sufficient.”²² This statement cannot conceivably coexist with the current assertion of a “Right of First Refusal.” Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs argue that CLO Holdco merely withdrew an objection pertaining to an alleged “Right of First Refusal” *in the HCLOF Members Agreement* (and not an objection arguing that Highland had some non-contractual obligation to offer the HarbourVest Interest to CLO Holdco first, based on “fiduciary duty” concepts), this is “no more than ineffectual hair splitting.” *See Systems. Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp.*, 39 F.Supp.2d 773, 778 (N.D.Tex.1999) (in response to plaintiffs arguing a position taken in one suit could coexist with a position taken in a subsequent suit, despite each position being non-qualified, unconditional statements). It would seem to be the classic example of playing fast and loose with the court.

²² Transcript of Hearing Held 1/14/2021, DE # 1765, at 17:24-18:16 (emphasis added).

The court also believes that the second prong of judicial estoppel is met. The Fifth Circuit has held that judicial estoppel may be applied whenever a party makes an argument “with the explicit intent to induce the district court’s reliance.” *Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin*, 138 F.3d 1036, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, the success requirement is satisfied when a court “necessarily accepted, and relied on” a party’s position in making a determination. *Ahrens v. Perot Systems Corporation*, 205 F.3d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, while the Plaintiffs did not succeed in stopping the approval of the HarbourVest Settlement, that is not the proper inquiry. Instead, what matters is that the Bankruptcy Court carefully considered CLO Holdco’s “Right of First Refusal” argument set out in its lengthy, written objection to the HarbourVest Settlement and perceived it as one of the major arguments that was relevant to the HarbourVest Settlement. At the HarbourVest Settlement hearing, the Plaintiffs stated: “CLO Holdco has had an opportunity to review the reply briefing, and after doing so has gone back and scrubbed the HCLOF corporate documents. Based on our analysis of Guernsey law and some of the arguments of counsel in those pleadings and our review of the appropriate documents, I obtained authority from my client, Grant Scott, as Trustee for CLO Holdco, to withdraw the CLO Holdco objection based on the interpretation of the member agreement.”²³ The Bankruptcy Court relied upon that withdrawal of CLO Holdco’s objection in making the determination to approve of the HarbourVest Settlement and, specifically, that Highland would not be running afoul of any obligation in entering into the HarbourVest Settlement. There is no question that, by withdrawing the objection, CLO Holdco caused the court to rely upon its withdrawal in making such determination. Thus, the Plaintiffs “convinced the court to accept that previous position.”

²³ *Id.* at 7:24-8:6.

The Bankruptcy Court concludes both elements of judicial estoppel are met. Counts 2 and 5 of the Complaint are based solely upon a “Right of First Refusal” under the HCLOF Members Agreement. Thus, judicial estoppel bars Counts 2 and 5 of the Complaint.

IV. Conclusion

Based upon the facts alleged in the Complaint, the judicially noticed docket entries from the HarbourVest Settlement, and the arguments presented to the court, the court rules that, together, collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel preclude all claims brought in the Complaint. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is *granted* and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

Because this court believes the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel bar the claims of the Plaintiffs as a matter of law, the court—for the sake of efficiency and judicial economy—will forego addressing the other arguments of Highland. Specifically, Highland has argued that, even if all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred as a matter of law by preclusion or estoppel theories, Plaintiffs have failed to state plausible claims upon which relief can be granted with regard to the all of counts in the Complaint based on the RICO statute, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract, Negligence, and Tortious Interference with Contract. While this court is inclined to agree with these arguments, the court will refrain from addressing them until such time as any higher court may instruct this court to address them.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is **GRANTED** as to all causes of action (Counts 1-5) asserted in the Complaint with prejudice.

###END OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER###

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT APPELLATE RECORD

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Currently before the District Court is the appeal of the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the adversary proceeding. One of the bases cited by the bankruptcy court for imposing judicial estoppel is a transcript of a hearing that occurred before the bankruptcy court, on January 14, 2021.¹ In the transcript of that hearing, counsel for the debtor, Mr. Morris, is quoted as stating (in relevant part),

I would respectfully request that we just enter into a short stipulation on the record reflecting that the Debtor's acquisition of Harbourvest's interests in HCLOF is compliant with all of the applicable agreements between the parties.²

Immediately thereafter, prior counsel for CLO Holdco, Ltd., is quoted as responding:

In response to Mr. Morris, I'm not going to enter into a stipulation on behalf of my client, but the Debtor is compliant with all aspects of the contract. We withdrew our objection, and we believe that's sufficient.³

The bankruptcy court's dismissal of the entire adversary on judicial estoppel grounds hinges in on the sentence "but the Debtor is compliant with all aspects of the contract" as a judicial admission which has been contradicted by the filing of the underlying suit.

Undersigned counsel requested the original recording of the hearing to verify the transcription. That recording was delivered on May 25, 2022. The recording makes clear that the word "but" at the beginning of "but the Debtor is compliant with all aspects of the contract" was wrongfully transcribed. The recording makes clear that what Mr. Kane said in actuality was:

In response to Mr. Morris, I'm not going to enter into a stipulation on behalf of my client **that** the Debtor is compliant with all aspects of the contract. We withdrew our objection, and we believe that's sufficient (emphasis added).

¹ See APP_000053.

² APP_001020.

³ Compare APP_000053 (Order) with APP_001020 (Tr. Of Hearing).

It is this correction—seemingly minor, but in the context of the opinion, is of significant consequence—that Appellants ask this for.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) allows a court to correct a transcription error to ensure that the record accurately reflects what occurred in the lower court:

(e) Correction or Modification of the Record.

(1) If any difference arises about whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference must be submitted to and settled by that court and the record conformed accordingly.

(2) If anything material to either party is omitted from or misstated in the record by error or accident, the omission or misstatement may be corrected and a supplemental record may be certified and forwarded:

(A) on stipulation of the parties;

(B) by the district court before or after the record has been forwarded;
or

(C) by the court of appeals.

FED. R. APP. P. 10(e)(1)-(2)(A).

The bankruptcy court issued a corrected transcript on May 26, 2022. *See In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, No. 19-bk-34054, **Docket No. 3348**. Movants respectfully request that this corrected transcript be made part of the appellate record.

Dated: May 26, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Undersigned counsel attempted to meet and confer with counsel for the debtor via email on May 25, 2022. Counsel for the debtor related that they would confirm whether they opposed or consented. At the time of preparation of this brief, 6:00 pm on May 26, 2022, we have not heard back. Should they respond we will supplement or amend this certificate.

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti

Amended 05/26/2022

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:) **Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11**
) Chapter 11
)
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Dallas, Texas
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,) Thursday, January 14, 2021
) 9:30 a.m. Docket
Debtor.)
) - MOTION TO PREPAY LOAN
) [1590]
) - MOTION TO COMPROMISE
) CONTROVERSY [1625]
) - MOTION TO ALLOW CLAIMS OF
HARBOURVEST [1207]

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STACEY G.C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

WEBEX APPEARANCES:

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003670

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| 18 | Recorded by: | Michael F. Edmond, Sr. |
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| | | (214) 753-2062 |

21 Transcribed by: Kathy Rehling
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25 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording;
transcript produced by transcription service.

1 | DALLAS, TEXAS - JANUARY 14, 2021 - 9:41 A.M.

2 THE CLERK: All rise. The United States Bankruptcy
3 Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, is
4 now in session, the Honorable Stacey Jernigan presiding.

5 THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. All
6 right. We're a little late getting started because we had
7 lots of reading material for the Court today. All right.
8 This is Judge Jernigan, and we have a couple of Highland
9 settings. The HarbourVest matters are the primary thing we
10 have set today, and then we also have a Debtor's motion
11 pursuant to protocols for authority for Highland Multi-Strat
12 to prepay a loan.

13 All right. Well, let's get a few appearances. First, for
14 the Debtor team, who do we have appearing this morning?

15 MR. POMERANTZ: Good morning, Your Honor. It's Jeff
16 Pomerantz, John Morris, and Greg Demo here on behalf of the
17 Debtor.

18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

19 All right. We have objections on HarbourVest. Who do we
20 have appearing for Mr. Dondero this morning?

21 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, it's John Wilson, and I'm
22 also joined by Michael Lynn, John Bonds, and Bryan Assink.

23 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. Could -- the court
24 reporter does yeoman's work in this case. Let me just make
25 sure we got all three of those names. Say again, Mr. Wilson.

1 MR. WILSON: John Bonds and Michael Lynn and Bryan
2 Assink.

3 THE COURT: Oh, okay. So, see, I thought I heard
4 somebody Wilson in all of that, which was why I was pressing
5 the issue.

6 All right. Is Mr. Dondero present on the video for
7 today's hearing?

8 MR. WILSON: I believe he is, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: Mr. Dondero, could you confirm that you
10 are out there? (No response.) Okay. My court reporter says
11 he sees the name out there. Is he in your office?

12 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, he is appearing remotely
13 from my office. I'm not sure exactly where he's appearing
14 from.

15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, Mr. Dondero, if you're out
16 there and you're speaking up to confirm you're present, we're
17 not hearing you. Maybe your device is on mute. So please
18 unmute yourself.

| | |
|----|----------------|
| 19 | (No response.) |
|----|----------------|

20 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take some other
21 appearances and you -- you need to try to communicate with
22 your client and let him know I need to confirm he's present.
23 Okay?

24 All right. Meanwhile, let's go to our other Objectors.

25 CLO Holdco. Who do we have appearing today?

1 MR. KANE: John Kane; Kane Russell Coleman & Logan;
2 on behalf of CLO Holdco.

3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Kane.

4 We had an objection from Dugaboy Investment Trust and Get
5 Good Trust. Who do we have appearing?

6 MR. DRAPER: Douglas Draper, Your Honor, for -- for
7 Draper.

8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Draper.

9 All right. I think those were the only written objections
10 we had. Mr. Pomerantz, do you confirm, we don't have any
11 other objectors for the motions set, correct?

12 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, there was those three.

13 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't catch your full
14 sentence.

15 MR. POMERANTZ: That is correct, Your Honor. There
16 were three objections to the motion.

17 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Clemente, you're there for the
18 Creditors' Committee?

19 MR. CLEMENTE: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Matt
20 Clemente on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured
21 Creditors.

22 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Thank you.
23 All right. We have a lot of other folks on the video. I'm
24 not going to go ahead and take a roll call of other lawyers.

25 MS. WEISGERBER: Your Honor?

1 THE COURT: Yes?

2 MS. WEISGERBER: Excuse me, Your Honor. It's Erica
3 Weisgerber from Debevoise on behalf of HarbourVest.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MS. WEISGERBER: And I'm joined by Natasha Labovitz
6 and Dan Stroik --

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 MS. WEISGERBER: -- from Debevoise as well.

9 THE COURT: Thank you. I was neglectful in not
10 getting your appearance, because, of course, you're at the
11 front and center of this motion to compromise, and I did see
12 that you filed a reply brief yesterday afternoon. Okay.
13 Thank you.

14 All right. Do we have -- do we have Mr. Dondero on the
15 line? I'm going to check again.

| | |
|----|----------------|
| 16 | (No response.) |
|----|----------------|

17 THE COURT: Mr. Dondero's counsel, I cannot hear you,
18 so please unmute your device.

19 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, it appears to me that Mr.
20 Dondero's device was unmuted as soon as you asked if he was
21 available. I sent him a communication a second ago asking if
22 he's having technical difficulties. I have not received a
23 response, so I --

24 MR. DONDERO: Hello. Can anybody hear me?

25 THE COURT: Oh.

1 MR. WILSON: Okay. I hear him.

2 THE COURT: Mr. Dondero?

3 MR. DONDERO: Hello?

4 THE COURT: Is that you?

5 MR. DONDERO: Yeah, it is. I've been on. I've heard
6 everything since the beginning. It's just we've had technical
7 difficulties. I couldn't use the Highland offices. We've
8 been trying to set up something else.

9 THE COURT: All right.

10 MR. DONDERO: But I'm on now, if -- yes.

11 THE COURT: All right. Very good. Well, I'm glad
12 we've got you.

13 All right. Well, Mr. Pomerantz, how did you want to
14 proceed this morning?

15 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, we could take up the
16 HarbourVest motion first, and I will turn it over to John
17 Morris. He and Greg Demo will be handling that. And then
18 after that we can handle the other motion, which is unopposed.

19 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Morris?

20 MR. KANE: Your Honor, this is -- sorry. This is
21 John Kane for CLO Holdco. Just very briefly, if I may. And
22 this will affect, I think, the Debtor's case in chief, so I'll
23 expedite things a little bit, I believe.

24 CLO Holdco has had an opportunity to review the reply
25 briefing, and after doing so has gone back and scrubbed the

1 HCLOF corporate documents. Based on our analysis of Guernsey
2 law and some of the arguments of counsel in those pleadings
3 and our review of the appropriate documents, I obtained
4 authority from my client, Grant Scott, as Trustee for CLO
5 Holdco, to withdraw the CLO Holdco objection based on the
6 interpretation of the member agreement.

7 THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you for that, Mr.
8 Kane. I think that -- that eliminates one of the major
9 arguments that we had anticipated this morning. So, thank you
10 for that.

11 Any other housekeeping matters that maybe someone had that
12 I didn't ask about?

13 MS. MATSUMURA: Yes, Your Honor. This is Rebecca
14 Matsumura from King & Spalding representing Highland CLO
15 Funding, Ltd. I just wanted to put on the record, we -- our
16 client had requested that some of its organizational documents
17 be filed under seal. But we have given permission for the
18 parties to present the relevant excerpts, to the extent it's
19 still relevant after Mr. Kane's announcement, in court. And
20 we'd just ask that the underlying documents remain sealed, but
21 we're not going to object if they show them on a PowerPoint or
22 anything like that.

23 So, to the extent that you had that on your radar, I just
24 wanted to clear that up for the proceedings.

25 THE COURT: All right. Well, I did sign an order

1 | late last night. I don't know if it's popped up on the
2 | docket.

3 MS. MATSUMURA: Yes, Your Honor. That's what this
4 referred to. That was what -- these are the documents that
5 were being sealed. And so I just wanted to note, if you --
6 you know, if the Debtor puts up an excerpt of those documents
7 and you're like, wait a minute, didn't I seal those, that we
8 were the party that requested them be under seal and we're
9 fine with them being shown in court, as long as the underlying
10 documents aren't publicly accessible.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Got you. Thank you.

12 || All right. Any other housekeeping matters?

13 MR. MORRIS: Yes, Your Honor. This is John Morris
14 from Pachulski Stang for the Debtor. Good morning.

15 THE COURT: Good morning.

16 MR. MORRIS: The only other matter that I wanted to
17 raise, and I can do it now or I can do it later, or Your Honor
18 may tell me that it's not appropriate to do at this time, is
19 to schedule the Debtor's motion to hold Mr. Dondero in
20 contempt for violation of the TRO.

21 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's do that at the
22 conclusion today. And please make sure I do it. I think I
23 was going to address this last Friday, and we went very late
24 and it slipped off my radar screen. But I did see from my
25 courtroom deputy that you all were reaching out to her

1 yesterday to get this set, and then Mr. Dondero's counsel
2 reached out to her and said, We're going to file an objection
3 to a setting next Wednesday, or I think you had asked for a
4 setting next Tuesday or Wednesday.

5 MR. MORRIS: I did.

6 THE COURT: And I don't -- I don't know if that
7 response/objection was ever filed last night. I haven't seen
8 it if it was. So, we'll -- please, make sure I don't forget.
9 We'll take that up at the end of today's matters. All right.
10 Well, --

11 MR. MORRIS: All right. So, --

12 MS. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, one last housekeeping
13 item from -- I'm joined this morning by Michael Pugatch of
14 HarbourVest, who will present some testimony this morning. I
15 just want to confirm he's on the line and confirm no
16 objections to him sitting in for the rest of the hearing.

17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pugatch, this is Judge
18 Jernigan. Could you respond? Are you there with us?

19 MR. PUGATCH: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Mike
20 Pugatch from HarbourVest here.

21 THE COURT: All right. Very good. I think we had
22 you testify once before in the Acis matter, if I'm not
23 mistaken. Maybe. Maybe not. Maybe I saw a video deposition.
24 I can't remember.

25 All right. So, we're going to let Mr. Pugatch sit in on

1 this. Anyone want to say anything about that? I consider him
2 a party representative, so I don't -- I don't think anyone
3 could invoke the Rule.

4 All right. Very good. Well, let's go forward if there
5 are no more housekeeping matters.

6 MR. MORRIS: Okay.

7 THE COURT: Mr. Morris?

8 MR. MORRIS: Thank you. Thank you very much, Your
9 Honor. John Morris; Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones; for the
10 Debtor.

11 It's a rather straightforward motion today. It's a motion
12 under Rule 9019, pursuant to which the Debtor requests the
13 Court's authority and approval to enter into a settlement
14 agreement with HarbourVest that will resolve a number of
15 claims that HarbourVest has filed against the Debtor.

16 What I -- the way I propose to proceed this morning, Your
17 Honor, is to give what I hope is an informative but relatively
18 brief opening statement. I'll defer to HarbourVest and its
19 counsel as to whether they want to make a presentation in
20 advance of the offer of evidence. Any objecting party, I
21 suppose, should then be given the opportunity to present their
22 case to the Court. Then the Debtor will call Jim Seery, the
23 Debtor's CEO and CRO. We will offer documents into evidence.
24 I would propose then that the objecting parties take the
25 opportunity to ask Mr. Seery any questions they'd like on the

1 matter.

2 After the Debtor rests, I think HarbourVest would like to
3 put Mr. Pugatch on the stand to offer some testimony on their
4 behalf. And I think that that will conclude the case. We can
5 finish up with some closing arguments as to what we believe
6 the evidence showed, but that's the way that I'd like to
7 proceed, if that's okay with the Court.

8 THE COURT: All right. That sounds fine.

9 OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR

10 MR. MORRIS: Okay. So, as I said, Your Honor, this
11 is a -- this should be a very straightforward motion under
12 Rule 9019. The standard is well-known to the Court. There
13 are four elements to a 9019 motion. The Debtor clearly has
14 the burden of proof on each one. And we easily meet that
15 burden, Your Honor.

16 The standard, just to be clear, the first part is that we
17 have to establish a probability of success, with due
18 consideration for uncertainty of law and fact. The second one
19 is the complexity, likely duration, expense and inconvenience
20 of the litigation. The third part of the test is the
21 paramount interest of creditors. And the fourth part of the
22 test is whether or not the proposed settlement was reached
23 after arm's-length negotiations.

24 The Debtor believes that it easily meets this standard,
25 and frankly, is a little bit frustrated that it's being forced

1 | to incur the expense by Mr. Dondero in going through this
2 | process.

3 A plain reading, a fair reading of the economics here
4 relative to the claim shows that this is a very reasonable
5 settlement. I don't need to go beyond that, Your Honor. I
6 don't even need to use the word reasonable. It surely meets
7 the lowest standard.

8 We've prepared a couple of demonstrative exhibits, Your
9 Honor. I'm going to use them with Mr. Seery. But I'd like to
10 just put one up on the screen now, if I may.

11 Ms. Canty, can you please put up Demonstrative Exhibit #3?

12 Demonstrative Exhibit #3 is an outline of the economics of
13 the settlement. It includes the various pieces, the
14 components that the parties have agreed to. And it shows, at
15 least from the Debtor's perspective, just what HarbourVest is
16 being given here.

17 Up on the screen is a demonstrative exhibit. It has
18 citations to the evidence that will be admitted by the Court.
19 The first line shows that HarbourVest will receive a \$45
20 million allowed general unsecured nonpriority claim. And that
21 -- that can be found at Debtor's Exhibit EE, Exhibit 1, at
22 Page 2.

23 That claim is discounted by the expected recovery that
24 general unsecured creditors are supposed to get. As of
25 November, in the liquidation analysis that was part of the

1 disclosure statement -- that's the citation in the footnote --
2 the Debtor believed that unsecured creditors were estimated to
3 recover approximately eighty-seven and a half cents on the
4 dollar. And so we just did the arithmetic there to get to the
5 net economic value of the proposed general unsecured claim.

6 And from that, we reduced \$22-1/2 million because that is
7 the net asset value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which,
8 pursuant to the settlement agreement, it will transfer back to
9 the Debtor, so that the net economic value is approximately
10 \$16.8 million.

11 You will hear testimony from Mr. Seery that this number
12 is, in fact, overstated, and it's overstated because, since
13 the time the disclosure statement was filed in November, a
14 number of events have occurred that will -- that have caused
15 the estimated recovery percentage to be reduced from
16 approximately 87-1/2 percent to something lower than that. We
17 don't have the exact number, Your Honor, but Mr. Seery will --
18 and the evidence will show that there's been more expenses,
19 that there's been some resolution of certain claims. There's
20 been some positive issues, too. But that number is probably
21 in the 70s somewhere.

22 And in any event, I think the point here is, Your Honor,
23 HarbourVest invested \$80 million in HCLOF, which was going to
24 participate in the investment in CLOs. They filed a claim for
25 \$300 million, through treble damages and other claims. But

1 the net economic impact of this is going to be somewhere
2 probably in between \$12 and \$14 million. I'll let Mr. Seery
3 give more precision to that. And it represents less than -- a
4 less than five percent recovery on the total claim.

5 And we think it's important for the Court to keep that in
6 mind. What are the economics here? Are we overpaying? Is
7 this an unreasonable settlement? And I think the evidence
8 will show that the Debtor is not, but that this settlement
9 that you see before you was the product of arm's length, and
10 I'm going to go in reverse order of the four-part test under
11 9019.

12 So, the last part is whether or not the settlement, the
13 proposed settlement was the product of arm's-length
14 negotiation. You'll hear lots of evidence that this
15 settlement that's up on the screen right now very much was the
16 product of arm's-length negotiation.

17 The third part of the test, Your Honor, is whether it
18 meets the paramount interest of creditors. You know,
19 regrettably, Mr. Dondero is the only purported creditor who is
20 objecting here. He may have done so through different
21 vehicles, but every objecting party here is a debtor [sic]
22 owned and controlled by Mr. Dondero. No other creditor -- not
23 the Creditors' Committee, UBS, Acis, Mr. Terry, Mr. Daugherty
24 -- nobody is objecting to this settlement except for Mr.
25 Dondero. And we believe that that highlights the Debtor's

1 | ability to meet the third prong of the test, and that is these
2 | are -- this settlement is in the paramount interest of
3 | creditors.

4 Again, going in reverse, the second part of the test is
5 the complexity, duration, and expense of litigation. There
6 will be no disputed evidence that we meet -- the Debtor easily
7 meets this prong of the test. The evidence is going to show
8 that HarbourVest's claim is based on fraud, fraud in the
9 inducement, fraudulent statements and omissions, the kind of
10 case, Your Honor, that I'm sure you're familiar with that is
11 incredibly fact-intensive, that will be incredibly difficult
12 to navigate through. It will be prolonged, it will be
13 expensive, because you're necessarily relying on he said/she
14 said, basically. And so we're going to have to get testimony
15 from every person that spoke in connection with the events
16 leading up to the transaction. So we think the second prong
17 will be easily met, Your Honor.

18 And then the last prong -- the first prong, if you will --
19 is the likelihood of success on the merits. We think that the
20 settlement, the economic recovery that's up on the screen
21 here, which ultimately will be less than five percent of the
22 claimed amount, in and of itself shows that the settlement is
23 consistent with the Debtor's perception of its likely success
24 on the merits. I'm certain that HarbourVest disagrees, but
25 that's okay, we're here today and that's the Debtor's view,

1 and the Court is here to assess the Debtor's business judgment
2 and whether the Debtor has properly analyzed the issues and
3 gone through the process. And the evidence will show
4 conclusively that it will. That it has.

5 Mr. Seery will testify at some length as to the risks that
6 he saw. I think that you'll hear counsel for Mr. Dondero ask
7 both Mr. Seery and Mr. Pugatch a number of questions designed
8 to elicit testimony about this defense or that defense. And
9 it's a little -- it's a little ironic, Your Honor, because,
10 really, every defense that they're going to try to suggest to
11 the Court was a valid defense is a defense that the Debtor
12 considered. In fact, it's, you know, it's a little spooky,
13 how they've -- how they've been able to identify kind of the
14 arguments that the Debtor had already considered in the
15 prosecution of their objections here.

16 But be that as it may, the evidence will conclusively show
17 that the Debtor acted consistent with its fiduciary duties,
18 acted in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, acted
19 completely appropriately here in getting yet another very
20 solid achievement for the Debtor, leaving very few claims that
21 are disputed at this point, all but one of which I believe are
22 in the hands of Mr. Dondero.

23 So, that's what we think that the evidence will show.

24 I do want to express my appreciation to Mr. Kane for
25 reflecting on the arguments that we made with respect to the

1 ability of the Debtor to engage in the transfer or the
2 acquisition of the asset from HarbourVest. I would -- I would
3 respectfully request that we just enter into a short
4 stipulation on the record reflecting that the Debtor's
5 acquisition of HarbourVest's interests in HCLOF is compliant
6 with all of the applicable agreements between the parties.

7 And with that, Your Honor, I look forward to putting Mr.
8 Seery on the stand and presenting the Debtor's case.

9 THE COURT: All right. Other opening statements?

10 OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF CLO HOLDCO, LTD.

11 MR. KANE: Yes, Your Honor. Sorry. John Kane on
12 behalf of CLO Holdco.

13 In response to Mr. Morris, I'm not going to enter into a
14 stipulation on behalf of my client that the Debtor is
15 compliant with all aspects of the contract. We withdrew our
16 objection, and we believe that's sufficient.

17 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm content with that.

18 Other opening statements?

19 | OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF HARBOURVEST

20 MS. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, Erica Weisgerber on
21 behalf of HarbourVest.

HarbourVest joins in Mr. Morris's comments in support of the settlement, and we believe that the question of whether the settlement between HarbourVest and the Debtor satisfies the Rule 9019 standard is not even a close one.

1 Some Objectors have made arguments about the merits of
2 HarbourVest's claims, which is why we're here. As Your Honor
3 will hear this morning, HarbourVest has meaningful and
4 meritorious claims against Highland, but made the business
5 decision to avoid the time, expense, and inherent risk of
6 litigation in the interest of preserving value, both for
7 itself and for the estate.

8 Today, Michael Pugatch, a managing director of
9 HarbourVest, will testify before the Court. He'll explain
10 that HarbourVest claims against Highland arise out of certain
11 misrepresentations and omissions by Highland to HarbourVest in
12 connection with HarbourVest's purchase of an interest in
13 HCLOF, one of Highland's managed funds. Those
14 misrepresentations and omissions, as Your Honor will hear,
15 relate to Highland's litigation with its former employee,
16 Joshua Terry, and transfers that were conducted in 2017 to
17 strip Acis of value and prevent Mr. Terry from collecting on
18 an \$8 million judgment.

19 Mr. Pugatch will further explain that HarbourVest would
20 not have invested in HCLOF had it known the underlying facts
21 about those Acis transfers.

22 Mr. Pugatch will also testify that not only did
23 HarbourVest not know about those transfers, it learned about
24 those transfers when it was accused of orchestrating the
25 transfers itself in the Acis bankruptcy. Your Honor will hear

1 that the Acis trustee sought extensive discovery from
2 HarbourVest after numerous accusations that HarbourVest was
3 behind the transfers.

4 Mr. Pugatch will also testify that Highland charged legal
5 fees for itself and its affiliates to HCLOF, essentially
6 forcing HCLOF to fund the litigation involving the Acis
7 bankruptcy and Mr. Terry.

8 In total, HarbourVest's claims for damages are over a
9 hundred million dollars in investment-related losses, lost
10 profits, legal fees inappropriately charged to HCLOF, its own
11 legal fees. And that's before interest or trebling damages.

12 But HarbourVest stands ready to litigate its claims, but
13 following hard-fought and extensive negotiations with the
14 Debtors, the parties reached the settlement that's now before
15 the Court. Mr. Pugatch's testimony regarding the strong
16 factual bases for HarbourVest's claims against Highland and
17 its recoverable damages will further underscore the risks that
18 the Debtors faced if they chose to litigate these claims, and
19 why this settlement is fair, equitable, and in the best
20 interest of the estate.

21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.

22 Other opening statements?

23 OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF GET GOOD AND DUGABOY TRUSTS

24 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is Douglas Draper on
25 behalf of one of the Objectors. I'd like to just make a few

1 | comments with respect to what I've heard and what the Court is
2 | going to hear.

3 The first issue I'd like to address is the comment by
4 counsel for the Debtor that no other party has objected. The
5 9019 motion is one of the issues that this Court has to rule
6 on, whether or not there was an objection or not. So the fact
7 that this may be -- bankruptcy is not a popularity contest and
8 not an issue of who votes for what and doesn't vote. This,
9 along with the 1129(a) tests, are clearly within your
10 province, and you need to listen carefully because you'll have
11 to make your own independent analysis whether my objection is
12 correct or incorrect.

Two other points I'd like to make that I think are very salient. Number one is, if you look at the Debtor's disclosure statement, it basically took the position that the HarbourVest claim is of little or no value. And lo and behold, thirty days later, there's a settlement that brings about a significant recovery to HarbourVest. The timing is interesting, and I think the Court needs to pay careful attention to what transpired between the two dates.

21 And then the last point I'd like to make is, as you listen
22 to the evidence, and what I learned abundantly clear from
23 hearing the depositions, is that the claim of HarbourVest, if
24 there is a claim at all, is probably one hundred percent --
25 should be subordinated in that it appears to arise out of the

1 purchase or sale of a security. And, again, I would ask the
2 Court to listen carefully to this because that's what it
3 appears to be and that's what the evidence is going to show to
4 the Court.

5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Draper, let me clarify
6 something I'm not sure if I heard you say or not. Were you
7 saying that the Court still needs to drill down on the issue
8 of whether the Debtor can acquire HarbourVest's interest in
9 HCLOF?

10 MR. DRAPER: No.

11 THE COURT: Okay. I was confused whether you were
12 saying I needed to take an independent look at that, now that
13 the objection has been withdrawn of Holdco. You are not
14 pressing that issue?

15 MR. DRAPER: No, I am not. Basically, I think it's
16 the fairness of the settlement. I think the transferability
17 of the interest is separate and apart from the fairness of the
18 settlement itself. I think the fairness -- the
19 transferability was a contractual issue between two parties
20 that the Court does not have to drill down on.

21 THE COURT: All right. I have another question for
22 you. I want to clarify your client's standing. Tell me --
23 I'm looking through a chart I printed out a while back. I
24 guess Dugaboy Investment Trust filed a couple of proofs of
25 claim; is that right?

1 MR. DRAPER: Yes.

2 THE COURT: Okay. What --

3 MR. DRAPER: And objections are pending.

4 THE COURT: Pardon?

5 MR. DRAPER: Objections to those claims are pending
6 before the Court, Your Honor, --

7 THE COURT: Okay.

8 MR. DRAPER: -- and have not been litigated.

9 THE COURT: And what about Get Good Trust?

10 MR. DRAPER: Get Good Trust has a proof of claim also
11 that objections are pending to. Pending.

12 THE COURT: Okay. I don't want to get too
13 sidetracked here, but I know standing was -- was mentioned as
14 a legal argument today. What is the basis for those proofs of
15 claim?

16 MR. DRAPER: The first one is, with respect to the
17 proof of claim for Dugaboy, there is an investment that
18 Dugaboy made that was then funneled, we believe, up to the
19 Debtor. And the -- the loan that exists, we believe is a
20 Debtor loan, as opposed to a loan to the entity that we made
21 the loans to.

22 And, again, it's a matter that the Court is going to hear.
23 The claim may or may not be allowed. It has not been
24 disallowed yet.

25 The second part to the Dugaboy ownership is we own an

1 Mr. Morris, you may call your first witness.

2 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Before I do,
3 just two very, very quick points.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. MORRIS: To be clear, Dugaboy's interest in the
6 Debtor is 0.1866 percent. Less than two-tenths of one
7 percent.

8 Secondly, the argument that Mr. Draper just made with
9 respect to subordination is one that appears in nobody's
10 papers. And, in fact, not only doesn't it appear in anybody's
11 papers, but Mr. Dondero, I believe, specifically took issue
12 with the fact that a portion of the consideration that
13 HarbourVest would receive would be on a subordinated basis,
14 and he would -- and I think he took the position there is no
15 basis to give them a subordinated claim.

16 So, I just wanted to point those items out to the Court,
17 not that I think either one makes a large difference today,
18 but I do want to deal with the facts.

19 THE COURT: Thank you.

20 MR. MORRIS: The Debtor would call -- you're welcome,
21 Your Honor. The Debtor calls Mr. James Seery.

22 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Seery, welcome back to
23 virtual court. If you could say, "Testing, one, two" so I can
24 see you and swear you in.

25 MR. SEERY: Testing, one, two.

Seery - Direct

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1 In addition, and this was the first time we saw that,
2 HarbourVest brought forth its claims that it was entitled to
3 effectively rescind the transaction. And I say rescind the
4 transaction: In security parlance, they claim that they were
5 induced by fraud, I think as most are -- to enter into the
6 transaction.

7 As most are aware, the liability limitations in the OMs
8 and the exculpation in the documents are pretty broad, and
9 HarbourVest's position was that they weren't going to be
10 subject to those limitations because the actual transaction
11 that they entered into was a fraud on them, designed by Mr.
12 Dondero, Mr. Ellington, and the Highland team.

13 Q All right. Let's talk about your understanding, the
14 Debtor's understanding of the factual background to
15 HarbourVest's claim. What is your understanding of the
16 investment that HarbourVest made?

17 A Well, HarbourVest made an investment in the Highland CLO
18 business. The Highland CLO business was -- was Acis. And
19 effectively, the business had been separated, but in name
20 only. Acis was just a shell, with a few partners --
21 obviously, Mr. Terry as well -- but it was all Highland
22 personnel doing all the work.

23 And what they were trying to do with Acis was, in essence,
24 resuscitate a business that had been in a bit of a decline
25 from its pre-crisis heyday.

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Seery - Direct

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1 pretty straightforward, let's take all the assets -- Dondero
2 scheme -- let's take all the assets and move them back into
3 Highland so Terry can't get anything.

4 Q And how does that scheme relate to the HarbourVest claim,
5 to the best of your knowledge?

6 A Well, HarbourVest -- HarbourVest's position is that they
7 invested in Acis and -- and whether Acis was called Acis or
8 called Highland, it doesn't really matter; there were valuable
9 assets in the -- in the entity that they were going to be
10 investing in through the equity in these CLOs and some of the
11 debt securities in those CLOs.

12 And then the stripping out and the fraudulent conveyances
13 out of Acis caused them damages because that's what left the
14 damage to Mr. Terry.

15 The quick math on Acis, by the way, is Acis has probably
16 lost, total damages, 175 million bucks. And that's pretty
17 easy. DAF lost 50. HarbourVest lost 50. Fifteen million of
18 fees charged to HCLOF. Another five million of fees, at
19 least, incurred by Mr. Terry. Ten million that went to Mr.
20 Terry, 15 to Highland fees, another five, plus Mr. Terry's
21 settlement in this case, over eight million bucks.

22 So HarbourVest's position, which, on a factual basis, you
23 know, is problematic for the estate, is, wait a second, we
24 invested in this vehicle with Highland. That was supposed to
25 invest in Highland CLOs. They were called Acis, but they were

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Seery - Direct

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1 A Yes, I have. But before I continue, I just -- I should
2 have checked. Are you able to hear me clearly? Am I speaking
3 too quickly or am I cutting out? I just want to make sure.
4 I'm using a different set of audio today.

5 THE COURT: All right.

6 MR. MORRIS: That's fine.

7 THE COURT: I hear you very well.

8 MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

9 THE COURT: So I think we're good right now. Thank
10 you.

11 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. I was
12 just checking.

13 THE COURT: Okay.

14 THE WITNESS: In response to your question, Mr.
15 Morris, yes, I have seen this before.

16 BY MR. MORRIS:

17 Q Okay. And can you -- did you form a view in doing the due
18 diligence as to the adequacy of this disclosure?

19 A Yes, I did.

20 Q Can you share your -- or share with Judge Jernigan the
21 Debtor's view as to the adequacy of this disclosure concerning
22 the litigation between Highland and Acis?

23 A With respect to the litigation between Highland and Acis,
24 or, really, between Acis, Highland, and Highland's principals
25 and Acis's principal, totally inadequate. The disclosure here

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Seery - Direct

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1 is very high-level. And if there were no other litigation
2 going on, it might serve to suffice. It basically says, In
3 our business, because we invest in distressed loans, there's a
4 lot of litigation around distressed investments, and that's
5 what we have. And then it says, We've talked with the
6 investor about other things and we're -- we think that's
7 enough.

8 Q Is there anything in this portion or anywhere in the
9 offering memorandum that you're aware of that disclosed to
10 HarbourVest that in the weeks leading up to the investment
11 Highland was engaged in the fraudulent transfer of assets away
12 from Acis?

13 A No. And I apologize, because I think it's -- I've
14 conflated two provisions. This one only deals with the very
15 high-level nature of the business. It doesn't give any
16 indication that there's any material litigation going on
17 elsewhere with respect to Acis.

18 I believe there's another provision that says, We -- we
19 have talked to -- oh, here -- I'm sorry. It is here.
20 Shareholders have had an opportunity to discuss with Highland
21 to their satisfaction all litigation matters against Highland
22 and its affiliates unrelated to its distressed business.

23 That, in my opinion, is wholly inadequate.

24 Q Okay.

25 MR. MORRIS: And let's put up -- actually, let's just

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8 So we do believe that that is a fair value as of that
9 date. It has not gone down. It hasn't gone up explosively,
10 either, but it hasn't gone down. We think that's good, real
11 value. That value is in the Acis CLOs, the equity in those
12 CLOs, which is 2 through 6, that we -- we will be working with
13 the HCLOF folks to get Mr. Terry to monetize those assets and
14 those longer-dated CLOs.

15 In addition, I think it's 85 percent of the equity in Acis
16 7 -- Acis 7 is managed by Highland -- that is also beyond its
17 reinvestment period. And in talking to the directors -- and
18 they're new directors, and I'll get to that in a minute, for
19 HCLOF -- they'll seek to push Highland, which is the
20 reorganized Highland, to monetize that asset, with due regard
21 to fair value.

22 In addition, Harbour -- HCLOF owned a significant amount
23 of the preferred or equity pieces, if you will, in the
24 Highland CLO, 1.0 CLOs. As we've talked about, those are not
25 really CLOs. Those are effectively closed-end funds with

5 But HCLOF also is a significant holder of those preferred
6 shares, and those directors would -- have indicated to me that
7 they would like to see those interests also monetized.

8 Q All right. Let's shift gears for a moment to talk about
9 the diligence that the Debtor did before entering into this
10 agreement. Can you just describe for the Court generally the
11 diligence that was undertaken at your direction?

12 A Well, when we first received the reply to our objection,
13 we dug into that reply and the specifics in it very
14 aggressively. So we reviewed all of the underlying documents
15 related to the original transaction. We discussed with
16 counsel the legal basis for the HarbourVest claims. We
17 interviewed our own HCMLP employees who were involved in the
18 transaction and tested their recollection, specifically around
19 who dealt with HarbourVest, who had the discussions with
20 HarbourVest, what was disclosed to HarbourVest with respect to
21 the Terry dispute and the Acis litigation.

22 We also had done, as I think the Court is well aware from
23 prior 9019 testimony, extensive work around the transfers and
24 the issues related to Acis. So we were familiar with their
25 impact on HCLOF.

Seery - Direct

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1 just wanted the Court to understand why they're in evidence.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

3 MR. MORRIS: You're welcome.

4 BY MR. MORRIS:

5 Q Let's talk about the Debtor and whether or not it had or
6 has any viable defenses. Did the Debtor form any views as to
7 whether or not it had any defenses to the HarbourVest claims?

8 A Yes, we did.

9 Q Can you describe for the Court the defenses that were
10 reviewed and analyzed by the Debtor?

11 A Yeah. I think we -- we had very significant defenses.
12 So, first and foremost, with respect to the original proof of
13 claim, as I mentioned earlier, it alluded to the expenses and
14 the overcharge. And I think with respect to the 15 million of
15 fees that were charged to HCLOF by Highland, we didn't have a
16 lot of defenses to that claim.

17 It's pretty clear, by any fair view of the Acis case, that
18 HCLOF, as the investor in the Acis CLOs and the Highland CLOs,
19 had no real responsibility for fighting with Acis and Josh
20 Terry and shouldn't have been charged those fees. I don't --
21 I don't think there's a legitimate investor that would
22 actually think that that was an appropriate amount to be
23 charged to a fund.

24 However, the claim was not as broad -- the proof of claim
25 was not as fulsome in terms of discussing and only vaguely

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Seery - Direct

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1 of digging into the public record, because you don't have to
2 go far on Google to find "fraud" within two words of
3 "Highland," and the tremendous, you know, litigious nature of
4 Highland. You know, even at that point, when this investment
5 was made, aside from Mr. Terry's arbitration, which by that
6 point, at least by the time (inaudible) was public, there was,
7 you know, significant public disclosure around the Credit
8 Strat and the litigation, the Crusader litigation, the UBS
9 litigation, the, gosh knows, the Daugherty litigation.

10 So our defense was going to be that you should have
11 figured this out, you're a sophisticated investor, and you
12 should have been able to figure out that there was significant
13 risk that, with respect to Mr. Terry, that Mr. Dondero would
14 not stop litigating and that those costs would put significant
15 risk on the investment.

16 The problem with that, as I mentioned earlier, is that the
17 OM is wholly deficient. If you have a typical risk factor in
18 the offering memorandum, you would have disclosed that there
19 was a litigation with Mr. Terry, a former partner in the
20 business, and that the Debtor had no intention of settling it.
21 There was no intention of settling. That litigation would go
22 on. It could go on for years and it could result in
23 bankruptcy or attachments and other risks to the business, and
24 that the investor should be fully aware that the Offeror does
25 not intend to be involved in any -- or the manager, in any

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Seery - Direct

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1 damages. Although in this case certainly somebody could lay
2 out the predicate acts and put forth a RICO-type argument, we
3 just didn't think that that had real merit in this commercial
4 dispute, even with a fraud claim.

5 But even without the trebling of the damages, there's no
6 dispute that HarbourVest lost more than \$50 million in this
7 investment. You know, we -- we thought about that risk as
8 well.

9 In addition, because the case would really be fact-based,
10 even if we had a high degree of confidence based upon our
11 discussions with our employees and the factual testimony, it
12 was going to be expensive to litigate this case, and time-
13 consuming.

14 And so we looked at the economic value, the potential
15 risks, and the actual value that we were giving up, and found
16 this to be an extremely, extremely reasonable settlement.

17 Importantly, and I think what drove it, you -- one of --
18 one of the things that drove it is another one of our defenses
19 on why, notwithstanding their -- what they held out as
20 meritorious claims, I don't think HarbourVest really wanted to
21 publicly litigate this claim. And we were aggressive in our
22 discussions with HarbourVest of how we would litigate it,
23 which would be quite publicly.

24 Now, that may or may not be fair, but that does put risk
25 on the counterparty. And so I think that helped drive the

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1 think there's an argument, and we analyzed it thoroughly, that
2 the injunction effectively caused a lot of the damages.
3 Because if you look at the values of the equity that
4 HarbourVest had, the -- and HCLOF had in the CLOs, it went
5 down dramatically after the Trustee in the Acis case took over
6 and then subsequently, when the case was reorganized and Mr.
7 Terry took over, you know, with Brigade as the sub-advisor.

8 Now, that would -- you know, we would -- we could
9 certainly attempt to throw, in our defense, the causation at
10 Mr. Terry's feet or at Mr. Phelan's feet. HarbourVest's
11 retort is that none of this would have occurred but for the
12 burn-it-down litigation that Mr. Dondero engaged in with
13 Highland.

14 In addition, in Mr. Terry's defense, you know, he did try
15 multiple times with HCLOF, tried to petition, if you will, the
16 HCLOF entity to -- and directors, former directors, to reset
17 the CLOs to make them more economically viable, based upon the
18 current level of asset returns versus the debt costs in the
19 CLOs. And that was rejected by the HCLOF and the Debtor as
20 the controlling party of HCLOF. So, we thought about those
21 risks.

22 You know, similarly, the economic values in Acis 7 went
23 down pretty significantly from that date as well. So I think
24 there's -- there are some defenses, but that's really Mr.
25 Terry's issue, not our issue. So we thought about those

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9 That led to Mr. Pugatch and I stepping away from counsel,
10 no offense to counsel, you know, ours and his, to begin
11 negotiations around the potential for a settlement. First, it
12 started with a 3018, and then, you know, argued that we would,
13 if we got past the 3018, we were going to litigate this,
14 because we effectively had -- thought we could get everyone
15 else done at -- in and around that time. And I think we were
16 also probably a little bit optimistic about UBS at that time
17 and the mediation, which subsequently we have settled. But
18 that was the genesis of those settlements.

19 Q And how did the structure, how did the Debtor and
20 HarbourVest derive at the structure whereby there is a general
21 unsecured claim, there is a subordinated piece, and there's
22 the takeback of the HCLOF interest?

23 A Well, as I outlined, we -- we aggressively set forth our
24 various defenses. Their position was that they -- they should
25 never have been in this transaction before. And they --

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1 HarbourVest is, in essence, a fund of funds, and they have
2 investors, and it certainly wouldn't be their, I'm sure, the
3 best-performing asset in their portfolio, to have made this
4 investment and lost \$50 million over this period of time. So
5 they felt strongly that they should never have been in this
6 investment, and but for the failure to disclose and the
7 improper disclosures, they would not have been in this
8 investment.

9 So, optically, getting out of it was important to them,
10 and that led to our idea and construction of a subordinated
11 claim and the transfer of the HCLOF interests to the estate.

12 Importantly, the HCLOF interests, as I mentioned, are --
13 the investments are in the Acis CLOs controlled by Acis and
14 Mr. Terry. The reorganized Acis. As well as the 1.0 CLOs and
15 the Acis 7.

16 So we were keenly focused on, if we were going to get that
17 interest, would we then have the majority control in HCLOF,
18 which we will, and would we be able to drive the recoveries,
19 as opposed to what Highland typically does in these
20 investments is use other people's money, drive down the value,
21 and then try to buy back the interest on the cheap.

22 Q Just in terms of timing, because I think there was a
23 suggestion in one of the openings that there was something
24 untoward about the timing here: At the time the liquidation
25 analysis was prepared on November 24th, had the Debtor reached

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Seery - Direct

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1 any agreement in principle with HarbourVest?

2 A If we had, it would have been reflected, so I don't -- I
3 don't think we were agreed by then. I don't recall the
4 specific dates, but if we had, it would have -- it would have
5 been reflected.

6 Q If I can refresh your recollection that the motion was
7 filed on December 24th, does that help form your understanding
8 or refresh your recollection that there was no agreement in
9 principle on November 24th?

10 A Yeah. Well, I'm quite sure there was no agreement in
11 principle or we would have reflected it minimally by a
12 footnote. There's -- there's no chance. It's a material
13 reduction in the claims pool that we were previously telling
14 people that, at least for purposes of distribution, like UBS
15 and a couple others we said we thought we would get to zero
16 on. So we didn't calculate in that amount. So I'm quite sure
17 we didn't have a deal when we filed the disclosure statement.

18 In terms of the timing, anyone who's done this business
19 for any degree of time knows that the crucible of bankruptcy
20 brings people to the settlement when they see something
21 happening in the case, and not before. I think HarbourVest
22 looked at our -- this is my supposition -- HarbourVest looked
23 at our plan, our ability to get this done, our settlement with
24 Redeemer, our settlement with Mr. Terry and Acis, and saw that
25 this plan was coming together, and if they didn't think about

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1 the settlement, they were going to think about not only the
2 risks that we laid forth for them with respect our defenses,
3 but also the opportunity to litigate with the Claimant Trustee
4 over a long period of time, which couldn't have been
5 particularly appetizing.

6 Q Can you describe for the Court the role played by the
7 independent board of Strand, the general partner of the
8 Debtor, in analyzing and participating in the approval
9 process?

10 A Yes. I think, as the Court is aware and I've testified
11 before, Mr. Russell Nelms and Mr. John Dubel are fellow
12 independent directors with me, appointed pursuant to the Court
13 order. They are kept abreast of every detail, and -- along
14 the way, not just in a summary form at the end. We have
15 reviewed and analyzed collectively each of the issues. Mr.
16 Dubel has extensive experience in these types of litigation
17 matters. Obviously, Mr. Nelms, from his -- both his practice
18 and his time on the bench, has a keen insight into how to
19 resolve and what the risks and benefits are from settling
20 litigation. So I consult them every step of the way.

21 Q And as part of this process, did the Debtor reach out to
22 the directors of HCLOF?

23 A Yes, we did. So, we reached out and we've had several
24 conversations on video chats with the directors. The
25 directors of HCLOF are two new gentlemen, Mr. Richard Boleat

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They were appointed by the old directors, Scott and Bestwick, and they have been in control. They have outside counsel, which is King & Spalding in the U.S. They have Guernsey counsel. They have accountants and professional advisors, and are being, in my opinion, exceptionally careful. I've got -- very quickly developed a lot of respect for them, and we consulted with them on this settlement and how it would work.

Q And is it your understanding that the directors of HCLOF approved of this transaction?

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1 of the transfer under the documents. We had a negotiation
2 with -- with those directors, and making sure that we did
3 everything correct -- correctly, excuse me -- with respect to
4 the requirements for the transfer under the documents. And
5 they've indicated their support and acknowledgement that we're
6 doing it correctly.

7 I don't know if it's fair to say they approved it. I'd
8 just have to go check the documents. But they certainly
9 support it. And I think they generally support our position
10 with respect to how to move forward with the assets.

11 Q I appreciate that. I guess I meant approval with a small
12 a and not a capital A.

13 You mentioned WilmerHale. Who do they represent in all of
14 this?

15 A WilmerHale is the Debtor's outside corporate counsel, in
16 particular with respect to the fund issues that we don't
17 handle in-house. We have significant support for fund issues
18 from the expertise of Mr. Surgent, who's been the CCO, and he
19 is also a lawyer, with respect to, you know, some of the
20 difficult fund issues that Highland has. But when we use
21 outside counsel, we use WilmerHale for that, and they've been
22 -- they've been exceptional.

23 Q Okay. Just the last two points that were made in Mr.
24 Dondero's objection, I believe. Did the Debtor overpay in
25 this settlement in order to gain the support of HarbourVest in

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1 connection with its -- with the Debtor's attempt to get its
2 plan confirmed?

3 A Not in any way. My -- I believe the settlement is
4 extremely reasonable. As I testified, it's -- it's less than
5 the -- the actual value going out, depending on unless there's
6 successful litigation, and there well could be, is less than
7 on a pro forma basis the fees that were taken and charged to
8 HCLOF. We didn't do this for votes. We will have Class 2,
9 Class 7, Class 8, and Class 9. So I don't think that's a --
10 there's no vote purchasing, I think you called it. No, not at
11 all.

12 Q Yeah. Well, on that topic, I think the phrase that was
13 used was gerrymandering. Are you aware of the argument that's
14 been made that the subordinated claim was dropped in there in
15 order to gerrymander a positive vote for the impaired class of
16 Class 9, I believe?

17 A In a word, I would say that's preposterous. The -- as I
18 said, we have a number of classes that will vote for the plan.
19 The plan is -- the plan is a monetization plan. And if -- if
20 the creditors determine that they don't want to pursue this
21 plan, we'll go forward with another -- we'll try to get
22 another plan. We tried to have a grand bargain plan. We
23 tried to have a pot plan, as I've testified previously. I'm
24 quite certain that I've done more work on that than anyone
25 else, including Mr. Dondero and anybody who works for him.

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1 And he hasn't been willing to do that.

2 This is a -- this is a plan that's come together. We
3 think it's going to be in the best interests of the estate.
4 That'll be confirmation next week. Or two weeks, I guess.
5 But I don't see how this is any way related -- this settlement
6 is not any way related to the voting on that -- on that -- on
7 that plan.

8 Q Just to put the finest point on it, is the Debtor relying
9 on Class 9 to be the impaired consenting class?

10 A No. I think -- I think what I've -- as I said, I believe
11 we already have the votes in Class -- I think it's 2 or 3, 7,
12 8, and -- and 9 will vote in favor as well. So that won't be
13 an issue.

14 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I have no further questions
15 of Mr. Seery.

16 THE COURT: All right. Pass the witness. I'll ask
17 HarbourVest counsel first: Do you have any questions of Mr.
18 Seery?

19 MS. WEISGERBER: No, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

21 What about cross-examination? Mr. Dondero's counsel?

22 CROSS-EXAMINATION

23 BY MR. WILSON:

24 Q Mr. Seery, how are you doing today?

25 A I'm well, thank you.

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Seery - Cross

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1 A I don't recall the date, but the triggering event was
2 HarbourVest's response to our omnibus objection.

3 Q Okay. And that would have been filed September 11th of
4 2020?

5 A I'll take your representation. I don't -- I don't recall
6 the specific date.

7 Q Okay. And so when you began to investigate the
8 HarbourVest claims, what was your initial reaction?

9 A My initial reaction was that the -- the larger claims that
10 they were asserting -- the fraud in the inducement, the RICO
11 -- that those claims were, in my view, attorney-made and that
12 when we dug in and did the work, we saw that HarbourVest
13 clearly lost north of \$50 million on the investment. We had
14 just started to uncover the fee issue and saw the risk we had
15 there.

16 But I thought the bulk of those claims were attorney-made.
17 Clever, but attorney-made, as opposed to what I would think
18 are more legitimate. And so we started to develop our
19 defenses around that.

20 Q And was your initial reaction that the HarbourVest claims
21 were largely worthless?

22 A I think with respect to the claim around the fees, I
23 believed there was significant risk. With respect to the
24 other claims, I thought our defenses would make them
25 worthless, yes.

003733

Seery - Cross

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1 Q And did you ever represent to any party that the
2 HarbourVest claim was worth, at most, \$5 million?

3 A I think I represented often, including to HarbourVest,
4 that it was worth nothing. I don't recall if I specifically
5 said \$5 million. \$5 million would have been a nominal amount
6 to -- which is litigation costs. So it may -- it may have
7 been in my models that I put in that as a settlement amount,
8 but I -- I thought that there were valid and good defenses to
9 those larger claims.

10 Q And you recognize that HarbourVest was a large,
11 sophisticated investor, correct?

12 A Yes. I think they manage north of -- right around a
13 hundred billion dollars.

14 Q And you recognize that HarbourVest routinely structured
15 complex customized investments, correct?

16 A I believe that -- I don't know the intricate part of their
17 businesses, but as a fund of funds who does creative
18 investments, I think that they do do quite a bit of that.
19 This, I believe, was their first investment in the CLO space.

20 Q And it was not -- or I should say, you did not believe
21 that HarbourVest was simply a passive investor in HCLOF,
22 correct?

23 A I don't think that that's true, no.

24 Q You don't -- you don't believe that you denied their claim
25 to be a passive investor?

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1 A Oh, I think -- I'm sure that in defense of their claims I
2 would argue that they were -- they were more than a passive
3 investor. But it was pretty clear when you look at the
4 structure of what they invested that there was an intent that
5 they be passive on their part. They didn't take a majority
6 interest.

7 In fact, Highland made it clear in the structure of the
8 deal that they couldn't -- it would be hard for them to get a
9 majority interest because Highland entities would control that
10 and Dondero-controlled entities or individuals would control
11 the majority.

12 I think that they -- they had hoped to be a passive
13 investor.

14 Q But was it not your position that HarbourVest was actually
15 an active, involved investor?

16 A I think our defense was going to be that they knew exactly
17 what was going on, that they participated, that they were
18 active, and that, indeed, that they were in and around some of
19 the subsequent issues in the Acis case.

20 Q And you understood that HarbourVest played a material role
21 in the various outcomes in the Acis bankruptcy case, correct?

22 A I don't believe that to be correct, no.

23 Q Have you ever made that representation to anyone before?

24 A Not -- not that I recall.

25 Q Well, do you recall giving statements to a reporter named

Seery - Cross

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1 Syed Khaderi?

2 A I've never spoken to a reporter named Syed Khaderi in my
3 life.

4 Q Well, did you participate in the preparation of statements
5 to be given to Syed Khaderi?

6 A I've never heard of Syed Khaderi, nor have I participated
7 in any preparation of statements. I don't know who that is.

8 MR. WILSON: All right. I'm going to have Bryan
9 Assink put on the screen a document.

10 And Bryan, can you go to Page 7? Bottom of -- the top of
11 Page 7. Well, actually, before you do that, go to the very
12 top of the document.

13 BY MR. WILSON:

14 Q Now, Mr. Seery, are you familiar with Lucy Bannon?

15 A Yes.

16 Q And who is Lucy Bannon?

17 A She is the Highland public relations person.

18 MR. WILSON: Okay. Now go back to Page 7.

19 BY MR. WILSON:

20 Q Now, do you -- do you see on your screen an email of
21 September 14th from Syed Khaderi that says, Hi, Lucy, how are
22 you?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Have you seen this email before?

25 A Not that I recall, no.

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Seery - Cross

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1 Q All right. It continues on that, I saw the filing on
2 Friday about HarbourVest claims against Highland for a CLO
3 investment, and I'm looking to put out a report tomorrow
4 morning London time. Ahead of that, I wanted to check if
5 Highland would like to comment on the matter.

6 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, this is -- the Debtor
7 respectfully objects. A, this document is not in evidence.
8 B, it's rank hearsay.

9 THE COURT: Response, Mr. Wilson?

10 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, I am attempting to
11 authenticate this document, but I'm using it in rebuttal to
12 the testimony that Mr. Seery just offered.

13 THE COURT: All right. I'll allow it. Overrule the
14 objection.

15 MR. WILSON: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

16 BY MR. WILSON:

17 Q All right. Now, if we -- and oh, that September 14th
18 date, that was three days after the September 11th date that
19 we discussed was the date that HarbourVest filed its response
20 to the omnibus objection, correct?

21 A Yes. If that's the date that they filed it, then I -- if
22 you're representing that, I concede that the 14th is three
23 days after the 11th.

24 Q All right. And if you go back to the first page of this,
25 it looks like, on the following day, Lucy Bannon sends an

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Seery - Cross

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1 email to you, and is that your email address,
2 jpseeryjr@gmail.com?

3 A That's correct, yes.

4 Q And do you recall receiving this email from Lucy Bannon?

5 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I renew my objection that
6 this is hearsay. He's not rebutting anything that Mr. Seery
7 testified to. He testified that he'd never heard of the
8 gentleman at the bottom of the document. There's nothing in
9 this document that rebuts Mr. Seery's testimony at all.

10 THE COURT: Response, Mr. Wilson?

11 MR. WILSON: Well, I'm not -- I'm not trying to rebut
12 his statement that he hadn't -- that he hadn't heard of Syed
13 Khaderi. My rebuttal is attempted to -- attempting to show
14 that he has made various statements that he denied.

15 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.

16 BY MR. WILSON:

17 Q All right. So, back to this exhibit, Mr. Seery. You
18 recall receiving this email from Lucy Bannon on Tuesday,
19 September 15, 2020?

20 A Not specifically. But to be clear, I recall talking to
21 Lucy Bannon about the HCMLP dispute with HarbourVest.

22 Q Okay. And --

23 MR. WILSON: Bryan, can you go down to the next page?
24 Scroll down to where -- the James Seery email.

25 BY MR. WILSON:

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Seery - Cross

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1 Q Do you see this email on your screen that's dated
2 September 15, 2020 at 10:33 p.m.?

3 A Yes, I do.

4 Q And do you recall sending this email to Lucy?

5 A Not specifically, no.

6 Q Well, do you deny that you sent this email to Lucy?

7 A It appears to be my email.

8 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, we would move to admit this
9 document into evidence as Dondero Exhibit Letter N.

10 THE COURT: Any objections?

11 MR. MORRIS: I would consent to the admission of Mr.
12 Seery's email, but the balance of it ought to be excluded as
13 hearsay.

14 THE COURT: What about that?

15 MR. WILSON: Well, Your Honor, I think that this
16 document -- and I'll get into this in a little more detail in
17 a second -- but I think this document is a combination of the
18 work product of Lucy Bannon and Mr. Seery in preparing a
19 response for the reporter who requested comment from Highland.

20 THE COURT: Okay. I --

21 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, um, --

22 THE COURT: Go ahead.

23 MR. MORRIS: I just -- I do question how they got
24 this document, but that's for another day. That's number one.
25 Number two, in addition to the hearsay argument, I just --

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2 THE COURT: Okay. I'll allow the portion that is the
3 communication of Seery, that portion of Exhibit N. All right?

11 THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. That'll be
12 allowed.

14 (James Dondero's Exhibit N is received into evidence as
15 specified.)

19 BY MR. WILSON:

25 MR. WILSON: Can you scroll down to that next page?

1 BY MR. WILSON:

2 Q And this says -- I think part of this got cut off for some
3 reason, but it looks like the official statement is in
4 quotation marks. It says, "We dispute the allegations made in
5 the filing and believe the underlying claims are invalid and
6 will be found to be without merit. Our focus continues to be
7 treating all valid claims in a transparent, orderly, and
8 equitable manner, and vigorously disputing meritless in the
9 court. That focus will assure that HCMLP's reorganization
10 process -- progress is towards an efficient and equitable
11 resolution."

12 And then below that there's another section of this email
13 that says, Background/Clarification, Not for Attribution. And
14 do you know the purpose of this second section of the
15 response?

16 A Do I know the purpose of that? Yes.

17 Q And what would that purpose be?

18 A Ms. Bannon was speaking on background to reporters. As I
19 said earlier, I've -- I never heard of the gentleman from
20 London. If he's at the bottom of the email, I didn't pay any
21 mind, never heard of him. Nor have I heard it since. Ms.
22 Bannon didn't ever reference the specific person.

23 But she is the public relations person. So, as I
24 testified earlier, she does communicate with the press. And
25 as I previously testified when Mr. Morris questioned me, one

1 discussion that she would have. So, no, she was not
2 authorized in any way whatsoever to send that out. She was
3 authorized to have conversations with those general facts.

4 MR. WILSON: Okay. Bryan, go to the top, or the
5 bottom of the page immediately preceding that. That's it.
6 Yes, that's it right there.

7 BY MR. WILSON:

8 Q Now, you'll see that this email from Lucy Bannon on
9 September 15, 2020 at 10:29 p.m. starts off, "Jim, let me know
10 what you think of the below. And, again, the first would be
11 on the record and the second will be sent for information
12 purposes to ensure accuracy, not for attribution."

13 So the intent was that this -- that this entire statement
14 be sent to the reporter, correct?

15 A I don't believe that's correct. I think when she goes on
16 background she doesn't send them a written doc. It's got to
17 be clear to the reporter, at least my understanding is that
18 what on background means -- I've been involved with this
19 before -- is that typically that's done orally. I don't know
20 if she's done it in a written statement before. I have never
21 seen that done in a written statement before. You give the
22 official statement and then you walk the reporter through your
23 other views on background. And you're not quoted. And it's
24 usually attributed to a source with knowledge.

25 Q Okay. We'll come back to that in a minute. The next

Seery - Cross

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1 sentence after the one I just read to you --

2 MR. WILSON: Go back to where we were on the
3 background.

4 BY MR. WILSON:

5 Q Now, we just read you the sentence that starts with, "Then
6 it's important." The following sentence says, "HarbourVest
7 was not simply invested in HCLOF as an ignorant,
8 unsophisticated, passive investor, but was an active and
9 informed participant in the inception of its investment
10 through all of the Acis bankruptcy proceedings, and
11 HarbourVest played a material role in various outcomes related
12 to that case and its impact on HCLOF."

13 And is it -- did you not just tell me before we
14 investigated this document that HarbourVest did not play a
15 material role in the various outcomes of the Acis bankruptcy?

16 A I don't know exactly what I said, but I think that's
17 correct, after we'd done the research on it, yeah.

18 Q But you took the position in this email that you approved
19 to go out to a reporter that says that -- that HarbourVest was
20 an active and informed participant in the inception of -- of
21 its investment through all of the Acis bankruptcy proceedings
22 and played a material role in various outcomes related to that
23 case and its impact on HCLOF. Can we agree with that?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And then the final sentence of this paragraph says that,

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Seery - Cross

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1 We believe that neither the facts nor the law support
2 HarbourVest's, quote, We-were-too-lazy-to-know allegations.

3 Whose words were those, "We-were-too-lazy-to-know
4 allegations"?

5 A I don't recall. They may be mine. It's aggressive the
6 way I am, so that -- that may well be the case.

7 MR. WILSON: All right. Go -- go down to the next
8 page.

9 BY MR. WILSON:

10 Q And with respect your comment that that second paragraph
11 would not have gone to the reporter, look at this email in the
12 middle of the page from Lucy Bannon to Syed Khaderi, September
13 16, 2020, at 1:51 a.m. And --

14 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, this I will object to as
15 hearsay. There is no witness here to testify to anything on
16 this document.

17 THE COURT: All right. How about that?

18 MR. WILSON: Well, it's -- well, scroll up just a
19 little bit. This email at the top of the page is three
20 minutes after the one in the middle of the page, where Lucy
21 Bannon is forwarding this to James Seery, saying, See below
22 for responses sent to *Creditflux*. Will follow up with the
23 story when it runs or with any other updates.

24 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, these --

25 MR. WILSON: So I think this --

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Seery - Cross

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1 MR. MORRIS: These documents don't appear on the
2 witness list. They're not being offered to impeach anything.
3 They're just -- he's taking discovery as we sit here.

4 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, in response, I'm simply
5 trying to rebut the statements that Mr. Seery made. In fact,
6 he told me just a minute ago that that second paragraph would
7 not have gone out to the reporter. However, this email from
8 Lucy Bannon to Syed Khaderi directly rebuts that statement.

9 THE COURT: But your whole purpose in this line of
10 questioning, with an undisclosed document, is to rebut the
11 earlier testimony he gave before you even put this exhibit in
12 front of him.

13 MR. WILSON: I'm trying to rebut multiple statements
14 that Mr. Seery has made today, and I think it -- you know, if
15 he's going to testify that this information did not go out to
16 a reporter, I think I'm allowed to rebut that to demonstrate
17 that it did.

18 THE COURT: All right. Why didn't you disclose this
19 in advance? It's feeling less and less like an impeachment
20 document the more we go through it.

21 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, I did not -- I did not
22 actually have this document at the time we filed our witness
23 and exhibit list, but I would also say that I didn't have any
24 purpose to use it if I didn't need it for rebuttal.

25 THE COURT: Okay. First off, you're supposed to

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1 disclose all exhibits you anticipate using except those for
2 purposes of impeachment. Okay? Not rebuttal, to be
3 technical.

4 So, if you didn't disclose this exhibit, the only way you
5 can use it, subject to other possible objections, is if you're
6 impeaching a statement. And I'm just saying I think we're
7 going beyond trying to impeach the original statement and now
8 we're trying to impeach statements he's made after seeing
9 portions of the document.

10 What did you mean, you didn't have this document in time
11 to disclose it?

12 MR. WILSON: Well, I actually just received this
13 document this morning, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Where did you receive it from?

15 MR. MORRIS: From who?

16 MR. WILSON: I -- I honestly do not know the source
17 of this document, although it was provided to me by my client.

18 MR. MORRIS: Your client being Mr. Dondero?

19 THE COURT: Could you answer that, Mr. Wilson?

20 MR. WILSON: Yes, that's -- yes, that's correct.

21 THE COURT: All right. I will -- that's --

22 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I'd like to --

23 THE COURT: That's a different can of worms. But for
24 now, I sustain the objection. You're done questioning on this
25 document.

Seery - Cross

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1 A I believe that the Trustee had the overall, and then
2 subsequently, with the confirmation of the plan, they took it
3 over. So I think that ultimately Mr. Terry had the management
4 authority, full management authority, and some advice through
5 Brigade. But I think technically it wasn't actually during
6 the Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 proceeding, I believe that Mr.
7 Phelan had the actual authority.

8 (Echoing.)

9 Q I'm sorry. And so your testimony is that Mr. Phelan had
10 the actual authority but he delegated that authority to Josh
11 Terry and Brigade?

12 A I think that's fair, yes.

13 Q And do you know when that occurred?

14 A I believe that the control of the CLOs was in July of
15 2018, and then the ultimate confirmation of the case was at
16 the very beginning of '19.

17 Q So, after being instituted as portfolio manager, and
18 during the time when Acis and Brigade were working under the
19 direction of the Trustee, who would have receive the fees for
20 managing those portfolios?

21 A I believe -- I don't know. I believe the -- that the Acis
22 estate would have received those fees.

23 Q And who -- and so is that your testimony, that prior to
24 confirmation the Acis estate would have received the
25 management fees?

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Seery - Cross

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1 A I believe that -- I believe they would have if they were
2 the manager, yeah.

3 Q Okay. And who would have received the fees after
4 confirmation?

5 A Acis.

6 Q Okay. And who would have had the discretion to set the
7 amount of those management fees?

8 A They would be agreed to in the -- in the investment
9 management agreement.

10 Q They would be agreed to?

11 A Yes. As far as I've seen, I've -- I haven't seen
12 unilateral ability of a manager to set fees at its -- at its
13 whim.

14 Q So is it your understanding that Acis and Brigade ended up
15 charging substantially more fees than Highland had charged
16 when it was under Highland's management?

17 A I think the fees were -- the fees were -- the fees were
18 set by the agreement.

19 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I just object to the line of
20 questioning on relevance grounds. This is a 9019 hearing,
21 Your Honor. How -- I just don't think this has any relevance
22 at all.

23 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wilson, what is the
24 relevance?

25 MR. WILSON: The relevance is that Mr. Seery has

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1 testified that these Acis CLOs were among the worst-performing
2 in the market, and frankly, we would agree with that, and I'm
3 trying to get his understanding as to why, because I think
4 there's direct relevance in the reason that the value of the
5 HarbourVest investment diminished.

6 MR. MORRIS: I don't think that was his testimony,
7 Your Honor. But at the end of the day, Your Honor has heard
8 the litany of reasons why the Debtor is entering into this
9 agreement. I just, I just think it's irrelevant, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wilson, I barely think
11 this is relevant. I mean, I'm going to give you some benefit
12 of the doubt on that because of, you know, the testimony that
13 HarbourVest lost \$50 million of value and --

14 (Echoing.)

15 THE COURT: -- maybe that shouldn't, you know, lie at
16 the feet of Highland. I think the compromise reflects that
17 they don't -- it doesn't lie entirely at the feet of Highland.
18 But, you know, maybe two or three more questions.

19 MR. WILSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. And I
20 didn't have very much more on this point. But to be a hundred
21 percent honest, I can't remember my question right before the
22 objection.

23 THE WITNESS: I think you were asking me about the
24 fees and somehow alluding or implying that the manager could
25 unilaterally set fees.

1 The fees are set in the investment management contract.

2 The manager doesn't get to wake up on Wednesday and say, you
3 know, I'd like another half a basis point. It doesn't work
4 that way.

5 BY MR. WILSON:

6 Q But you would agree with me that the fees and expenses
7 charged to an investment would impact the performance of that
8 investment in the market?

9 A Absolutely.

10 Q Would you also agree with me that there was one CLO -- and
11 I think you referred to it in your direct testimony -- but CLO
12 7, which continued to be managed by Highland?

13 A That's correct.

14 Q And is it fair to say that CLO 7 exceeded the performance
15 of the CLOs that were managed by Acis and Brigade?

16 A I think that's fair. I don't -- I don't recall the
17 magnitude, but I think it's outperformed those -- those CLOs,
18 yes.

19 Q All right. Well, thank you. I want to turn your
20 attention to the portion of the settlement agreement that
21 deals with voting of the HarbourVest claim. How did
22 HarbourVest's commitment to vote for the plan become a part of
23 the settlement?

24 A Pretty straightforward negotiation. We -- in negotiating
25 the settlement, one of the key factors was the cost and

Seery - Cross

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1 A I think it's an important part of the settlement, that the
2 part of the settlement is the subordinated claim. We could
3 put that into presumably any plan. But our plan does -- does
4 have a Class 9 for that. So I think it's a -- it's a part of
5 the settlement that is important or we wouldn't have included
6 it. It clearly wraps everything up and moves us towards
7 confirmation.

8 Q And would you have made the deal with HarbourVest if they
9 had pushed back on the commitment to vote for the plan?

10 A Yeah, I would have.

11 Q All right. Thank you.

12 MR. WILSON: No further questions.

13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Draper, anything from
14 you?

15 MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor.

16 CROSS-EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. DRAPER:

18 Q Mr. Seery, I may not understand the settlement, and I
19 apologize, but the way I think the settlement reads, the
20 interest that you're acquiring, you have the right to place in
21 any entity. Is that my -- is that correct?

22 A I don't recall the -- the specifics, but just from a
23 structural standpoint, we wanted to be able to put it into a
24 subsidiary as opposed to putting it directly in HCMLP. If we
25 couldn't do that, we would -- we would put it into HCMLP. So

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Seery - Cross

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1 there wasn't a -- I don't recall the actual specifics, but we
2 certainly thought about holding that interest in a -- in a
3 subsidiary, just to have a cleaner hold.

4 Q Why aren't you putting it into the Debtor so the Court and
5 the estate have jurisdiction over that?

6 A I think the Court certainly has jurisdiction over an
7 entity that the estate owns a hundred percent of. I don't
8 think that's -- that's even a close call. So the important --

9 Q Now, --

10 A Can I finish?

11 Q Sure.

12 A You asked me why. To the extent that somebody thinks that
13 problematic, I will consent to the Court having complete
14 jurisdiction over it, since I control it a hundred percent.

15 Q No. The real reason is, if I remember correctly, Mr.
16 Dondero and Judge Lynn filed a motion to have some say or some
17 information as to sales by subsidiaries, and I think you took
18 the position that they weren't entitled to it. And so my
19 concern was that putting this in a subsidiary in a sense gave
20 you unfettered control without any review of the item.

21 A I don't -- I don't think that's the case where we --
22 there's a directly-held subsidiary where we own a hundred
23 percent of it. I don't think that that's the case.

24 Q Okay. But you're willing to (a) put this into the Debtor,
25 number one; and number two, have the estate and have the Court

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1 have complete control over the disposition of it and its
2 actions, correct?

3 A That's not correct, no.

4 Q What -- what is incorrect about my statement?

5 A The debtor-in-possession has control of its assets. The
6 Court doesn't have complete control over its assets. There's
7 --

8 Q Well, --

9 A -- issues -- hold on a second. This is not -- this is not
10 a game and a trap. We put it in a subsidiary for specific
11 reasons. You asked why. I'm giving you the why. It's not to
12 hide it from anybody. We're not going to sell the asset
13 unless somebody comes up with a great price for it. We're
14 going to monetize the assets. We're going to control HCLOF by
15 a majority.

16 Q But, again, the issue is, if it's in the estate, the Court
17 has supervision over it. If it's not in the estate, the Court
18 has no supervision of it.

19 A I don't think that's correct, because the Court has
20 supervision over the estate, which owns a hundred percent of
21 the special-purpose entity that will own the shares.

22 Q Okay. All right. Now, let's talk about the \$15 million
23 that you discussed and the legal fees that were incurred. Is
24 that the total amount that was spent, or is -- or is that --
25 was the total amount \$30 million and HarbourVest was only

Seery - Cross

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1 responsible for one half of it or functionally took the brunt
2 of one half of it?

3 A I think the total amount is between \$15 and \$20 million.
4 I don't have the exact numbers.

5 Q So, in fact, the HarbourVest loss due to its ownership
6 would have been one half of that, not \$15 million?

7 A Well, the vehicle lost the money. HarbourVest owned 49.98
8 percent of it, and Highland controlled the rest. So if you
9 allocate it that way, I suppose that would be a -- that's how
10 you would divide it, in -- roughly in half, yes.

11 Q And so HarbourVest's actual dollar loss due to the legal
12 fees is really the 49-point-whatever percent of \$15 million,
13 not \$15 million?

14 A I don't know if -- I certainly would argue that. I don't
15 think that HarbourVest has that position.

16 Q Okay. Now, in connection -- you were asked a question
17 about the documentation that was provided by Highland to
18 HarbourVest both during the bankruptcy of Acis and before.
19 You have control over the Harbour -- over the Highland server,
20 correct?

21 A I'm sorry. Can -- can we do two things? One is, Mr.
22 Draper, I can't see you, so it would be better if I could see
23 you during the questioning.

24 Q Okay.

25 A And could you repeat the question?

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Seery - Cross

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1 Q All right. I'll be happy to. You were asked a question
2 about the documentation that was provided by Highland to
3 HarbourVest during the Acis bankruptcy and meetings that took
4 place between the parties. Correct?

5 A Yes.

6 Q And you stated you were unaware of the material that was
7 sent over?

8 A I think I testified that I didn't receive the 40,000
9 documents that were mentioned.

10 Q Did you do any search or order a search of the Highland
11 server to see what material was sent over by any party to
12 HarbourVest to analyze what -- what information they had
13 available to them and what was provided to them?

14 A Yes, we did a search.

15 Q And did you review the documentation that was sent over?

16 A The -- the documentation that we looked at was very
17 specific to the investment and to the OM. So we didn't look
18 for the -- the supposed 40,000 documents, no.

19 Q Did you look for the material that was provided to them
20 during the Acis bankruptcy and the periodic meetings that you
21 discussed? Or that you testified to earlier?

22 A The answer is no.

23 Q One last question. I think, and just so I understand your
24 testimony, you've broken out the HarbourVest claim into two
25 pieces. One is the legal fee amount that we've just

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1 discussed, and I gather the other piece of that is the fraud
2 in the inducement to enter into the CLO purchase?

3 A It's -- it's more -- it's much more than that.

4 Q Okay. Well, let me say it in a different way. The other
5 part of it is the losses as a result of the fraud in the
6 inducement to purchase the interest?

7 A I don't think that's -- that's fair. If I could explain?

8 Q Sure.

9 A Yeah. The legal fee piece is pretty clear. The other
10 piece starts with fraud in the inducement, but it's extensive
11 fraud claims. Fraud in the inducement, as I testified
12 earlier, would get them around the exculpation and liability
13 limitations in the OM. You don't get around all of those with
14 just the fraud. And so that's -- that's the split of that
15 claim. So the fraud in the inducement contains fraud
16 allegations. Even if you didn't have inducement, you'd have
17 other potential fraud claims.

18 Q But let me state it in a different fashion. But for the
19 investment, the fraud that you allege wouldn't have occurred?

20 A I -- HarbourVest alleges it.

21 Q No, I'm just -- in your analysis of the claim, but for the
22 inducement, the rest of the damages wouldn't have flowed?

23 A That's HarbourVest's position, yes. But for the fraud,
24 they wouldn't have made the investment.

25 Q All right.

Seery - Redirect

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1 MR. DRAPER: I have nothing further for this witness.

2 THE COURT: All right. Any redirect, Mr. Morris?

3 MR. MORRIS: Just a few very questions, Your Honor.

4 Just a very few questions.

5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. MORRIS:

7 Q Mr. Seery, you were asked about that document that Lucy
8 prepared. Do you remember that?

9 A Yes, I do.

10 Q In your experience, don't defendants often deny liability
11 before entering into settlements, or even worse, getting
12 adverse judgments entered against them?

13 A Of course. Yes.

14 Q Okay. And in response to Mr. Draper's questions, isn't
15 the Guernsey claim another claim that the Debtor took into
16 account in assessing the potential risks of this settlement?

17 A There's a number of claims contained in it. As I
18 mentioned earlier, I mentioned the RICO claim. But there is a
19 Guernsey shadow director claim, which is not dissimilar to
20 U.S. claims that somebody effectively controls an enterprise,
21 notwithstanding them not having the official role.

22 Q Okay.

23 MR. MORRIS: I have nothing further, Your Honor.

24 THE COURT: All right. Any recross on that redirect?

25 All right.

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Seery - Redirect

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1 MR. WILSON: No, Your Honor.

2 MR. DRAPER: No, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Seery, that concludes
4 your testimony. Thank you.

5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: We need to take a bathroom break. Before
7 we do, I just want to be clear with what we have left. As I
8 understood it, we were having Mr. Pugatch from HarbourVest.
9 Mr. Morris, will that conclude the Debtor's evidence?
10 (Pause.) Okay. You were on mute, but I think you were saying
11 yes.

12 MR. MORRIS: Sorry. But to be clear, Debevoise is
13 going to be putting their witness on the stand.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. MORRIS: But it's part of the evidence in support
16 of the motion.

17 THE COURT: All right. Do the Objectors have any
18 witnesses today?

19 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, Mr. Dondero intends to
20 examine Mr. Pugatch, but if he's going to be called by his
21 counsel, then we will do that as a cross-examination.

22 THE COURT: All right.

23 MR. DRAPER: This is Douglas Draper. I have no
24 witnesses.

25 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I'm asking --

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1 well, I do want to ask: Can we get a time estimate
2 potentially for Mr. Pugatch?

3 MS. WEISGERBER: For my examination, Your Honor,
4 twenty minutes, perhaps.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MS. WEISGERBER: Or less.

7 THE COURT: All right. Well, let me tell you what
8 we're going to do. We're going to take a ten-minute bathroom
9 break. But I have a 1:30 hearing and I have a 2:00 o'clock.
10 Well, I have a 1:30 docket, multiple matters, and a 2:00
11 o'clock docket. So, you know, I'm really intending that we
12 get finished in time to give me and my staff a little bit of a
13 lunch break before launching into the 1:30 docket, so I'm
14 hopeful we can get done around 1:00-ish. If we can't, then
15 we're going to have to reconvene, I'm going to say probably
16 3:00-ish Central time. So let's hope we can get through
17 everything. All right? Ten-minute break.

18 THE CLERK: All rise.

19 (A recess ensued from 11:58 a.m. until 12:08 p.m.)

20 THE CLERK: All rise.

21 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. We're
22 going back on the record in the Highland matters. Do we have
23 everyone? It looks like we do. Ms. Weisgerber is going to
24 call the next witness; is that correct?

25 MS. WEISGERBER: Yes, Your Honor. We call Michael

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1 Pugatch of HarbourVest to the stand.

2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pugatch, if you could
3 turn on your video and say, "Testing one, two."

4 MR. PUGATCH: Two.

5 THE COURT: All right. There you are. Please raise
6 your right hand.

7 MICHAEL PUGATCH, HARBOURVEST'S WITNESS, SWORN

8 THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed.

9 MS. WEISGERBER: Thank you, Your Honor.

10 DIRECT EXAMINATION

11 BY MS. WEISGERBER:

12 Q Good morning. Can you please state your name for the
13 record?

14 A Sure. It's Michael Pugatch.

15 Q And where do you work, Mr. Pugatch?

16 A HarbourVest Partners.

17 Q And what is your title?

18 A I'm a managing director in our secondary investment
19 group.

20 Q Did HarbourVest file claims in the Highland bankruptcy,
21 Mr. Pugatch?

22 A We did, yes. Several claims, in fact.

23 Q What was the basis for those claims?

24 A Yeah. Among other things, fraudulent inducement based on
25 misrepresentations and omissions on the part of Highland in

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Pugatch - Direct

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1 conduct diligence on the investment?

2 A We did. We conducted very detailed due diligence, as we
3 do for all of our investments. That diligence period lasted
4 several months ahead of our investment decision.

5 Q And did HarbourVest conduct that diligence by itself?

6 A No. So, in addition to internal investment professionals
7 at HarbourVest, we engage with outside advisors, both
8 consultants as well as legal advisors, in connection with
9 that due diligence.

10 Q And did Highland answer all of HarbourVest's questions
11 during that diligence period?

12 A They did. And they were numerous. But yes, they
13 answered all the questions that we had for them.

14 Q Was the Terry dispute part of HarbourVest's diligence?

15 A It was. That came up as one of the outstanding items of
16 litigation as part of our due diligence.

17 Q I'm going to ask my colleague to pull up on the screen an
18 exhibit that was on our exhibit list as Items -- Exhibits 34
19 and 35. It's an August 15, 2017 email from Brad Eden to
20 Dustin Willard. Mr. Pugatch, do you recognize this document?

21 A I do, yes.

22 Q And what is it?

23 A This was an email sent to us during our due diligence
24 period in response to a request for more information on the
25 outstanding litigation that Highland was involved with.

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1 MR. MORRIS: No objection from the Debtor, Your
2 Honor.

3 THE COURT: All right. What is the letter or number
4 for this exhibit?

5 MS. WEISGERBER: It's HarbourVest Exhibit 34.

6 THE COURT: All right. So HarbourVest Exhibit 34 is
7 admitted.

8 (HarbourVest's Exhibit 34 is received into evidence.)

9 THE COURT: And I need to be clear where it appears
10 on the docket. Can someone tell me?

11 MS. WEISGERBER: So, it's identified on our exhibit
12 list, not -- it's not attached to the exhibits. It is on the
13 docket. We were -- when we initially filed the exhibit list,
14 we were working out confidentiality issues. But it was
15 subsequently filed with our reply last night. It's at Docket
16 No. 1735 --

17 THE COURT: All right.

18 MS. WEISGERBER: -- at Pages A -- Pages A345 to A350.

19 THE COURT: All right. Very well. Thank you.

20 BY MS. WEISGERBER:

21 Q Mr. Pugatch, we'll just scroll down to the second page of
22 the attachment. Can you describe generally what the
23 litigation says regarding the Terry dispute?

24 A Yes. Generally speaking, this dispute was described as
25 an employee dispute, employment agreement dispute, with Mr.

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Pugatch - Direct

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1 HarbourVest Exhibit 36, into evidence.

2 THE COURT: Any objections?

3 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, John Wilson. I would object
4 as to the relevance of this document.

5 THE COURT: All right. What's your response?

6 MS. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, it shows
7 misrepresentations that the witness will testify how it
8 relates back to prior representations prior to HarbourVest's
9 investment, as well as misrepresentations at that time.

10 THE COURT: Okay. I overrule the objection. I'm
11 going to admit it.

12 (HarbourVest's Exhibit 36 is received into evidence.)

13 BY MS. WEISGERBER:

14 Q Mr. Pugatch, can you describe generally -- we spoke about
15 this a little bit -- just what this communication from
16 Highland was conveying to HarbourVest at the time?

17 A Yes. Specifically, again, responding to this *Wall Street*
18 *Journal* article that had been published, trying to defend,
19 again, Highland's own views why there were inaccuracies in
20 the reporting. But importantly, from our perspective, trying
21 to reassure us as to the fact that, you know, these
22 accusations would have no bearing and any results from it
23 would have no bearing on their ongoing business or
24 partnership or the investment that we had made in HCLOF.

25 MS. WEISGERBER: And if you can scroll to the second

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1 in the late stages of our diligence and closing process on
2 the investment into HCLOF.

3 Q And generally, what did Highland tell you about the
4 arbitration award?

5 A We were aware of its existence. We were aware of the
6 quantum of the award, I think it was around an \$8 million
7 arbitration award in the favor of Mr. Terry, and that was
8 following the litigation around the wrongful termination and
9 employee dispute that Highland had described to us
10 previously.

11 Q Did you ask to see a copy of the arbitration award?

12 | A No, we did not.

| | | |
|----|---|----------|
| 13 | Q | Why not? |
|----|---|----------|

14 A Ultimately, we -- you know, the explanations that
15 Highland had provided to us all seemed very reasonable. We
16 relied on their representations that this was, again, nothing
17 more than a dispute with a former disgruntled employee, in
18 their words, that had no bearing or, you know, would not have
19 any bearing on our investment in HCLOF or their ongoing CLO
20 business, which all very clearly was not the case, as
21 we've -- as we've learned over the last several years.

22 Q Following learning about the arbitration award, did
23 HarbourVest do other diligence?

24 A We did. So, in addition to asking questions related to
25 the arbitration award and any impact that it would have, we

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8 in ultimately making our investment.

| | |
|----|--------|
| 10 | award? |
|----|--------|

11 | A They were, yes.

13 | changes?

25 investment period.

1 And in connection with that, in light of the arbitration
2 award, Highland's view was that there may be difficulties in
3 the market in resetting certain of those Acis CLOs with the
4 Acis brand associated with them, given, again, the existence
5 of the arbitration award and concerns in the market around
6 the Acis brand reputation.

7 Q And what did they tell you was the market view of Acis,
8 or the Acis brand?

9 A Yeah. Their view or their concern was that the, you
10 know, because of the existence of that arbitration award, the
11 brand would be viewed as toxic.

12 Q Didn't this put you on notice that perhaps there was
13 something wrong with the structural changes?

14 A I mean, we -- I mean, short answer, no. We ultimately
15 asked questions, we diligenced the legal structure, but
16 relied on the representations that were made to us by
17 Highland around the rationale for the structural changes,
18 that these are all changes that were within a Highland-
19 managed vehicle or sat below the vehicle that we were
20 investing in, and so ultimately were in Highland's purview,
21 was the representations that we relied on.

22 Q And did HarbourVest alone do that diligence of the
23 structural changes?

24 A So, no. I mean, in connection with the diligence that we
25 did internally and with Highland directly, we engaged with

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1 Q Did HarbourVest instruct any of those structural changes
2 or transfers to occur?

3 | A We did not. Absolutely not.

4 Q Why didn't HarbourVest itself appear in the Acis
5 bankruptcy and file a claim?

6 A Yeah. HarbourVest's role, again, in HCLOF, we were a
7 passive investor in a Highland-managed company. We had no
8 direct interaction with or relationship with Acis. There was
9 really no reason for us to be directly involved until we were
10 subsequently dragged into involvement on account of those
11 misstatements. And then at that point our focus really
12 pivoted to, you know, whether we needed to defend ourselves
13 against those accusations that had been made by Highland and
14 after a request for further information in discovery by the
15 Acis trustee.

| | | |
|----|---|---|
| 16 | Q | Did HCLOF participate in the Acis bankruptcy? |
|----|---|---|

17 | A They did, yes.

18 Q Did HCLOF incur fees for participating in the Acis
19 bankruptcy?

20 A Yes. In fact, very meaningful fees, to the tune of well
21 in excess of \$15 million of legal fees, as we understand it,
22 that have been incurred, largely in connection with the
23 ongoing Acis bankruptcy and Highland's continued pursuit of
24 and in connection with the litigation with Mr. Terry, which
25 we firmly believe was entirely inappropriate that HCLOF and

7 || A We did not.

| | | |
|---|---|------|
| 9 | A | Yes. |
|---|---|------|

12 A We had conversations with a couple of Highland
13 individuals throughout the Acis bankruptcy process, yes.

17 | A That's correct, yes.

20 | A I do not recall that, no.

23 | A I don't know the answer to that.

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2 THE COURT: Well, I said I really wanted you to be
3 done by 1:00 o'clock because I have a 1:30 docket and a 2:00
4 o'clock docket and I'd rather not have to hang up 70-
5 something people and reconnect them again at 3:00 o'clock.
6 How close are you to being finished?

8 THE COURT: This is going at a very slow pace.

13 THE COURT: Keep going.

15 THE COURT: Keep -- let's --

17 THE COURT: Let's talk fast and try to get through.
18 You know, even if I'm sacrificing lunch today, I don't want
19 to inconvenience 75 people this way. So we'll just probably
20 start our 1:30 hearing a little late and inconvenience those
21 people.

23 MR. WILSON: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

25 Q Did Acis form its -- I can't recall if you answered this

2 Q Okay. The next misrepresentation that you refer to says
3 that Highland indicated to HarbourVest that the dispute with
4 Mr. Terry would have no impact on its investment activities.
5 Would you agree with me that that is also an opinion?

7 MS. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, I'm going to object to
8 the extent these questions are seeking a legal conclusion
9 regarding, you know, if something's an opinion or not.

11 THE WITNESS: It was -- it was a statement that was
12 made to us by Highland and represented in multiple different
13 formats as fact. And a representation that we relied on in
14 connection with our investment.

16 Q And finally, the misrepresentation, the last
17 misrepresentation identified, is that Highland expressed
18 confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the
19 CLOs. Would you agree with me that that statement is an
20 opinion?

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2 BY MR. WILSON:

3 Q Well, this document is HarbourVest Exhibit 40, and this is
4 the statement of operations for the financial year ended 31
5 December 2018. Here, the total investment income is only
6 \$11.1 million. Do you see that?

7 || A I do.

8 Q And do you see where the expenses have increased to \$13.6
9 million?

10 || A I do, yes.

11 MR. WILSON: Okay. Scroll down some more.

12 BY MR. WILSON:

13 Q And do you see where it says net change and unrealized
14 loss on investments of \$48.47 million?

| | | |
|----|---|------|
| 15 | A | Yes. |
|----|---|------|

16 Q And so after Acis and Brigade took over the managements of
17 these CLOs, we had a net decrease in net assets resulting from
18 operations of \$52.483 million in the year 2018, correct?

19 MS. WEISGERBER: Objection, Your Honor. Assumes a
20 fact not in evidence.

21 THE COURT: Overruled. He --

22 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, --

23 THE COURT: We're just looking at this statement and
24 testifying about it says, so I overrule the objection.

25 MR. WILSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your

1 | objection, I'll --

2 || MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, --

3 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Was there an objection? I
4 will admit Dondero Exhibits A through M, and those appear at
5 Docket Entry 1721, correct, Mr. Wilson?

6 MR. WILSON: That is correct, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: All right.

8 MR. WILSON: That is correct, Your Honor.

9 (James Dondero's Exhibits A through M are received into
10 evidence.)

11 MR. WILSON: And one final matter is, during the
12 examination of Mr. Seery, you at least partially admitted
13 Dondero's Exhibit N, and I was wondering if we need to -- how
14 we'd need to submit that for the record.

15 THE COURT: Okay. First, I'm confused. I think you
16 said Mr. Terry's testimony. You --

17 MR. WILSON: I said Seery. I'm sorry.

18 THE COURT: Oh, Seery?

19 MR. WILSON: Or I may have said Terry, but I meant to
20 say Seery.

21 THE COURT: Okay. Maybe you said it. Okay. During
22 Mr. Seery's testimony -- oh, the email that I admitted a
23 portion of?

24 MR. WILSON: That is -- that's correct, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: What -- what are you asking? It's not in

1 | your notebook. Are you asking do you need to separately
2 | submit it or what?

3 MR. WILSON: Yeah, I was just asking what the Court's
4 preference on how we submit that for the -- put it in the
5 record.

6 THE COURT: Okay. That was so garbled I didn't hear
7 you. You need to file that on the docket as a supplemental
8 exhibit that was admitted, okay?

9 MR. WILSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: All right. Closing arguments? Mr.
11 Morris?

12 CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR

13 MR. MORRIS: Yes, very briefly, Your Honor. The
14 Debtor easily meets the standard here. The settlement
15 consideration relative to the claim establishes and reflects
16 the likelihood of success on the merits.

17 You know, I've never -- I did hear Mr. Pugatch in the
18 deposition the other day, but I otherwise haven't heard from
19 him. I found him to be incredibly credible, Your Honor, and I
20 regret the fact that he and HarbourVest are being blamed twice
21 here. The fact that they got 40,000 documents or didn't read
22 the arbitration award, it's just -- it's a shame that they're
23 being dragged through this yet again.

24 The fact is, Your Honor, there is no evidence that they
25 made the disclosures that HarbourVest claims -- complains

1 about. They just don't. The fraudulent transfers led to the
2 bankruptcy, led to the appointment of a trustee, led to --
3 right? So, so it's -- that's why -- but they're getting
4 something for their claim.

5 It was a hard negotiation, Your Honor. There is no
6 dispute that if we litigated this it would be complex. It
7 would fact-intensive. The Debtor would be forced to rely upon
8 witnesses who are no longer employed by it. That it would be
9 expensive, for sure. There's no dispute about any of that.
10 There's no dispute that the creditor body has spoken loudly
11 here by unanimously refraining from objecting except for Mr.
12 Dondero and the entities controlled by him.

13 And you heard Mr. Seery's testimony. I think he
14 exhaustively informed the Court as to the process by which the
15 transaction was analyzed and negotiated, and there's no
16 evidence to the contrary that this was an arm's-length
17 negotiation.

18 Unless Your Honor has any questions, we would request that
19 the motion be granted.

20 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Weisgerber, your closing
21 argument?

22 CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF HARBOURVEST

23 MS. WEISGERBER: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. I'll
24 also be brief. We again join in Mr. Morris's arguments and
25 comments.

1 The Court has now heard testimony from Mr. Pugatch
2 regarding the factual detail underlying HarbourVest's claims.
3 The Court has also heard about the significant damages that
4 HarbourVest stands to recover for those claims. And
5 HarbourVest came to this Court ready to litigate. It would --
6 it's ready to do so if needed. It believes it would prevail
7 on its claims if it had to do so.

8 But the Court also heard from Mr. Seery about his
9 understanding of HarbourVest's claims, his calculus, and his
10 decision to settle them. And we submit that nothing further
11 is needed by this Court in order to approve the settlement.
12 This is a question of the Debtor's business judgment. We're
13 not here to have a trial on the merits of HarbourVest's
14 claims. The Objectors have made various arguments, including
15 about the cause of HarbourVest's damages. But even the nature
16 of the legal claims that HarbourVest is asserting, some do not
17 require a loss causation. So we submit that's not even
18 relevant to the merits of the claims.

19 The settlement is clearly in the best interest of the
20 estate, and we respectfully request that the Court approve it.

21 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Mr. Wilson, your
22 closing argument?

23 MR. LYNN: Michael Lynn. I will give the closing
24 argument, if that's satisfactory to the Court.

25 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF JAMES DONDERO

MR. LYNN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I just want to make a few points, and I'll try to do it as quickly as possible.

First, I feel compelled to address the argument of the Debtor that Mr. Dondero is repeating his litigious behavior from the Acis case. I don't know about the Acis case. I wasn't involved except very, very peripherally. But with respect to this case, we have only taken positions in court that we believed -- that is, his lawyers -- believed were warranted by law, facts as we knew them, and that are consistent with professionalism. I'd be glad to explain any position we took.

Often, through the Debtor's very persuasive powers, we never had the chance to explain our position previously to the Court. In fact, for the most part, as today, we have been reactive rather than commencing proceedings. In fact, during the first seven months of this case, we only appeared in court a few times, when we felt we had to -- for example, when discovery was being sought by the Creditors' Committee that we feared might invade privilege. Then, much to the Debtor's fury, we opposed the Acis 9019. We did so because we thought it was too much.

Since, as the Court can see, the principal instigators of litigation have been the Debtor, and to a lesser extent, the

1 Committee.

2 Indeed, in an apparent effort to drown Mr. Dondero and his
3 counsel in litigation, the Debtor has repeatedly sought court
4 action on a very short fuse, claiming need for expedited
5 hearing.

6 Perhaps the most startling example of this is the recent
7 contempt motion, for which there is no good reason for a quick
8 hearing. Resolution of that motion is not necessary to reach
9 the confirmation hearing. The motion could be heard after the
10 confirmation hearing. There is no need to put Mr. Dondero and
11 his professionals in a position where they have to respond in
12 a couple of days, two business days, and then will have two
13 days to prepare for trial.

14 Second, Your Honor, Mr. Seery has repeatedly asserted,
15 contrary to today's motion, that the HarbourVest claim was of
16 no merit. That is why, when he came in to settle for tens of
17 millions of dollars, we opposed this motion. It appears that
18 the motion is occurring without any cross-party discovery.
19 There is no consideration, apparently, of trying dispositive
20 -- dispositive motions first. There is no consideration for
21 junior classes of equity, which Mr. Seery has previously
22 opined were in the money. This, even though there's no reason
23 that this settlement is necessary pre-confirmation, unless Mr.
24 Seery wants HarbourVest's vote.

25 Third, for whatever reason, that seems to be the driving

1 factor for settling. On its face, the vote seems to be a key
2 factor of the settlement. About the longest provision of the
3 settlement agreement relates to voting. The motion itself --
4 in the motion itself, five of seven bullet points cited by the
5 Debtor for approval of the settlement deal with and emphasize
6 support of the plan or the vote that is to be cast for the
7 plan.

8 If the settlement is a good deal, it didn't need to have
9 as one of its parts the requirement that HarbourVest vote for
10 the plan.

11 Your Honor, I'll stop there. I know Your Honor would like
12 to get just a few minutes before your 1:30 docket. I've been
13 there and I understand that, and I do apologize for taking the
14 time we have, but I think that responsibility is shared with
15 the Debtor and HarbourVest.

16 Thank you, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you for that.

18 Mr. Draper, any closing argument from you?

19 CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF GET GOOD AND DUGABOY TRUSTS

20 MR. DRAPER: Yes, I have three comments. The first
21 is the claim -- the loss claim, absent the fraud claim, is, at
22 best, \$7 million. I think Mr. Seery's argument that a hundred
23 -- one hundred percent is attributable to there is just wrong.
24 If he and I both invested in a company 50-50 and it goes
25 broke, we only lost 50 cents each.

1 Number two, I think the Court heard the evidence. I think
2 this is, at best, a subordinated claim under 5 -- under the
3 Bankruptcy Code. It's really a "But for the
4 misrepresentations, we wouldn't have invested."

5 And the last one is the -- Judge Lynn represented the
6 voting, so I won't deal with that. But the one that troubles
7 me the most is the fact that this asset that is ultimately
8 being paid for in claim dollars that's being transferred over
9 to the Debtor and being put it outside the estate, outside the
10 purview of this Court, and placed in some subsidiary, this --
11 this transaction, if it is approved, must -- should contain a
12 provision that the asset that's being acquired come into the
13 Debtor and be owned by the Debtor.

14 THE COURT: All right.

15 MR. DRAPER: I have nothing further, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Draper.

17 Mr. Morris, you get the last word since it's your motion.

18 MR. MORRIS: Very quickly, Your Honor. The
19 subordination argument doesn't hold water. This is not a
20 claim against the Debtor for the security; it's a claim for
21 fraud. Okay? So, so 510(b), if it was a claim against HCLOF,
22 that might make sense, but this is a claim against the Debtor.
23 And it's a Debtor -- it's a claim for fraud. That's number
24 one.

25 Number two, we need to keep this exactly as it's been

1 structured in order to avoid litigation. Mr. Seery told the
2 Court. I'm sure the Court can make its own assessment as to
3 Mr. Seery's credibility as to whether or not the Debtor is
4 intending to somehow get this asset beyond the Court.

5 But there are reasons why we've done this, Your Honor.
6 They could have made an objection on that basis. In fact, if
7 they did, it would be overruled, because there's no -- there's
8 no basis for this Court to find that somehow the Debtor and
9 Mr. Seery are doing something untoward to get assets away from
10 this Court's jurisdiction.

11 You know, I don't know what to say about Mr. Lynn's
12 commentary. Much of it had nothing to do with any evidence in
13 the record.

14 The fact remains, Your Honor, that this settlement is
15 fair. It's reasonable. It's in the best interest of the
16 estate. And we would respectfully request that the Court
17 grant the motion.

18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Well, I
19 appreciate all the arguments and evidence I have heard today.
20 I'm going to be brief in my ruling here, but I reserve the
21 right to supplement in a more fulsome written order, which I'm
22 going to instruct Mr. Morris to submit. I am approving the
23 motion to compromise the HarbourVest claim today, and I guess
24 subsumed in that is granting the motion to allow their claim
25 for 3018 voting purposes.

1 I in all ways find this compromise to meet the required
2 legal standard set forth in such cases as *TMT Trailer Ferry*,
3 *AWECO*, and *Foster Mortgage*, numerous other Fifth Circuit
4 cases.

5 First, I'm going to specifically say for the record that I
6 found both witnesses today, Mr. Seery and Mr. Pugatch, to be
7 very credible. Very credible testimony and meaningful
8 testimony was provided to the Court today. And based on that
9 testimony, I find, first, that this compromise was the product
10 of arm's-length negotiations. It was a hard-fought
11 negotiation, as far as I'm concerned. The Debtor objected to
12 these numerous HarbourVest proofs of claim. The Debtor did
13 not want to allow HarbourVest a significant claim for voting
14 purposes. I duly note the statements made in the disclosure
15 statement before this compromise was reached suggesting, you
16 know, the Debtor didn't think HarbourVest should have a large
17 claim.

18 That is consistent with everything I typically see in a
19 bankruptcy case when there's a claim objection. The objector
20 vehemently denies the claimant should have a proof of claim,
21 and then people sit down and think about the risks and rewards
22 of litigating things. And I believe very fervently that's
23 what happened here. There were good-faith, arm's-length
24 negotiations that resulted in this proposed compromise.

25 I find the compromise -- and I'll add to that point, on

1 the good-faith point, I find nothing sinister or improper
2 about the fact that the compromise includes a commitment of
3 HarbourVest to vote in favor of the plan. Again, we see this
4 a lot. You know, there's even a buzz word that doesn't even
5 exist in the Bankruptcy Code: "plan support agreement." You
6 know, we see those a lot -- you know, oftentimes negotiated
7 before the case, but sometimes after. You know, it may be
8 improper in certain situations, but there was nothing here
9 that troubles me about that component of the compromise.

10 I find the compromise to meet the paramount interest of
11 creditors here. Notably, we have very large creditors in this
12 case who have not objected. The *Foster Mortgage* case from the
13 Fifth Circuit tells me I am supposed to consider support or
14 opposition of creditors. No opposition of UBS. No opposition
15 of the Redeemer Committee Crusader Fund. No opposition from
16 Josh Terry or Acis. No opposition from Daugherty.

17 But moreover, when considering the paramount interest of
18 creditors, I find this compromise to be in all ways fair and
19 equitable and in the best interest of the estate, and
20 certainly within the range of reasonableness. The evidence
21 showed that HarbourVest asserted over \$300 million. Over \$300
22 million. Granted, that was based on all kinds of legal
23 theories that would be contested and expensive to litigate,
24 but the evidence also showed that they invested over \$70
25 million. You know, close to \$75 million. I forget the exact

1 number. \$75 or \$80 million, somewhere in that range. And now
2 the credible evidence is that investment is worth about \$22
3 million.

4 So, certainly, while the claim may not have, at the
5 ultimate end of the day in litigation, resulted in a \$300
6 million proof of claim, certainly, certainly there were strong
7 arguments for a very sizeable claim, more than this compromise
8 amount. So it's certainly fair and equitable and reasonable
9 when considering the complexity and duration of further
10 litigation, the risks and rewards, the expense, delay, and
11 likely success.

12 A couple of last things I'm going to say are these. I
13 understand, you know, there is vehement disagreement on the
14 part of our Objectors to the notion that Highland might have
15 caused a \$50 million loss to HarbourVest. But I will tell
16 you, for what it's worth -- I want the record clear that this
17 is part of my evaluation of the reasonableness of the
18 settlement -- my reaction is that, indeed, Highland's
19 litigation strategy in the Acis case caused HCLOF to lose a
20 huge portion of its value, to the detriment of HarbourVest.
21 You know, whether all evidence at the end of the day would
22 convince me of that, I don't know, but that's -- that is
23 definitely this judge's impression.

24 I'm very sympathetic to HarbourVest. It appears in all
25 ways from the record, not just the record before me today, but

1 the record in the Acis case that I presided over, that
2 Highland back then would have rather spent HarbourVest's
3 investment for HCLOF legal fees than let Josh Terry get paid
4 on his judgment. They were perfectly happy to direct the
5 spending of other people's money, is what the record suggested
6 to me.

7 And then, you know, I have alluded to this very recently,
8 as recently as last Friday: I can still remember Mr.
9 Ellington sitting on the witness stand over here to my left
10 and telling the Court, telling the parties under oath, that
11 HarbourVest -- he didn't use its name back then, okay? For
12 the first phase of the Acis case, or most of the Acis case, we
13 were told it was an investor from Boston. And at some point
14 someone even said their name begins with H. I mean, it seemed
15 almost humorous. But Mr. Ellington said it was they,
16 HarbourVest, the undisclosed investor, who was insistent that
17 the Acis name was toxic, and so that's what all of this had
18 been about: the rebranding, the wanting to extract or move
19 things away from Acis.

20 So, you know, I have heard for the -- well, at least the
21 second time today, from Mr. Pugatch, what I perceive to be
22 very credible testimony that that's just not the way it
23 happened.

24 And I guess the last thing I want to say here today, and
25 you know, I guess I have multiple reasons for saying this, not

1 | what caused the plummet in value, and that's why I think
2 | ultimately HarbourVest would potentially have a meritorious
3 | claim here in a significant amount if this litigation were to
4 | go forward.

5 So, I approve this under 9019. And again, Mr. Morris,
6 you'll upload an order.

7 It is now 1:41, so let's as quickly as possible hear the
8 other motion that I don't think had any objections. Mr.
9 Morris?

10 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, just -- yes, just very
11 quickly, just four things.

12 With respect to the order, I just want to make it clear
13 that we are going to include a provision that specifically
14 authorizes the Debtor to engage in -- to receive from
15 HarbourVest the asset, you know, the HCLOF interest, and that
16 that's consistent with its obligations under the agreement.

17 The objection has been withdrawn, I think the evidence is
18 what it is, and we want to make sure that nobody thinks that
19 they're going to go to a different court somehow to challenge
20 the transfer. So I just want to put the Court on notice and
21 everybody on notice that we are going to put in a specific
22 finding as to that.

23 THE COURT: All right. Fair --

24 MR. MORRIS: Number two is --

25 THE COURT: Fair enough. I do specifically approve

1 | that mechanism and find it is appropriate and supported by the
2 | underlying agreements.

3 And just so you know, I spent some time noodling this
4 yesterday before I knew it was going to be settled, so I'm not
5 just casually doing that. I think it's fine.

6 | Okay. Next?

7 MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Number
8 two, with respect to the motion to pay, there is no objection.
9 If we can just submit an order. Or if Your Honor has other
10 guidance for us, we're happy to take it.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone have anything they
12 want to say about that motion?

13 Again, I looked at it. I didn't see any objections. I
14 didn't see any problem with it. It's -- you know, you're
15 going through this exercise because of the earlier protocol
16 order.

17 MR. MORRIS: Correct.

18 THE COURT: All right. Well, if there's nothing,
19 then, I will approve that, finding there is good cause to
20 grant that motion.

21 MR. MORRIS: Okay.

22 THE COURT: All right. Is the only other
23 housekeeping matter --

24 MR. MORRIS: I --

25 THE COURT: -- we have the contempt motion?

1 MR. MORRIS: It is, and I do -- I do have to point
2 out how troubled the Debtor is to learn that Mr. Dondero was
3 still receiving documents from Highland as late as this
4 morning. It's got to be a violation of both the TRO -- I
5 guess it's now the preliminary injunction.

6 I would respectfully request -- I know that time is what
7 it is -- but maybe Mr. Dondero can answer now where he got the
8 document, who he got the document from, what other documents
9 he's gotten from the Debtor since Your Honor ordered him not
10 to communicate with the Debtor's employees.

11 This is not saying hello in the hallway. I mean, this is
12 just -- it is really troubling, Your Honor, and it's why we
13 need the contempt motion heard as soon as possible.

14 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Wilson, do you want to address
15 that? I think the words I heard were that you just got the
16 document this morning, and you got it from Mr. Dondero, but we
17 don't know where and when Mr. Dondero got it. Mr. Wilson, are
18 you there?

19 MR. LYNN: I'm afraid I'm back, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. LYNN: I am not sure whether Mr. Dondero had it
22 in his files from some -- from back before he was asked not to
23 communicate with members or with employees of the Debtor. I
24 believe -- I believe he's with us, though I don't think he's
25 available by video.

1 || Are you there, Mr. Dondero?

2 THE COURT: We can't hear you, Mr. Dondero.

3 MR. DONDERO: Judge?

4 THE COURT: Oh, go ahead.

5 MR. DONDERO: Can you hear me now?

6 THE COURT: Yes.

7 MR. DONDERO: Yes, I -- I -- when I moved offices, I
8 found it in a stack of paper, and --

9 MR. LYNN: I understand it shows that his microphone
10 is working.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

12 MR. DONDERO: Can you hear me?

13 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

14 MR. DONDERO: Yeah, I -- I'm sitting in new offices.
15 I've got everything in boxes. I was going through everything
16 yesterday, and I found those emails in a stack of papers and I
17 sent them over because I thought they would be relevant
18 relative to Seery's initial impression.

19 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's talk about the timing
20 of this hearing. Mr. Morris, I'm going to -- I'm going to ask
21 you why --

22 MR. LYNN: Michael Lynn, Your Honor. I don't want to
23 waste the Court's time. We have not made available anything
24 to the Court objecting to the expedited hearing on the
25 contempt motion. We've been here.

1 I would say to Your Honor that if Mr. Dondero is indeed in
2 contempt, or was in contempt toward the motion, which has
3 nothing to do with the document that was presented as Dondero
4 Exhibit N, there is no need to hear this on an expedited
5 basis.

6 Every time we turn around, Your Honor, the Debtor is
7 asking that something be heard on an expedited basis. And we
8 have not opposed that. We have not fought that, to speak of,
9 to date. But this is getting a little ridiculous. We're
10 within days of confirmation of the Debtor's plan, and it is
11 simply a means of causing pain and suffering to Mr. Dondero
12 and those who are working with him and for him. And he does
13 have employees at NexPoint who are assisting him.

14 So we most strongly object to being put on a schedule
15 where we are expected to get a response to the contempt motion
16 on file by Monday, today being Thursday, and a weekend
17 intervening. And we strongly object to any setting of this
18 contempt motion on Tuesday or Wednesday. It is absurd, and it
19 is done solely, solely, Your Honor, to cause pain.

20 THE COURT: All right.

21 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, if I may?

22 THE COURT: Please.

23 MR. MORRIS: Just very briefly, we had a hearing the
24 other day. The evidence is the exact same. The evidence is
25 crystal clear that the violations are meaningful, they're

1 || substantial, and they are repeated.

2 After the TRO was entered into, Mr. Dondero and only Mr.
3 Dondero chose to interfere with the Debtor's business. Mr.
4 Dondero and only Mr. Dondero chose to communicate with the
5 Debtor's employees, not about saying hello in the hallway but
6 about coordinating a legal defense strategy against the
7 Debtor.

8 The need is immediate, Your Honor, and I would
9 respectfully request that the hearing be set for Tuesday or
10 Wednesday. They've had this motion now since the 7th of
11 January. They had a full evidentiary hearing, so they know
12 most of the evidence that's going to be presented. They have
13 a whole team of -- they have an army of lawyers, Your Honor,
14 and half a dozen firms working on behalf of Mr. Dondero and
15 his interests. For him to cry here, for him to cry that this
16 is too much is really -- it's obscene. It just is.

17 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to say a couple --

18 MR. LYNN: That is absurd.

19 THE COURT: I'm going to say a couple of things. One
20 is that I -- well, the one time I remember getting reversed
21 for holding someone in contempt of court, the District Court
22 felt like I had not given enough notice of that. The District
23 Courts, what they think is reasonable notice, is sometimes
24 very different from what the bankruptcy judges think. We're
25 used to going very lickety-split fast in the bankruptcy

1 courts. And the Courts of Appeals, District Court, Courts of
2 Appeals obviously, for good reason, are very concerned about
3 due process in this kind of context. So I'm sensitive to
4 that.

5 I'm also sensitive to the fact that it is monetary damages
6 that are being sought here to purge the contempt. Okay? The
7 shifting of attorneys' fees is basically what I understand is
8 being sought at this point. You know, we have a preliminary
9 injunction halting behavior at this point, and so I think
10 that's another reason I'm hesitant to give an emergency
11 hearing. I feel like monetary damages can wait and we can
12 give 21-plus days' notice of the hearing.

13 But I'm going to throw this out there as well. If I do
14 feel like there is a showing of contempt, if I do feel like
15 the phone -- as I told you the other day, I'm very, very
16 fixated on the phone that may have been destroyed or thrown
17 away, maybe at Mr. Dondero's suggestion. I mean, the
18 potential monetary sanction here may be very, very large if
19 the evidence plays out in the way I fear it might play out.
20 So I need to make sure everybody has adequate time to prepare
21 for that hearing and make sure I get all the evidence I need
22 to see. All right? Contempt of court is very, very, very,
23 very serious, and I don't think anyone would deny that.

24 So, with that, it was filed what day? January 4th? Is
25 that what I heard? Or --

1 MR. MORRIS: January 7th, I believe, Your Honor.

2 THE COURT: January 7th? All right. Well, Traci,
3 are you there? Hopefully, you're not in a hunger coma at this
4 point.

5 THE CLERK: I am here.

6 THE COURT: Okay. We have -- we're going to have to
7 go to that first week of February, right? Because we've got
8 the confirmation hearing that, you know, late in January, and
9 then --

10 THE CLERK: Yes. Uh-huh.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have an available date to
12 give right now?

13 THE CLERK: How about -- if you're willing to hear
14 them on Friday, February 5th.

15 THE COURT: Okay. I can do that. February 5th at
16 9:30. Any -- anybody want to argue about that?

17 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. That's
18 acceptable to the Debtor.

19 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lynn, is that good with you?

20 MR. LYNN: We'll do that, Your Honor. I would say,
21 by the way, that I'll be happy to buy Mr. Seery, out of my own
22 pocket, five cell phones, which ought to make up for the one
23 that was lost, though I recognize that those cell phones will
24 not have on them the privileged information, the conversations
25 between his lawyers and Mr. Dondero that I imagine he was

1 || looking forward to seeing.

2 THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't want him to see that
3 information, but I do think he's entitled to any nonprivileged
4 information, texting, or calls that are on that phone. So,
5 again, I'm either going to hear good explanations for that or
6 not, but it's something very concerning to me.

7 All right. So we have a game plan.

8 I'm going to ask, Did we have good-faith negotiations
9 between Dondero and the Committee and anything positive to
10 report? I'll ask Mr. Lynn and Mr. Clemente to weigh in.

11 MR. CLEMENTE: Yes, Your Honor. I'll go first, Your
12 Honor. Mr. Lynn and I have exchanged several emails over the
13 weekend, and the message that I sent to Mr. Lynn was very
14 clear. There had been a term sheet that Mr. Seery had sent
15 back to Mr. Dondero. I had asked Mr. Lynn to take a pencil
16 out and be very specific as to what it was Mr. Dondero was
17 prepared to do in connection with the pot plan. I instructed
18 him that some of the issues that the Committee still has is
19 obviously the overall value, along with the concept that's
20 signing up to a promise from Mr. Dondero to comply with
21 (indiscernible) as part of that value. As Your Honor may
22 understand, the Committee is obviously very skeptical of Mr.
23 Dondero's future performance under an agreement that he enters
24 into.

25 Those are but a couple of issues, Your Honor, that I

1 advised Mr. Lynn were very concerning to the Committee. And I
2 suggested to him that if he wanted to move things forward, the
3 best way to do it would be to come to us with a fulsome term
4 sheet that explained exactly what it was in clear and precise
5 detail that Mr. Dondero was proposing, and that would be the
6 best way to move the process forward, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lynn, anything to add to
8 that?

9 MR. LYNN: Well, Your Honor, my experience in
10 negotiations is that it is useful to agree on substantive
11 terms, or at least be in the ballpark, before term sheets are
12 exchanged. Long ago, a term sheet was prepared and presented
13 to the Committee. Ultimately, I think it was rejected, though
14 I don't know if we ever received a formal rejection.

15 I explained in my emails, which I'm happy to share with
16 the Court if Your Honor wants to see them, why I was reluctant
17 to try to put into a term sheet form the proposal that I
18 suggested to Mr. Clemente. As I said, I'm more than happy to
19 provide you with that email chain and let you form your own
20 judgment, Your Honor, as to whether we're proceeding in good
21 faith.

22 THE COURT: All right. Well I'm not going to ask --

23 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor? Your Honor, this is Jeff
24 Pomerantz.

25 THE COURT: -- to see any of that. Mr. Pomerantz?

1 MR. POMERANTZ: May I just be heard real quickly?

2 THE COURT: Sure.

3 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, we also took Your Honor's
4 comments to heart. We, Mr. Seery and I, had an over-an-hour
5 conversation with Mr. Lynn and with Mr. Bonds. We provided
6 them with our thoughts as to what they needed to do in order
7 to move forward. Of course, it's not really the Debtor to
8 agree. It's the creditors to agree. But as Mr. Seery has
9 testified many times before and as I have told the Court, we
10 would support a plan that the Committee and Mr. Dondero could
11 get behind.

12 So we again -- I'm not going to divulge the nature of
13 those communications, but we suggested several things that Mr.
14 Dondero could do in order to move the ball forward, and
15 unfortunately, we have not seen any of those things done thus
16 far. So we are, at this point, not optimistic that there will
17 be a grand bargain plan.

18 THE COURT: All right.

19 MR. DONDERO: Your Honor, could I comment for a
20 second? This is Mr. Dondero.

21 THE COURT: If you and your counsel want you to
22 comment, you can comment.

23 MR. DONDERO: I'd love to do a pot plan. I would
24 love to reach some kind of settlement and everybody move on
25 with their lives. The estate started with \$360 million of

1 | third-party assets and \$90 million of notes. The \$360 million
2 | of third-party assets are down to \$130 million.

3 MR. POMERANTZ: Again, Your Honor, I must interrupt.
4 I did this at the last hearing, and it's not my practice to
5 interrupt, but issues regarding what the value is or not, it's
6 going to require a response, and that's not really before Your
7 Honor. I think before Your Honor is --

8 MR. DONDERO: Okay.

9 MR. POMERANTZ: -- have there been negotiations?

10 Have they been in good faith? If Mr. Dondero wanted to

11 address that, that's fine, but I object to having any

12 discussion at this point, especially with Mr. Dondero not even

13 under oath, on what the nature of the value of the assets and

14 why they have changed and what not.

15 THE COURT: Well, --

16 MR. POMERANTZ: It's just not appropriate.

17 THE COURT: I understand --

18 MR. DONDERO: Okay. Can I --

19 THE COURT: Stop.

20 MR. DONDERO: Can I -- can I finish?

21 THE COURT: Let me please respond to that. I
22 understand your concern, but I've heard from Mr. Seery
23 testimony many months ago about the value plummeting during
24 the case. And I asked why, and I got some explanations. This
25 is not evidence. This is just, you know, this is not going to

1 | be binding in any way. Mr. Dondero can speak as to what he
2 | thinks, you know, the situation is.

3 || Go ahead, Mr. Dondero.

4 MR. DONDERO: Okay. I'm not trying to fixate on the
5 numbers. And as far as the third-party assets are, we would
6 be willing to pay -- I would be willing to pay for those. I'd
7 be willing to pay more, and even some value for the affiliate
8 notes that were really part of compensation agreements
9 throughout the history of Highland and avoid the POC
10 arguments. I'd be willing to pay for the assets and I'd be
11 willing to pay even more than that.

12 I have no transparency in terms of what the assets are,
13 and there's no fulsome discussion in terms of, well, here are
14 the assets, here are the notes, here's what we think the
15 values are, can you get to this number? It's just a -- you --
16 the -- it -- I don't view there is good-faith negotiations
17 going on because it's always just a: You need to put a big
18 number on a piece of paper; otherwise, you're going to get run
19 over.

20 And there's no back and forth going on, but it's not due
21 to a lack of willingness on my part. And maybe there needs to
22 be a committee set up. Maybe there needs to be, I don't know,
23 a mediator or an examiner or somebody to try and push through
24 the pot plan, but there's nothing happening. People are not
25 returning the judge's calls, I mean, Mr. Lynn's calls, or my

1 calls. They're -- there's -- despite efforts of our -- of my
2 own and a willingness of my own, there's no negotiations of
3 any sort going on at the moment.

4 THE COURT: All right. I don't want anyone to
5 respond to that. I know people have different views of what's
6 going on. But let me just say a couple of things, and then
7 we're done.

8 We do have a Committee in this case. We have a Committee
9 with very sophisticated members and very sophisticated
10 professionals. Okay? That's who I wanted you to be talking
11 to before the end of the day Tuesday.

12 We have had co-mediators in this case. Okay? And, you
13 know, I identified very sophisticated human beings for that
14 role. Okay? And in fact, there ended up being settlements
15 that flowed out of the co-mediator process.

16 We're now 15 months into the case. There are major,
17 significant compromises now: HarbourVest, UBS, Acis, Terry,
18 and Redeemer Committee. I hate to use a worn-out metaphor,
19 but the train is leaving the station. We've got confirmation.
20 I've pushed out two weeks. I mean, you all are either going
21 to get there in the next few days or we're just going to go
22 forward with I think what everyone, you know, would rather be
23 a pot plan, but if we can't get there, we're just going to
24 have to consider the plan that's on the table now. Okay?

25 You know, the Committee, again, they're sophisticated.

1 They can compare apples to oranges and decide whether the plan
2 on the table, with its risks of future litigation and
3 recoveries, whether it's better or worse than whatever
4 consideration you're offering, Mr. Dondero.

5 And you know, as we all know, there is distrust here,
6 there, and everywhere among these parties. So I can totally
7 understand them, you know, taking a hard line: We either get
8 all cash or we're just not going to mess with it. We don't
9 want to risk broken promises. We'd rather just do litigation.

10 So, anyway, that's as much as I'm going to say except I am
11 going to further direct good-faith negotiations. It sounds
12 like to me a written term sheet might be the appropriate next
13 step, given where I've heard things are at the moment. But,
14 you know, I guess we don't have any hearings between now and
15 the 26th, right? No Highland hearings that I can think of
16 between now and the 26th.

17 MR. POMERANTZ: I don't think so.

18 MR. MORRIS: I think that's correct, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: So you have all this time --

20 MR. MORRIS: At the moment.

21 THE COURT: You have all this time to negotiate and
22 simultaneously get ready for the confirmation hearing without
23 any other battles. So I know you will use the time well.

24 All right. We're adjourned.

25 THE CLERK: All rise.

— — ○ ○ — —

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Kathy Rehling

01/16/2021

/s/ Kathy Rehling

As Amended 05/26/2022

Kathy Rehling, CETD-444
Certified Electronic Court Transcriber

Date _____

003840

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United States District Court
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P. *and*
CLO HOLDCO, LTD.,

v.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, L.P., *et al.*

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-695-S

ORDER

The above-numbered case is hereby transferred to the docket of the Honorable Judge Jane J. Boyle for consolidation with *The Charitable DAF Fund LP, et al. v. Highland Capital Management LP*, Case No. 3:21-cv-3129-N. All future pleadings shall be filed under case number 3:21-cv-3129-B.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED June 9, 2022.


KAREN GREN SCHOLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

003843

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

Defendants.

Adv. Pro. No. 21-03067-sgj

003844

**DEFENDANT HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.'S
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT**

Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland”), a defendant in the above-captioned adversary proceeding, by and through its undersigned counsel, files this renewed motion (the “Motion”) seeking entry of an order dismissing the *Original Complaint* [Docket No. 1] (the “Complaint”) filed by Plaintiffs Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (the “DAF”) and CLO Holdco, Ltd. (“CLOH”) (together, “Plaintiffs”). In support of its Motion, Highland states as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.
2. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b).
3. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

RELIEF REQUESTED

4. Highland requests that this Court issue the proposed form of order attached as **Exhibit A** (the “Proposed Order”) pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable herein by Rule 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).

5. For the reasons set forth more fully in the *Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* (the “Memorandum of Law”) filed contemporaneously with this Motion, Highland requests that the Court: (a) dismiss the Complaint in its entirety and (b) grant Highland such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.

6. In accordance with Rule 7007-1(g) of the *Local Bankruptcy Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas*, contemporaneously herewith and in support of this Motion, Highland is filing: (a) its Memorandum of Law, and (b) the *Appendix in*

Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (the “Appendix”) together with the exhibits annexed thereto.

7. Based on the exhibits annexed to the Appendix, and the arguments contained in the Memorandum of Law, Highland is entitled to the relief requested herein as set forth in the Proposed Order.

8. Notice of this Motion has been provided to all parties. Highland submits that no other or further notice need be provided.

WHEREFORE, Highland respectfully requests that the Court (i) enter the Proposed Order substantially in the formed annexed hereto as **Exhibit A** granting the relief requested herein, and (ii) grant Highland such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

Dated: October 14, 2022

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EXHIBIT A

003848

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

| | | |
|---|---|----------------------------|
| In re: |) | |
| |) | Chapter 11 |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., ¹ |) | |
| |) | Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 |
| Reorganized Debtor. |) | |
| In re: CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P., AND |) | |
| CLO HOLDCO LTD., |) | Adv. Pro. No. 21-03067-sgj |
| Plaintiffs, |) | |
| vs. |) | |
| |) | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., |) | |
| HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD., AND |) | |
| HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD. |) | |
| Defendants. |) | |

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.’S
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT**

¹ The Reorganized Debtor’s last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (8357). The headquarters and service address for the Reorganized Debtor is 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, TX 75201.

Before the Court is *Defendant Highland Capital Management L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* [Docket No. __] (the “Motion”). Having considered: (a) the Motion; (b) the *Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* [Docket No. __] (the “Memorandum of Law”);² and (c) the *Appendix in Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* [Docket No. __] (the “Appendix”) and the exhibits annexed thereto; and this Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157; and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409; and this Court having found that (a) Counts 2 and 5 are barred by judicial estoppel, and (b) the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because the Complaint fails to allege any Claim for relief that is plausible for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable in this adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; and this Court having found that the Highland’s notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor and for the reasons set forth in the record on this Motion, it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT:**

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.
2. The Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

###End of Order###

² Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Memorandum of Law.

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**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

| | | |
|---|---|----------------------------|
| In re: |) | Chapter 11 |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., ¹ |) | Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 |
| Reorganized Debtor. |) | |
| In re: CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P., AND CLO HOLDCO LTD., |) | Adv. Pro. No. 21-03067-sgj |
| Plaintiffs, |) | |
| vs. |) | |
| HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD., AND HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD. |) | |
| Defendants. |) | |

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT HIGHLAND
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.’S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT**

¹ The Reorganized Debtor’s last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (8357). The headquarters and service address for the Reorganized Debtor is 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, TX 75201.

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Highland Capital Management, L.P., a defendant in the above-captioned case (the “Debtor” or “Highland,” as applicable), submits this memorandum of law in support of Highland’s *Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* (the “Motion”).²

I. INTRODUCTION³

1. This matter comes back to the Court on remand from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (the “District Court”). On September 2, 2022, the District Court entered its memorandum opinion and order (the “Decision”)⁴ on Plaintiffs’ appeal of this Court’s order (the “MTD Order”)⁵ granting Highland’s motion to dismiss this action (the “Original MTD”).⁶ In short, the District Court (i) reversed this Court’s finding that collateral estoppel barred Plaintiffs’ claims and (ii) remanded the judicial estoppel finding for a determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ withdrawal of its objection to the Settlement on a claimed Right of First Refusal was “inadvertent.” *Decision* at 17.

2. There can be no credible dispute that Plaintiff CLOH’s withdrawal of its objection to the Settlement was “advertent” and, therefore, that judicial estoppel bars Counts 2 and 5 of the Complaint. In addition, all Counts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint⁷ should be dismissed on the substantive grounds Highland advanced in the Original MTD and renews and restates herein.

3. In January 2021, the Debtor moved for an order approving its Settlement with HarbourVest pursuant to which, *inter alia*, HarbourVest settled its claims against the Debtor and

² Concurrently herewith, Highland is filing the *Appendix in Support of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Complaint* (the “Appendix”). Citations to the Appendix are notated as follows: Ex. #, Appx. #.

³ Capitalized terms not defined in this Preliminary Statement shall have the meanings ascribed to them below.

⁴ *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, No. 3:21-cv-03129-B (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2022) (slip op.), District Court Docket No. 28 (also available at 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159461), **Ex. 12, Appx. 437-458**.

⁵ District Court Docket No. 100 (slip op.) (also available at 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 659).

⁶ Docket No. 26. Unless otherwise indicated, “Docket No.” refers to the docket maintained in this Adversary Proceeding.

⁷ Docket No. 1-1.

transferred its interest in HCLOF, to a subsidiary of the Debtor (the “Prior Proceeding”). **Ex. 2, Appx. 62-75.** CLOH objected to the Settlement, presumably at the direction of its parent, the “Charitable” DAF Fund, L.P. (the “DAF”) ⁸ (**Ex. 6, Appx. 123-133**) on the grounds that: (i) it had a “Right of First Refusal” to acquire HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF and (ii) HarbourVest could not transfer its interest without complying with that purported right. *Id.* Two other objections were lodged, one by Mr. Dondero and the other by his Trusts.⁹ **Exs. 4-5, Appx. 96-122.** Each objecting party had the right to, and took advantage of, discovery, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the proposed Settlement and heard argument in support of parties’ objections and defenses. During the hearing, CLOH voluntarily withdrew its objection premised on the “Right of First Refusal,” after which the Court overruled the remaining objections and approved the Settlement.¹⁰

4. Three months later, Plaintiffs—with a new trustee and new counsel—filed their Complaint asserting that the Debtor violated the “Right of First Refusal,” breached the Members Agreement, and otherwise violated its alleged duties to Plaintiffs. But, as discussed below, Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from arguing the “Right of First Refusal” was violated. CLOH asserted this very argument during the Prior Proceeding, and knowingly, voluntarily, and advertently withdraw it after due deliberation of the underlying facts, relevant documents, and

⁸ The Court observed at the time that DAF, the parent of CLOH, “was seeded with contributions from Highland, is managed/advised by Highland, and [its] independent trustee is a long-time friend of Highland’s chief executive officer[, Mr. Dondero.” *In re Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 292, at *19 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2019) (emphasis in original). Mark Patrick—Mr. Dondero’s employee and senior tax counsel of more than a decade—subsequently was appointed trustee of the DAF but this Court has found, and the District Court affirmed, that James Dondero (“Mr. Dondero”) exerted significant control over both Mr. Patrick and the DAF. *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175778, at *17-23 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2022); see also *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 2780, at *5 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2022).

⁹ “Trusts” means The Dugaboy Investment Trust and The Get Good Trust, Mr. Dondero’s family “trusts:”

¹⁰ The Trusts appealed the Settlement, claiming (ironically and cynically) that the Debtor overpaid. On September 26, 2022, the District Court denied the appeal for lack of standing and affirmed this Court’s order approving the Settlement. See 3:21-cv-00261-L, Docket No. 38.

applicable law. Judicial estoppel thus bars Counts 2 and 5 of the Complaint. Plaintiffs also fail to state any claims on which relief can be granted, and the Complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), applicable here via Bankruptcy Rule 7012.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Highland Settles with HarbourVest

5. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (“HCLOF”) is a Guernsey-based investment vehicle managed by its Guernsey-based board of directors. Highland HCF Advisors, Ltd. (“HCFA”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Highland, is its portfolio manager.¹¹ Prior to the commencement of the Bankruptcy Case, HarbourVest¹² invested approximately \$80 million in HCLOF. Following its investment, CLO Holdco, Ltd. (“CLOH”) held 49.02% of HCLOF’s interests, HarbourVest held 49.98%, and the remaining 1% was held by the Debtor and certain Debtor employees. After the Debtor filed bankruptcy, HarbourVest filed claims against the Debtor in excess of \$300 million, alleging that it was fraudulently induced into its investment by factual misrepresentations and omissions made by Mr. Dondero and certain of his employees prior to the bankruptcy. (HarbourVest proofs of claim). **Ex. 1, Appx. 1-61**

6. On December 23, 2020, the Debtor filed its motion [**Docket No. 1625**] (the “Settlement Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of its settlement with HarbourVest (the “Settlement”). **Ex. 2, Appx. 62-75**. Pursuant to the Settlement, HarbourVest was to transfer its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor’s nominee (the “Transfer”) in exchange for allowed claims against the estate and certain other consideration. **Ex. 2 ¶ 32, Appx. 71-72; Ex. 3, Appx. 76-95**.

¹¹ HCLOF is past its investment period, and HCFA’s role is limited to advising on the liquidation of HCLOF’s portfolio and the recovery of cash for distributions to HCLOF’s members.

¹² “HarbourVest” means, collectively, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P.

The Transfer was a necessary component of the Settlement—HarbourVest was essentially seeking rescission of its investment in HCLOF—and the Settlement Motion disclosed all aspects of the Settlement and Transfer, including (i) what HarbourVest was transferring; (ii) the valuation (and method of valuation) of the interests being transferred; (iii) the method of transfer; and (iv) the claims against Highland that HarbourVest would receive. **Ex. 2 ¶ 32 & n.5, Appx. 71-72; Ex. 3, ¶ 1(b), Appx. 78.**

B. CLOH, Dondero and Dondero-Controlled Trusts Object to the Settlement Motion

7. On January 6, 2021, Mr. Dondero filed his objection to the Settlement [**Docket No. 1697**] (“Dondero’s Objection”). **Ex. 4, Appx. 96-111.** On January 8, 2021, the Trusts filed their objection [**Docket No. 1706**] (the “Trusts’ Objection”). **Ex. 5, Appx. 112-122.**

8. CLOH also objected to the Settlement on January 8, 2021 [**Docket No. 1707**] (“CLOH’s Objection”). **Ex. 6, Appx. 123-133.** CLOH challenged HarbourVest’s right to effectuate the Transfer contending that: (i) CLOH and the other members of HCLOF had a “Right of First Refusal” under the Members Agreement, *id.* ¶ 3, **Appx. 125**, and (ii) “HarbourVest has no authority to transfer its interest in HCLOF without first complying with the Right of First Refusal.” *Id.* ¶ 6, **Appx. 126.** CLOH offered a lengthy, but faulty, analysis of the Members Agreement, including CLOH’s purported “Right of First Refusal” under Article 6 thereof. *See id.* ¶¶ 9-22, **Appx. 127-132.**

9. After filing their objections, CLOH and Mr. Dondero exercised their right to conduct discovery under Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c) and deposed Michael Pugatch, a representative of HarbourVest [**Docket No. 1705**]. **Ex. 7, Appx. 134-188.** CLOH never contended that: (i) the Debtor had a fiduciary duty to offer the HCLOF interests to CLOH (and it did not) or (ii) the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”) was implicated by the Settlement (and it is not).

10. On January 13, 2021, the Debtor filed its reply [**Docket No. 1731**] (the “Omnibus Reply”) (**Ex. 8, Appx. 189-211**), in which it established that the Members Agreement did not impede the Settlement and rebutted CLOH’s argument that the Transfer could not be completed without complying with the “Right of First Refusal” under Article 6, *id.* ¶¶ **26-39, Appx. 203-209**.

11. Subsequently, at the January 14, 2021, hearing, CLOH *voluntarily withdrew* its objection after considering the Debtor’s analysis of the Members Agreement and applicable law. CLOH’s counsel unequivocally stated on the record:

CLO Holdco has had an opportunity to review the reply briefing, and after doing so has gone back and scrubbed the HCLOF corporate documents. ***Based on our analysis of Guernsey law and some of the arguments of counsel on those pleadings and our review of the appropriate documents***, I obtained authority from my client, Grant Scott, as trustee for CLO Holdco, ***to withdraw the CLO Holdco objection based on the interpretation of the Members Agreement***.

Ex. 9 at 7:20-8:6, Appx. 219-220 (emphasis added).

12. The Debtor called two witnesses in support of the Settlement Motion—its court-appointed Chief Executive Officer, James P. Seery, Jr., and Mr. Pugatch. Counsel for Mr. Dondero and the Trusts cross-examined the Debtor’s witnesses but did not inquire about the value of the HCLOF interests, the Debtor’s purported fiduciary obligations, or the Transfer. **Ex. 9 at 87:18-89:21, Appx. 299-301**. At the conclusion of the hearing, in reliance on CLOH’s withdrawal of its Objection, and the evidence admitted at the hearing, the Court entered an order overruling the remaining objections and approving the Settlement [**Docket No. 1788**] (the “Settlement Order”). **Ex. 10, Appx. 386-409**. The Settlement Order *expressly* authorized the transfer of HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF to a Debtor subsidiary providing, in relevant part, that “[p]ursuant to the express terms of the [Members Agreement] ... HarbourVest is authorized to transfer its interest in HCLOF to a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary of the Debtor ... ***without the need to obtain the consent of any party or to offer such interests first to any other investor in HCLOF.***” *Id.* ¶ 6,

Appx. 390 (emphasis added).¹³ This Court included this language because of concerns that Mr. Dondero would “go to a different court somehow to challenge the transfer.” **Ex. 9 at 156:17-22, Appx. 368.**¹⁴

C. Plaintiffs File this Adversary Case

13. With a new trustee and new counsel, on April 12, 2021, Plaintiffs effectively resurrected the CLOH Objection by filing their Complaint in the District Court, in which they, *inter alia*, challenged the Transfer premised on the “Right of First Refusal.” **Ex. 11, Appx. 410-436.** The District Court subsequently referred the case to this Court. [**Docket No. 1-1**]. The Complaint raises claims for: (i) breach of fiduciary duty (Count 1); (ii) breach of the Members Agreement (Count 2); (iii) RICO violations (Count 3); (iv) negligence (Count 4); (v) tortious interference (Count 5) (each, a “Count” and collectively, the “Counts”). In Count 1 (breach of fiduciary duty), Plaintiffs allege that the Debtor violated its “broad” duties to Plaintiffs under the IAA and the Debtor’s “internal policies and procedures” by: (i) engaging in “insider trading with HarbourVest”; (ii) “concealing” the value of the HarbourVest interest; and (iii) “diverting” the investment opportunity in the HarbourVest entities to the Debtor without offering it to Plaintiffs. *Id.* ¶¶ 67-74.¹⁵ In Count 3 (RICO), Plaintiffs allege that the Debtor and two affiliated entities were an “association-in-fact” engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity for this same underlying conduct; namely, failing to disclose the valuation of HCLOF’s interest and ultimately effectuating the HarbourVest Settlement. *Id.* ¶¶ 113-133.

¹³ See also **Ex. 9 at 156:10-25; 157:5.**

¹⁴ *Id.* at **156:10-25; 157:1-5, Appx. 368-369** (emphasis added).

¹⁵ Ironically (and cynically), Plaintiffs’ baseless insider trading allegations are premised on Mr. Dondero’s unsolicited disclosure of alleged material non-public information regarding MGM Holdings. Mr. Dondero’s disclosure to Mr. Seery violated the injunction issued by this Court and presumably violated Mr. Dondero’s duties and obligations as a director of MGM Holdings.

14. Plaintiffs' state-law Counts rest on the same underlying allegations. In support of Count 2 for breach of the Members Agreement, Plaintiffs again allege that the Debtor breached the "Right of First Refusal." **Complaint ¶¶ 92-102.** In Count 4 (negligence), Plaintiffs assert that the Debtor's actions violated the Members Agreement and the Debtor's internal policies by failing to accurately calculate the HCLOF interests and failing to give Plaintiffs the Right of First Refusal to purchase the interests. *Id.* ¶¶ 103-112. Count 5 (tortious interference) is again premised on the Debtor's alleged interference with Plaintiffs' "Right of First Refusal" under the Members Agreement. *Id.* ¶¶ 134-141.

D. Highland's Motion to Dismiss and the Decision

15. On May 27, 2021, Highland filed the Original MTD, which this Court granted on the grounds of collateral and judicial estoppel.¹⁶ MTD Order at 22, 26. Plaintiffs appealed the MTD Order to the District Court and that appeal was consolidated with Plaintiffs' appeal of this Court's order denying their motion for a stay. *See* 3:21-cv-03129-B, **Docket No. 20.**¹⁷ On September 2, 2022, the District Court issued the Decision in which it reversed and remanded the MTD Order.¹⁸ The District Court reversed this Court's finding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by collateral estoppel. On judicial estoppel, the District Court affirmed this Court's findings that the first two elements of judicial estoppel were satisfied (Decision at 14-17) but remanded solely for a determination on whether Plaintiffs' inconsistent position was "inadvertent." *Id.* at 17-18.

III. ARGUMENT

16. Counts 2 and 5 are barred by judicial estoppel, and Plaintiff fails to state claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) as to all Counts of the Complaint.

¹⁶ Because this Court granted the Original MTD on these bases, it "refrain[ed] from addressing" Highland's motion to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. MTD Order at 26.

¹⁷ Defendant HCLOF was voluntarily dismissed from this case on December 7, 2021. **Docket No. 80.**

¹⁸ Plaintiffs did not appeal the Decision.

A. Legal Standard

17. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557). “When well-pleaded facts fail to meet th[e] [Twombly] standard, ‘the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Decision at 5 (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679). Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) when, taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, it appears that the plaintiff “cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to the relief it seeks.” *C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortg. Co.*, 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.¹⁹

B. Counts 2 And 5 are Barred by Judicial Estoppel

18. Counts 2 and 5, for breach of the Members Agreement and tortious interference with the Members Agreement, are barred by judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is “a common law doctrine by which a party who has assumed one position in [its] pleadings may be estopped from

¹⁹ See *T.L. Dallas (Special Risks), Ltd. v. Elton Porter Marine Ins.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112613, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2008); *Cade v. Henderson*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13685, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2001), *aff’d sub nom Cade v. USPS*, 45 Fed. App’x 323 (5th Cir. 2002).

assuming an inconsistent position.” *Brandon v. Interfirst Corp.*, 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988); Decision at 14. The purpose of the doctrine is “to protect the integrity of the judicial process” by “prevent[ing] parties from playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self-interest.” *Brandon*, 858 F.2d 266, 268 (internal quotations omitted); *United States v. McCaskey*, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993); Decision at 14.

19. As set out in the Decision: “A court examines three criteria when determining the applicability of judicial estoppel: ‘(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.’” Decision at 14 (quoting *Reed v. City of Arlington*, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (*en banc*)).²⁰ As discussed *supra*, the District Court affirmed this Court’s determination on the first two criteria but remanded for a determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ change of position was “inadvertent.” *Id.* at 18. Thus, the only issue before this Court on a judicial estoppel determination is the element of “inadvertence”—an issue not raised by Plaintiffs in their prior briefing to this Court.

20. A failure to disclose is considered “‘inadvertent’ only when, in general, the *debtor* either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims *or* has no motive for their concealment.” *Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P & I Underwriters (In re Superior Crewboats, Inc.)*, 374 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2004); *see also Jethroe v. Omnova Sols., Inc.*, 412 F.3d 598, 600-01 (5th Cir. 2005) (“To establish that [debtor’s] failure to disclose was inadvertent, [debtor] may prove either

²⁰ In the Fifth Circuit, the element of “inadvertence” is generally applied in a bankruptcy context where a debtor, post-discharge, seeks to assert a claim that had or could have been addressed within the bankruptcy. Thus, it is unclear whether the element of “inadvertence” applies in this case, which relates to a *non-debtor plaintiff’s* change of position in an adversary proceeding. *See Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.) Inc.*, 753 F.3d 550, 553 n.3 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the third factor of “inadvertence” applies in a non-bankruptcy case, noting, “we apply [inadvertence] only when the judicial estoppel is based on the non-disclosure of a claim in a prior bankruptcy proceeding.”); *Hall v. GE Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd.*, 327 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying two-factor test to judicial estoppel determination in non-bankruptcy case, namely, (a) whether position was inconsistent, and (b) whether court relied on such position). Regardless, there can be no viable dispute that Plaintiffs’ conduct was “adventent.”

that she did not know of the inconsistent position or that she had no motive to conceal it from the court ... at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition.”)

21. Plaintiffs’ inconsistent position with regard to their Claims premised on the “Right of First Refusal” was not “inadvertent.” Plaintiffs knew of and analyzed the factual and legal issues concerning Counts 2 and 5 when they unequivocally withdrew their Objection to the Transfer in the Prior Proceeding; indeed, CLOH’s thorough, multi-page objection to the Transfer was premised on an alleged violation of the “Right of First Refusal.” *See Ex. 6 ¶¶ 3, 6, Appx. 125-126.*

22. After “review[ing] the reply briefing,” “scrubb[ing] the HCLOF corporate documents,” analyzing Guernsey law, and reviewing the “appropriate documents,” CLOH, on the record, withdrew its Objection to the Transfer premised on the “Right of First Refusal” “based on the interpretation of the Members Agreement.” *See Ex. 9 at 7:20-8:6, Appx. 219-220.* Thus, Plaintiffs²¹ knew of the underlying facts and legal issues underlying Counts 2 and 5 when CLOH withdrew its Objection in the Prior Proceeding. Based on the record, CLOH’s inconsistent positions regarding the “Right of First Refusal” under the Members Agreement are deliberate, directed, and advertent. They cannot possibly be deemed “inadvertent.” *See Superior Crewboats, Inc.*, 374 F.3d at 335-36 (debtors’ non-disclosure of a viable personal injury claim in schedules filed in their no asset bankruptcy case was not “inadvertent” where debtors “were aware of the facts underlying the claim” for months, noting, “[a]lleged confusion as to a limitations period does not evince a lack of knowledge as to the existence of the claim.”); *Jethroe*, 412 F.3d at 601 (failure to disclose claim was not “inadvertent” where party was aware of “the facts giving rise to them”

²¹ It is indisputable that the DAF is in privity with CLOH and therefore cannot be heard to argue that only CLOH should be bound by judicial estoppel for filing and then withdrawing its objection. *Charitable DAF Fund L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175778, at *12-13 (“DAF is in privity with CLO Holdco because it controls and owns 100% of CLO Holdco ... [DAF] had a fair chance to challenge the gatekeeping orders or [is] in privity with an entity that did.”)

at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition); *U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDM Idea City, L.L.C.*, 798 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2015) (failure to disclose claims was not “inadvertent” where party “was aware of the facts underlying his claims as early as 2010 and [] filed this lawsuit in 2011,” noting that, inadvertence through lack of knowledge cannot be shown “as long as the debtor has enough information to suggest that he may have a potential claim; the debtor need not know all of the underlying facts or even the legal basis of the claim.”).

23. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ inconsistent legal positions with regard to the Transfer violating the “Right of First Refusal” in the Members Agreement were in no way, shape, or form the result of “inadvertence.”²²

24. Any claim of inadvertence is also belied by Plaintiffs’ self-evident financial interest in the way that they have chosen to proceed here. In the (unlikely) event they succeed on their claims for breach of contract or tortious interference, Plaintiffs would have “reaped a windfall” in withdrawing their Right of First Refusal objection. *See Superior Crewboats*, 337 F.3d at 336. Had Plaintiffs acquired the Interests, they would have had to pay tens of millions of dollars to HarbourVest.²³ Those Interests would have been speculative, illiquid, hard to value (by their own admission), and subject to portfolio performance risk. By contrast, in the Complaint, Plaintiffs now seek monetary recovery or specific performance. *See Complaint* ¶ 143 (ad damnum). But

²² Plaintiffs’ allegation in support of Count 2 that “Plaintiff was not informed of the fact that HarbourVest had offered its shares to Defendant HCM for \$22.5 million ...” (*Complaint* ¶ 98) is irrelevant, inaccurate, and contradicted by the record. The allegation is irrelevant because the “Right of First Refusal” is not dependent on the value of the shares. The allegation is inaccurate because HarbourVest did not “offer” its interest in HCLOF to Highland. Rather, pursuant to the Settlement, HarbourVest *transferred* its interest in HCLOF to Highland’s nominee in exchange for allowed claims against the estate and other consideration given to resolve HarbourVest’s claim for, among other things, rescission of its investment in HCLOF. *Ex. 2* ¶ 32, *Appx. 71-72*; *Ex. 3, Appx. 76-95*. Finally, the allegation is contradicted by the record because the Settlement Motion expressly stated that the net asset value of the interest was “estimated to be approximately \$22 million as of December 1, 2020.” *Ex. 2* ¶ 32 & n.5, *Appx. 71-72*; *Ex. 3, ¶ 1(b), Appx. 78*.

²³ HarbourVest received a total of \$80 million in allowed claims in the Settlement. Presumably, Plaintiffs would have had to have paid that much for the Interests.

HCLOF's investments have been (with limited exception) reduced to cash or equivalents. Accordingly, the only current risk with respect to the Interests is litigation risk—a risk generally created by Plaintiffs.²⁴ Their financial interest in bringing the claim in this posture—they allowed the Debtor to assume the speculative risk yet now seek to seize the non-speculative reward—on its own vitiates any claim of inadvertence. *See Superior Crewboats*, 337 F.3d at 336 (debtors “had the requisite motivation to conceal the claim as they would certainly reap a windfall had they been able to recover on the undisclosed claim”). For this additional reason, Counts 2 and 5 are barred by judicial estoppel.

25. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' inconsistent position is not the result of “inadvertence,” and Counts 2 and 5 should, therefore, be dismissed on grounds of judicial estoppel.

C. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim under RICO in Count 4

26. To state a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege: “1) the conduct; 2) of an enterprise; 3) through a pattern; 4) of racketeering activity.” *Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp.*, 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987). To defeat a motion to dismiss, “a RICO plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish each of the essential elements of his or her RICO claim.” *Robinson v. Standard Mortg. Corp.*, 191 F. Supp. 3d 630, 638 (E.D. La. 2016). The RICO claim must be plead “with sufficient particularity” under Rule 9(b). *Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc.*, 975 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992); *see also MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229755, at *23 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2020). “Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what [they] obtained thereby.” *Tel-Phonic Servs.*, 975 F.2d at 1134 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]o establish a RICO claim based on a pattern of mail or wire

²⁴ *See, e.g.*, Bankr. Docket Nos. 3507, 3550.

fraud, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant act[ed] knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to [themselves].” *Ranieri v. AdvoCare Int’l, L.P.*, 336 F. Supp. 3d 701, 715 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

1. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Pattern of Racketeering Activity

27. “‘A pattern of racketeering activity consists of two or more predicate criminal acts that are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’” *D&T Partners v. Baymark Partners LP*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83140, at *15 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2022) (quoting *St. Germain v. Howard*, 556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs allege three predicate offenses: (i) wire fraud, (ii) mail fraud, and (iii) violation of the IAA’s antifraud provisions. **See Complaint ¶¶ 130-132.** Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead any predicate act.

28. First, alleged violations of securities laws cannot be predicate acts for a RICO claim. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); *Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P.*, 625 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2010). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ RICO claims, however pitched, allege “conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)), the claims are barred by statute. “Courts have interpreted the scope of § 1964(c)’s so-called ‘securities fraud exception’ broadly to apply even where a plaintiff does not expressly plead securities fraud as the predicate act, where a plaintiff could not have even brought a securities fraud claim against the particular defendant, and where a plaintiff pleads securities fraud violations but fails to state a claim for relief.” *Woods v. Michael*, No. 20-80651-CV, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26563, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2021). Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is wholly predicated on violations of the securities laws: “Defendants’ conduct violated the wire fraud and mail fraud laws, and the [IAA’s] antifraud provisions.” **Complaint ¶ 132.** Because the RICO claim is improperly founded on alleged securities fraud, it must be dismissed.

29. Second, the Complaint fails to state a claim for mail or wire fraud. To state a claim for mail fraud, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) which involves the use of the mails, (3) for the purpose of executing the scheme.” *United States v. Gray*, 96 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 1996). The elements of wire fraud are the same but apply to “wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.” *Id.* “[B]oth RICO mail and wire fraud require evidence of intent to defraud, i.e., evidence of a scheme to defraud by false or fraudulent representations.” *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson*, 224 F.3d 425, 441 (5th Cir. 2000); *Robinson*, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 639–40 (“[A] scheme to defraud must involve fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions”). Accordingly, the specificity requirements and heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) apply. *See MWK Recruiting*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229755, at *23-24 (claim failed to allege time or location of fraudulent occurrences). The Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 9(b).

30. The thrust of Plaintiffs’ claim is that the Debtor operated in such a way as to “violate insider trading rules and regulations when it traded with HarbourVest” by concealing “non-public information that it had not supplied” to Plaintiffs. **Complaint ¶ 118.** Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is nothing more than a series of conclusory allegations predicated on allegations of mail, wire, and securities fraud. *See id.* ¶¶ 113-133. The Complaint only vaguely alleges, for instance, that Mr. Seery (i) “utilized the interstate wires and/or mails to obtain or arrive at valuations of the HCLOF interests,” *id.* ¶ 120; (ii) “transmitted or caused to be transmitted through the interstate wires information to HCLOF investors from HCM,” *id.* ¶ 121 and (iii) “operated [the Debtor] in such a way that he concealed the true value of the HCLOF interests by utilizing the interstate wires and mails to transmit communications to the court in the form of written representations...” *id.* ¶ 122. Plaintiffs do not plead with particularity details about the contents of those alleged communications, when the Debtor had them, to whom, or where such communications were

directed. *See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Young*, 91 Civ. 2923 (CSH), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2929, at *22-27 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1994); *Tel-Phonic Servs.*, 975 F.2d at 1138. Plaintiffs only generally allege that Mr. Seery testified about the valuation of the HCLOF interests (Complaint ¶ 125) but provide no details about mail or wire fraud.

31. The Complaint therefore “does not identify specific acts of communication by mail or by interstate wires” undertaken by the Debtor “in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme” as required by Rule 9(b). *See Merrill Lynch*, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2929, at *31-32; *Tel-Phonic Servs.*, 975 F.2d at 1134 (Rule 9(b) requires pleading particulars of time, place, content and maker of the misrepresentation). Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under RICO. *See Robinson*, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 640 (dismissing RICO claims where plaintiff provided no factual details); *see also MWK Recruiting*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229755 at *23-24.

32. Finally, Plaintiffs also fail to plead a “pattern of racketeering activity.” “To prove a pattern of racketeering activity, a plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of racketeering that are related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” *MWK Recruiting*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229755, at *25 (quoting *Tel-Phonic Servs.*, 975 F.2d at 1139-40 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2020)). To constitute a “pattern,” the activities must show “continuity.” *Tel-Phonic Servs.*, 975 F.2d at 1140. “Continuity” refers “either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” *Id.* at 1139-40. “Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement.” *Id.* (quoting *H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.*, 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1989)); *see also Calcasieu Marine Nat’l Bank v. Grant*, 943 F.2d 1453, 1464 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Short-term criminal conduct is not the concern of RICO.”)

33. Here, the Complaint does not allege “continuity.” There is no specific “threat of repetition” or distinct threat of long-term criminal conduct. Nor do the allegations suggest the Debtor is “operating as part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes.” *See Partain v. City of S. Padre Island*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220850, at *43 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2018) (quoting *H. J. Inc.*, 492 U.S. at 242-43). Plaintiffs’ RICO bald allegations concern only non-specific conduct allegedly occurring in a limited period, September 2020 to January 2021, concerning one transaction—the HarbourVest Settlement. *See, e.g., Complaint* ¶¶ 119-128. Such allegations concern short-term, discrete transactions, and do not show a “pattern of activity,” or threat of “continuing racketeering activity.” *See Calcasieu*, 943 F.2d at 1464.

2. Plaintiffs Fails to Allege a RICO Association-in-Fact Enterprise

34. A RICO “enterprise” can be either a legal entity or an “association in fact” enterprise. 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). “A RICO association in fact enterprise must be shown to have continuity.” *Calcasieu*, 943 F.2d at 1461. “The linchpin of enterprise status is the continuity or ongoing nature of the association.” *Bordelon v. Wells Fargo Fin. La., LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124877, at *8 (E.D. La. July 25, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The enterprise must have continuity of its structure and personnel, which links the defendants, and a common or shared purpose. . . . An association in fact enterprise (1) must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering, (2) must be an ongoing organization and (3) its members must function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure.

Calcasieu, 943 F.2d at 1461 (internal quotations omitted). That is, an “association in fact enterprise must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering.” *Id.*

35. Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants, together, constitute an “association-in fact” enterprise because “the purpose of the association-in-fact was the perpetuation of Seery’s position at HCM and using the HarbourVest settlement as a vehicle to enrich persons other than the HCLOF investors, including [Plaintiffs].” **Complaint** ¶ 115. However, these allegations fail to show that

Defendants functioned as a continuing unit, separate and apart from the alleged RICO violation, and fail to allege that Defendants are an “enterprise” within the purview of RICO. *See Montesano*, 818 F.2d at 427 (association-in-fact enterprise not pled under RICO where plaintiffs alleged only that defendants “conspired in this one instance”).

36. Plaintiffs also fail to identify the roles of the two affiliates of the Debtor, HCFA and HCLOF, and how they, with the Debtor, participated in the alleged criminal enterprise.²⁵ *See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Donovan*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92401, at *31-32 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2012) (complaint lacked factual allegations scheme formation, who was in charge, how each defendant participated, and whether there were communications or understanding among the defendants advancing the fraud).

3. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Causation

37. Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly allege causation. RICO provides civil remedies to “[a]ny person injured in [their] business or property *by reason of* a violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added). “An injured party must show that the violation was the but-for and proximate cause of the injury.” *Robinson*, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (internal quotations omitted). Causation requires “[a] direct relationship between the fraud and the injury.” *In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”*, 802 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 (E.D. La. 2011).

38. Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Debtor’s actions induced them to act or that any Debtor’s actions were the proximate cause of any cognizable injury. Plaintiffs generally allege that “had Plaintiff been offered those [HCLOF] interests, it would have happily purchased them and therefore would have infused over \$20 million in cash into the estate for the purpose of executing the HarbourVest Settlement.” **Complaint ¶ 50**. Such conclusory and speculative

²⁵ Highland and Mr. Seery are subject to this Court’s oversight. Mr. Seery was specifically appointed by this Court to oversee the Debtor. The Debtor and Mr. Seery were thus risibly unlikely participants in a RICO enterprise.

“would have” allegations are insufficient to show proximate and but-for causation.²⁶ *See Robinson*, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (allegations failed to state causation where plaintiff’s “after-the-fact” and “bare assertion that she would have acted differently” had she known of certain facts were insufficient “absent additional factual allegations to support or explain this assertion,”); *In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon*, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (no causation where economic harms suffered by plaintiffs were “too remote” and causation theory “depends on a series of speculative assumptions to link the alleged fraud” with the harm).

39. Plaintiffs’ RICO claim fails every element and should be dismissed.

D. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Count 1

40. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim is premised on the Debtor’s alleged: (i) insider trading; (ii) concealment of the value of the HarbourVest interests; and (iii) diversion of an investment opportunity from Plaintiffs to the Debtor, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the IAA. ***See Complaint ¶¶ 67-80.*** Where, as here, a plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is premised on theories of securities fraud, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleadings standards apply. *See Tighe Inv. Co. v. Chase Bank of Tex., N.A.*, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27582, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2004). “Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 makes unlawful the use of ‘any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in contravention of SEC rules.” *Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Am. Fid. Life Ins. Co.*, 606 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1979). “A cause of action lies under Rule 10b-5 ‘only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of the statute.” *Id.* (quoting *Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green*, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)). To state a securities-fraud claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,

²⁶ At no time prior to filing the Complaint did CLOH indicate it wanted to acquire the Interests or state that it was interested in, willing, or able to purchase the HarbourVest interests.

plaintiffs must plead: “(1) a misstatement or omission; (2) of a material fact; (3) made with scienter; (4) on which the plaintiffs relied; and (5) that proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries.” *Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc.*, 365 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2004). “A fact is material if there is ‘a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.’” *Id.* (quoting *Grigsby v. CMI Corp.*, 765 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[S]cienter is a crucial element of the securities fraud claims.” *Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp.*, 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).

41. Plaintiffs’ allegations underlying their breach of fiduciary duty claim are premised on largely the same conclusory allegations as those underlying their fraud-based RICO claim. *See Complaint ¶¶ 67-91*. Because Plaintiffs fail to properly plead securities fraud, any fiduciary claim premised on such allegations necessarily fails as well. *See Town North Bank, N.A. v. Shay Fin. Servs.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137551, at *74 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2014). Plaintiffs fail to plead with particularity that any alleged omissions by the Debtor assumed any real significance for the Plaintiffs. *See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 82-89* (speculating about Plaintiffs’ “lost opportunity cost,” and vaguely asserting that “Defendants’ malfeasance” has “exposed HCLOF to a massive liability from HarbourVest”). These allegations also fail to give rise to a “strong interference of scienter” sufficient to state a claim under Rule 10(b). *See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.*, 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2003); *Southland*, 365 F.3d at 368 (plaintiff must plead “more than allegations of motive and opportunity to withstand dismissal” for claim of securities fraud). Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding proximate cause are equally deficient. *See Complaint ¶¶ 88-89* (vaguely alleging that because of Defendants’ actions, “Plaintiffs have lost over \$25 million”).

42. Plaintiffs also fail to allege any breach of fiduciary claims premised on state law. Texas law²⁷ provides “[t]he elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant must have breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s breach must result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant.” *Matter of ATP Oil & Gas Corp.*, 711 F. App’x 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). “The plaintiff must plead some facts as to the nature of the relationship to state a plausible claim that that a fiduciary duty has been breached.” *Matter of Life Partners Holdings, Inc.*, 926 F.3d 103, 125 (5th Cir. 2019).

43. The Complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts regarding the nature of the relationship between Plaintiffs and the Debtor. *See* **Complaint ¶¶ 62-63** (generally alleging simply that (i) the Debtor “owed a fiduciary duty to [Plaintiffs]” pursuant to which the Debtor “agreed to provide sound investment advice, and (ii) this fiduciary relationship is “broad and applies to the entire advisors-client relationship”). The Complaint also fails to adequately allege that any state law or Guernsey fiduciary duty existed, let alone was breached for the same reasons. *Matter of Life Partners Holdings, Inc.*, 926 F.3d 103, 125 (5th Cir. 2019) (no allegation of “the nature of the fiduciary duty owed” to plaintiff). The allegations of the Debtor’s breach of its “internal policies and procedures” or the diversion of “corporate opportunities” are vague and conclusory. **Complaint ¶¶ 72-89**. *See In re Soporex, Inc.*, 463 B.R. 344, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011).

44. Plaintiffs allege the Debtor breached its “unwaivable” fiduciary obligation under the IAA by, among other things, “diverting a corporate opportunity.” **Complaint ¶¶ 82-84**. This

²⁷ Plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary duty under state law; however, HCLOF is a Guernsey entity and the Members Agreement is governed by Guernsey law. *See* Ex. 13 at 14. Under the internal affairs doctrine, Guernsey law controls on issues of fiduciary duties to the members. *See Pridgin v. Safety-Kleen Corp.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240210, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021).

Count is purportedly premised on the IAA because (i) the Debtor was the DAF's investment adviser under an advisory agreement and (ii) HCFA is HCLOF's investment adviser under a separate advisory agreement.²⁸ However, under clear Supreme Court precedent, the IAA does not provide a private right of action to sue for damages arising from breach of fiduciary duty.²⁹ *Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis*, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (holding there is no private right of action under Section 206 of the IAA); *see also Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 2780, at *13, n. 23 ("The court notes that the ... Supreme Court has held [in *Transamerica*] that there is not a private right of action for damages under the [IAA]."); *NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Tr.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142029, at *8 ("Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a claim ... under the IAA ... there is no private right of action to bring a claim pursuant to [Section 206 of the IAA].")³⁰

45. Even if there were a right of action under the IAA, Plaintiffs' allegations would still be deficient for failure to plead "duty" or "breach." The Debtor owed no duty to offer the Interests to Plaintiffs. The Transfer was effectuated in compliance with the Members Agreement and "Right of First Refusal." The DAF's advisory agreement included full and clear disclosure that the Debtor could compete with the DAF for investments with no obligation to offer those investments to the DAF.³¹ *SEC v. Cap. Gains Research Bureau, Inc.*, 375 U.S. 180, 181-82 (1963) (finding disclosure of an adviser's "practice of purchasing shares ... for his own account" satisfied the

²⁸ Plaintiffs cite to Section 47(b) of the IAA for the proposition that the Transfer is unenforceable. **Complaint ¶ 89.** There is no Section 47(b) in the IAA.

²⁹ A party can seek to void an investment management agreement under Section 215 of the IAA if the agreement's formation or performance would violate the IAA. *NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Tr. v. Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142029, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2022). Plaintiffs have not pled such claim nor could they.

³⁰ *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25107, at *26 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022).

³¹ *See, e.g., Ex. 14 at Appx. 504* ("The Fund will be subject to a number of actual and potential conflicts of interest ... including ... that ... Highland ... may actively engage in transactions in the same securities sought by the Fund and, therefore, may compete with the Fund for investment opportunities...").

adviser's fiduciary obligations under the IAA); *Dugaboy Inv. Trust v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172351, at *10-11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2022) (addressing argument that fiduciary obligations under the IAA cannot be waived and finding no breach of duty when conflict disclosed). Defendants also owed no duty to CLOH as an investor in HCLOF; there is no fiduciary relationship between an adviser to a fund and the fund's investors. *Goldstein v. SEC*, 451 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

46. There was also no corporate opportunity to divert. HarbourVest asserted a claim against the Debtor seeking, among other things, effectively the rescission of its investment in HCLOF, an investment allegedly induced by fraud. The Settlement effectuated that remedy. Because HarbourVest had no claims against Plaintiffs, there was no taking of a corporate opportunity. The Debtor was resolving a claim against the Debtor, not purchasing a security for cash, and could not transfer its liability to HarbourVest to Plaintiffs.

47. Accordingly, Count 1, for breach of fiduciary duty, should be dismissed.

E. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Breach of Members Agreement in Count 2

48. In addition to Count 2 being barred by judicial estoppel, Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to state a breach of the Members Agreement's Right of First Refusal. **Complaint ¶¶ 92-102.** Further, Plaintiffs' claim of breach is contradicted by the Members Agreement itself. Section 6.1 of the Members Agreement (**Ex. 13, § 6.1, Appx. 468-469**) grants members the unconditional right to transfer its interests to an "Affiliate of an initial Member." Section 6.2 (**Id., § 6.2, Appx. 469**) sets forth the Right of First Refusal and has two exceptions: (i) transfers to "affiliates of an initial Member" from Members *other than* CLOH and the "Highland Principals" and (ii) transfers from CLOH or a Highland Principal to (a) the Debtor, (b) the Debtor's "Affiliates," or (c) another Highland Principal. Under the Members Agreement, "Affiliate" is defined as, "with respect to a person, (i) any other person who, directly or indirectly, is in control

of, or controlled by, or is under common control with, such person ...” *Id.* § 1.1, Appx. 463. A “Member” is a “holder of shares in the Company.” *Id.*, § 1.1, Appx. 464. The “initial Member[s]” are the initial Members of HCLOF listed on the first page of the Members Agreement and include the Debtor, HarbourVest, and CLOH. *Id.*, § 6.2, Appx. 469. Since HarbourVest transferred its interests directly to the Debtor’s wholly-owned subsidiary—an Affiliate of an initial Member—the transfer was permitted, without restriction, under section 6.1 and satisfied the exception to the Right of First Refusal in section 6.2. *See* Ex. 13, Appx. 459-487; Ex. 8 ¶¶ 28-35, Appx. 203-208.

49. Plaintiffs also fail to plead actual damages resulting from the alleged breach of the Members Agreement, other than contending, that “had plaintiff been allowed to do so, it would have obtained the interests” in HCLOF. *E.g.*, **Complaint** ¶ 100. Such conclusory allegations ignore the fact that CLOH elected not to make an offer to purchase the HCLOF interests³² and, in any event, are insufficient to state a claim. *See Snowden v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 2019 WL 587304, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2019), *adopted by* 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2019) (actual damages inadequately pled); *Little v. KPMG LLP*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26281, at *15 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008) (lost profits claim “speculative and conjectural.”)

F. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Negligence in Count 3

50. The Complaint fails to state a claim for negligence. First, this Count is barred by the Plan.³³ Highland has been exculpated from all claims for “conduct occurring on or after [October 16, 2019] in connection with or arising out of (i) the ... administration of the Chapter 11 Case ... and (v) any negotiations, transactions, and documentation in connection with the foregoing” unless such conduct constituted “bad faith, gross negligence, criminal misconduct, or

³² *See* note 26 *supra*.

³³ “Plan” means the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)* [Bankr. Docket No. 1808].

willful misconduct.”³⁴ The negotiation and consummation of the Settlement were part of the “administration of the Chapter 11 Case,” and Highland, therefore, has been exculpated from Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence. *NexPoint Advisors, L.P.*, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25107, at *33. Second, even absent exculpation, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim. “The elements of a negligence claim under Texas law are: ‘(1) a legal duty on the part of the defendant; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from that breach.’” *Sivertsen v. Citibank, N.A. as Tr. for Registered Holders of WAMU Asset-Back Certificates WAMU Series No. 2007-HE2 Tr.*, 390 F. Supp. 3d 769, 789 (E.D. Tex. 2019). The negligence allegations (**Complaint ¶¶ 106-107**) are speculative, conclusory, and fail to allege proximate cause; the claim must be dismissed. *See Rodgers v. City of Lancaster Police*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14588, *37 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017). To the extent Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is premised on a breach of the Members Agreement, the advisory agreement with DAF, or the IAA, they are duplicative of Plaintiffs’ other Counts and fail for the reasons set forth above.

G. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Tortious Interference with Contract in Count 5

51. Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim is premised on the Debtor’s alleged violation of the Members Agreement and concealment of the value of HCLOF. **Complaint ¶¶ 134-141**. The elements of tortious interference with contract are: “(1) the existence of a contract subject to interference, (2) willful and intentional interference, (3) that proximately causes damage, and (4) actual damage or loss.” *Specialties of Mexico Inc. v. Masterfoods USA*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58782, at *15 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2010). Plaintiffs fail to allege how the Debtor intentionally interfered with the Members Agreement, and Plaintiffs have conceded—and are judicially estopped from arguing otherwise—that the transfer of the HCLOF interests did not violate the

³⁴ Plan, Art. I.B.62; Art. IX.C, *aff’d* 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25107, at *33.

Members Agreement. Plaintiffs also fail to allege proximate causation or any actual damages sustained as a result of the alleged interference. This claim should be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Highland respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion, enter an order in the form annexed to the Motion as **Exhibit A**, and grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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